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SKILL-BASED RELIABILISM 
Daniel C. Marshall 
Dr. Paul Weirich, Dissertation Supervisor 
ABSTRACT 
 Reliabilism, at its most general, is the claim that a belief has some positive 
epistemic status (typically justification or knowledge) only if it was formed by a reliable 
belief-forming process or mechanism. One important problem facing reliabilism is the 
Generality Problem. The Generality Problem arises because reliability is generally taken 
to be a property of a type of mechanism or process, and a given token process belongs to 
as many different types as it has properties. The Generality Problem consists of the task 
of specifying in a principled manner which of the multitude of types a given belief-
forming token-process belongs to is the one whose reliability is relevant to the epistemic 
project. 
 In this dissertation, I will propose a solution to the Generality Problem. My 
proposed solution is based on a model of skill-learning which I have developed based on 
the theories of motor-learning provided by John A. Adams and Richard A. Schmidt, and a 
theory of cognitive architecture (which focuses on cognitive skills) provided by John R. 
Anderson. This model is most directly applicable to cases where beliefs are formed by 
acquired cognitive skills, but it can easily be extended to apply to cases involving innate 
cognitive instincts, and, with some degree of difficulty, to cases involving belief 
formation through a process of deliberation. 
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 I will develop my proposed solution to the Generality Problem in two stages. In 
the first stage, I will propose a “rough draft” version of the solution. According to this 
rough draft version, the mechanism type that is relevant to the epistemic project is a 
mechanism’s activation type. A belief-forming mechanism of a given activation type 
consists of an activation mechanism which is responsible for activating ‘a’ belief-forming 
program that is stored at a certain address. This belief-forming program is, at least 
typically, acted on by learning, selection, and/or maintenance mechanisms, which 
constrain the degree and manner of how the program can vary from time-slice to time-
slice and from world to world. Any belief-forming program (or version of the same 
program) that is activated by the same activation mechanism belongs to the same 
activation type. 
 This rough draft solution is incomplete in two ways. First, it provides no way of 
specifying the epistemically relevant type a given activation mechanism belongs to. 
Secondly, it provides no obvious reason to think that this type, out of the multitude that a 
given belief-forming process-token or mechanism-token belong to, is relevant to the 
epistemic project.  
These two issues are addressed by a more refined version of my proposed 
solution, which claims that the type a belief-forming mechanism belongs to which is 
relevant to the epistemic project is its extended activation type. This type is also identified 
on the basis of the activation mechanism, but this proposed solution recognizes that the 
epistemically relevant type of the activation mechanism itself can be specified by some 
underlying adaptive mechanism (a learning, selection, developmental, maintenance, etc. 
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mechanism). This mechanism’s type, in turn, is specified by some further underlying 
adaptive mechanism. This regress can be non-problematically terminated by such 
adaptive mechanisms as evolution by natural selection or a certain kind of Intelligent 
Design. The reliability of this type is plausibly linked to the epistemic project, since it 
incorporates the entire flow of information that went into shaping the belief-forming skill, 
including information that is not reflectively accessible by the subject. 
This proposed solution provides some traction for solving two other problems that 
confront reliabilism: the New Evil Demon Problem and the Strange and Fleeting Process 
Problem. In the course of this dissertation, I will use my proposed solution to the 
Generality Problem to provide solutions to two versions of the New Evil Demon 
Problem, and to provide partial solutions to cases involving a third version of the New 
Evil Demon Problem. I will also use my proposed solution to the Generality Problem to 
provide solutions to several Strange and Fleeting Process problem cases. The basic 
strategy I will use to solve these Strange and Fleeting Process problem cases is that the 
belief-forming processes involved in these cases tend to belong to a ‘common-sense’ type 
which is reliable, but to an extended activation type that is unreliable.
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Chapter 0 
Introduction 
 
1. Reliabilism, and Three Problems Facing It 
 Traditionally, epistemology has applied a deliberative model in order to provide a 
picture of how we form beliefs. Deliberation is the process of using reasons (including 
desires, and especially in the context of epistemology, beliefs), to arrive at some 
conclusion about what action we should perform or what belief(s) we should hold. This 
model of belief formation is natural, but it can lead to problems of over-intellectualization 
and regress. It is possible that these problems could be solved by extending the 
deliberative model. For example, we could count mental states other than beliefs and 
desires, such as experiential states, as reasons. But another approach is to replace or 
supplement the deliberative model with a different picture of belief formation.1 
 Reliabilism can be interpreted as providing such an alternative model of belief-
formation. In general, reliabilism claims that a belief counts as knowledge only if the 
belief was produced by some reliable belief-forming process. By making this claim, 
reliabilism focuses on the causes of a belief, and not the reasons the belief holder has for 
holding this belief.  
A paradigm case of a belief that, intuitively, counts as knowledge, is caused by 
some reliable belief-forming process, but the believer may be unable to provide a reason 
for, are the beliefs arrived at through the use of the skill of chicken sexing. In raising 
                                                     
1 The first two paragraphs of this introduction to reliablism owe a debt to Robert Brandom’s “Insights and 
Blindspots of Reliabilism,” The Monist, Vol 81, Issue 3 (1998): 371-392. 
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chickens, the ability to distinguish between female chicks (which will grow up to be 
valuable egg-laying hens) and male chicks (which have little economic value) is of 
considerable economic importance. It is possible to distinguish the sexes of day-old 
chicks with about 95% accuracy by looking at their cloacal vents. However, this ability is 
a difficult skill to learn. According to the version of the story I have heard, even master 
chicken sexers are unable to describe how the cloacal vent of a female chick differs from 
that of a male chick. The only way to learn this skill is to spend months under the 
guidance of a master chicken sexer, attempting to guess the sex of chicks, and being 
corrected by the master chicken sexer. Eventually something ‘clicks,’ and the student 
becomes reliable at distinguishing the sex of chicks.2  
Intuitively, a master chicken sexer does know the sex of a chick based on her ability to 
distinguish the sex of chicks. It is difficult (but perhaps not impossible) to explain this 
using a deliberative model of belief-formation, since the master chicken sexer is unable to 
explain the reasons why she arrived at the conclusion she did. But since the chicken 
sexing skill is a reliable belief-forming mechanism, it is quite easy for reliablism to 
explain why a master chicken sexer does know the sex of a chick. 
 While reliabilist epistemic theories do have some advantages over theories based 
on the deliberative model, these theories face three problems: the Generality Problem, 
                                                     
2 This story of how chicken-sexing works appears to be false, and chicken sexers have a greater degree of 
reflective access to their skill than this story portrays.  The origin of this technique may have played some 
role in how this story developed in epistemology. An early account of chicken sexing is provided by John 
H. Lunn, in his 1948 article, “Chick Sexing,” American Scientist, Vol 36, pp 280-287. This technique was 
originally developed in Japan in 1933, and was introduced to America in 1934. As Lunn (who was clearly a 
product of his times) describes it, “this new technique of accurately determining the sex of the day-old 
chick sounded like one of the mysteries of the Orient, like standing an egg on end at the Equinox” (p 280). 
 The practice of chick sexing has fallen on hard times in recent decades – the profession requires a 
high amount of training, the work is seasonal, and the price of chicks has not kept up with inflation. 
Chicken breeds that indicate the sex of chicks through differences in feather coloration have been 
developed, and are well on their way to making this skill obsolete. 
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what I will call the “Justification Problem” (the New Evil Demon Problem is a subset of 
this larger problem), and the Strange and Fleeting Process Problem. One of the major 
goals of this dissertation is to assist in developing a reliabilist theory that can provide at 
least partial solutions to all three of these problems. 
 The Generality Problem arises because reliability is a property of a type of 
process, and is not a property of an individual process token. In order to determine if the 
process responsible for forming a belief is reliable, we cannot just look at a single 
execution of the process (a process token). Instead, we must look at a range of executions 
of processes of the same type. Since a token process belongs to as many different types as 
it has properties, there are a multitude of process types to consider for any given belief-
forming event. The Generality Problem is the problem of providing a principled method 
for specifying the process type that a given belief-forming process token belongs to that 
is relevant to the epistemic project. 
 The second problem that faces reliabilist theories is what I will call the 
“Justification Problem” - the problem of plausibly explaining how the reliability of a 
belief-forming mechanism is related to the justification of the resulting belief. One subset 
of this problem is the New Evil Demon Problem. This particular problem is related to 
Descartes’ Tricky Demon. In Descartes’ original version of this case, it is pointed out that 
it is possible that we are victims of a demon that has all of the powers of God, but none of 
God’s benevolence, and is attempting to trick us. Since, if this possibility were the case, 
we would have the same beliefs as we do now, but those beliefs would be false, this case 
originally provided the basis for an argument for skepticism. The New Evil Demon 
Problem is that the processes that a counterpart of ours that is trapped in a world where 
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this demon exists would use to form beliefs appear to be unreliable (due to the demon’s 
interference), but, intuitively, our counterpart’s beliefs are just as justified as ours.  
 The third problem facing reliabilist epistemic theories is the Strange and Fleeting 
Process Problem. This problem consists of a set of problem cases which involve belief-
forming process that appear to be reliable but, intuitively, are not an appropriate basis for 
knowledge because they are "strange" or "fleeting." An example of such a case is the 
Case of the Serendipitous Brain Lesion. In this case, a subject develops a brain lesion, 
which, by traumatizing certain parts of her brain, causes her to form the belief that she 
has a brain lesion. This strange belief-forming process does appear to be reliable (since 
every time these parts of the subject's brain are traumatized, the patient, by definition, has 
a brain lesion), but, intuitively, the patient does not know she has a brain lesion.3 
 The challenge these Strange and Fleeting Process Problem cases poses for 
reliabilism might be overcome by providing additional necessary conditions for 
knowledge, aside from reliable formation, without appealing to the subject having 
internally accessible reasons for her belief. 
 
2. An Evolutionary Dead-End: Proper Functionalism 
 One family of reliabilist epistemic theories which may initially appear to offer the 
promise of overcoming these three problems is the Proper Function family of epistemic 
theories. This family of theories includes Alvin Plantinga's theory of warrant, Michael 
Bergmann's theory of justification, and Peter Graham's theory of entitlement. While this 
                                                     
3 This case appears in Alvin Plantinga’s Warrant and Proper Function, New York: Oxford University 
Press, 1993, p 4. Plantinga credits this case to Alvin Goldman. Oddly, the Stanford Encyclopedia of 
Philosophy’s article on Reliabilism, which was written by Alvin Goldman, credits this case to this passage 
in Plantinga. 
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set of theories may appear to offer the promise of overcoming many of the problems 
facing reliabilism, this family of epistemic theories also faces a serious problem, one 
which I believe will require a radical theoretical reformulation to overcome. 
 As I will argue in the first chapter of this dissertation, certain objections to the 
Proper Function family of epistemic theories present in the literature of epistemology are 
actually (apparently independently developed) variants of existing objections to the 
Selected Effect theory of biological function that the Proper Function epistemic theories 
are based on. This strongly suggests that, in order to avoid these objections, the Proper 
Function theories need to be reformulated using some alternative theory of function.  
 Plantinga's theory of warrant, the original and paradigm example of a Proper 
Function epistemic theory, to a ‘first approximation,’ claims that “a belief B has warrant 
for S if and only if the relevant segments (the segments involved in the production of B) 
are functioning properly in a cognitive environment sufficiently similar to that for which 
S’s faculties are designed; and the modules of the design plan governing the production 
of B are 1) aimed at truth, and 2) such that there is a high objective probability that a 
belief formed in accordance with those modules (in that sort of cognitive environment) 
will be true; and the more firmly S believes B the more warrant B has for S.”4 
 As previously mentioned, the Proper Function family of epistemic theories offers 
at least partial solutions to all three of the major problems facing reliabilist theories. 
Firstly, Proper Function theories are largely immune to the Generality Problem. This is 
because, for Proper Function theories, the relevant type of belief-forming mechanism 
whose reliability matters does not necessarily include the belief-forming mechanism 
                                                     
4 Plantinga, Warrant and Proper Function, p 19. 
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actually involved in forming the subject's actual belief. Instead, for Proper Functionalism, 
the relevant type of belief-forming mechanism is the set of cognitive faculties that are 
functioning in accordance with the 'design' plan of the subject's own cognitive faculties, 
and are functioning in the environment they were 'designed' for.5  
 As a result, the relevant type of belief-forming mechanism whose reliability needs 
to be taken into account is neatly specified by the relevant 'design' plan. While Proper 
Function theories do face a generality problem, this generality problem consists of 
specifying the set of cognitive faculties responsible for the formation of a given belief. 
Once this set of cognitive faculties has been specified, we can, at least in principle, 
discover the details of these cognitive faculties' 'design' plans, and reconstruct the 
relevant set of belief-forming mechanisms in order to gauge the reliability of this set. 
Plantinga compares the task of specifying the relevant set of cognitive faculties to the 
task of drawing a line that marks where one mountain ends and another begins.6 By 
contrast, the Generality Problem that faces standard reliabilist theories can be compared 
to the task of specifying what it is to be a mountain. 
 Proper Functionalism also offers a partial solution to the Justification Problem. 
Plantinga's own theory of warrant is silent on the subject of justification, but Michael 
Bergmann offers a related theory of justification: 
Jpf: S’s belief B is justified iff (i) S does not take B to be 
defeated and (ii) the cognitive faculties producing B are (a) 
                                                     
5 Plantinga and other Proper Function epistemologists admit that evolution by natural selection is not 
literally a design process, but claim that the design model can be metaphorically extended to include 
instances of evolution by natural selection. As a result, Proper Functionalists usually place the term 
‘design’ in quotes in contexts where this model may be extended to include instances of natural evolution. 
6 Plantinga, Warrant and Proper Function, pp 28-9. 
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functioning properly, (b) truth-aimed and (c) reliable in the 
environments for which they were ‘designed.’7 
 This theory of justification provides a solution to the New Evil Demon problem, 
since the demon’s victim does not take his beliefs to be defeated, and the cognitive 
faculties of the demon’s victim are functioning properly, aimed at producing true belief, 
and would be reliable in the environments for which they are ‘designed.’ The only reason 
the cognitive faculties of the demon’s victim are not currently reliable is that they are not 
functioning in an environment similar to the one of the ones they were ‘designed’ for, but 
are currently subject to the demon’s interference. 
 While Proper Functionalism provides a solution to this version of the New Evil 
Demon Problem, it is vulnerable to at least one related problem case. This case involves a 
variation of the standard Brain-in-a-Vat skeptical scenario. In the standard version of the 
Brain-in-a-Vat case, a normal human brain has been placed in a vat full of nutritive fluid, 
and has been hooked to a super-computer which provides the brain with the same neural 
stimulus as it would receive if it was present in a normal human body existing in the 
everyday world. In this variant case, the brain is not a normal human brain, but one that 
has been artificially created by scientists investigating human brain function. 
 Because the cognitive faculties of this artificial brain were not designed to 
produce true beliefs and to avoid producing false beliefs, but merely to replicate the 
functioning of human brains, these cognitive faculties at least appear to violate the "well-
'designed'" condition of Bergman's theory of justification. Yet, intuitively, the artificial 
                                                     
7 Michael Bergmann, Justification Without Awareness, Oxford University Press, 2006, p 133. Bergmann 
places ‘designed’ in quotation marks since evolution by natural selection is not literally a design process, 
but can be treated as such in an extended and metaphorical sense. 
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brain's beliefs are just as justified as the beliefs of a normal human whose brain was 
placed in the computerized vat.8 
 Proper Functionalism also offers solutions to the Strange and Fleeting Process 
Problem. Proper Functionalism's overall approach towards solving this problem is to 
provide a necessary condition for knowledge, in addition to reliability: in order to provide 
a basis for knowledge, a cognitive faculty must not just be reliable (when functioning 
according to its 'design' plan and in the proper environment), it must be part of the 
subject's own 'design' plan. This additional limitation on the kinds of belief-forming 
mechanisms provides a solution to many Strange and Fleeting Process problem cases. For 
example, the brain lesion that was responsible for forming the subject's belief in the 
Serendipitious Brain Lesion case was not in accordance with the subject's 'design' plan. 
 An exception to Proper Functionalism's success at solving the Strange and 
Fleeting Process Problem is a problem case proposed by John Greco, based on a case 
study authored by neurologist Oliver Sacks. In this case, two twins, suffering from severe 
autism, are able to perform astounding mathematical feats, such as instantly knowing that 
a pile of matchsticks had 111 matchsticks in it, and then instantly realizing that 
3x37=111.9 (This caused the twins to become very amused, since 37 is a prime number – 
a fact that the twins also instantly perceived.) This case challenges Proper Functionalism 
since the twins' mathematical abilities seem to arise from their neurological 
abnormalities, and not despite these neurological abnormalities.  
                                                     
8 This case appears in Bergmann’s Justification Without Awareness, p 150. Bergmann credits this case to 
Richard Feldman and Earl Conee, explaining that this was part of their reply to Bergmann’s comments on 
their symposium paper ‘Some Virtues of Evidentalism’ presented at the Central Division Meeting of the 
American Philosophical Association in April 2005. 
9 John Greco, Achieving Knowledge: A Virtue-Theoretic Account of Epistemic Normativity, Cambridge 
University Press, 2010, p 151. 
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 One possible response to this case is that the cognitive faculties responsible for 
the twins' mathematical beliefs are functioning according to their 'design' plans, but are 
benefiting from their abnormal environment. However, this response might implausibly 
imply that the beliefs of a normal human who attempted these kinds of mathematical 
feats would be more justified or warranted, etc., in these beliefs than the twins, since his 
cognitive faculties would be functioning in an environment more similar to the one they 
were 'designed' for.  
 Overall, Proper Functionalism appears to be an improvement over standard 
reliabilist theories, since this family of theories offers at least partial solutions to three 
major challenges facing reliabilist theories. While these solutions may be imperfect, their 
imperfections might at least initially appear to be the kind of minor issues that can afflict 
any theory, and may eventually be resolved, given time. 
 But, as I will argue in the first chapter of this dissertation, these apparently minor 
issues are more serious than they may first appear: The Artificial Brain-in-a-Vat case, 
along with a second problem case, the Swampman case, are not just minor problems that 
Proper Functionalism may eventually be able to overcome, but are actually versions 
(apparently independently developed by epistemologists) of objections leveled against 
the Selected Effect theories of biological function that the Proper Function epistemic 
theories rest on. If this claim is true, then this strongly suggests that Proper Functionalism 
needs to be reformulated on the basis of some alternative theory of biological function. 
One candidate alternative theory is Christopher Boorse's General Goal Contribution 
theory of function. One existing theory which could be construed as a functionalist theory 
compatible with Boorse's theory of function is John Greco's trait-virtue theory of 
10 
 
knowledge. 
 
3. A Third Way: John Greco's Achieving Knowledge 
 The theory of knowledge John Greco provides in Achieving Knowledge, like the 
Proper Function epistemic theories, is a variant of reliabilism. The central thesis of 
Achieving Knowledge is that knowledge is a kind of success from intellectual ability, 
skill, or virtue.10 As the cover of my personal copy of this book (which depicts Derek 
Jeter hitting a baseball) illustrates, Greco compares intellectual skills to athletic skills. As 
we shall see, this analogy is quite insightful. 
 As previously mentioned, traditional accounts of knowledge use a deliberative 
model of belief-formation – the paradigm processes of belief-formation they focus on 
involve beliefs that were arrived at through an explicit reasoning process. Proper 
Functionalism uses a second basic approach to epistemology. It places primary focus on 
instinctive belief-forming mechanisms which are the product of 'design' processes, such 
as evolution, which are external to the epistemic agent. By using this 'design' process 
model to study these cases of instinctive belief formation, Proper Functionalism 
implicitly compares naturally evolved instinctive belief-forming mechanisms to 
manufactured artifacts.  
While this approach may avoid the over-intellectualization and regress problems 
that afflict traditional epistemology, it comes with its own weaknesses. In addition to the 
objections arising from Proper Functionalism’s reliance on the Selected Effect theories of 
function, the “manufactured artifacts” model Proper Functionalism deploys may tend to 
                                                     
10 John Greco, Achieving Knowledge, Cambridge University Press, 2010, p 3. 
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break down when applied to belief-forming processes that are directed by the epistemic 
agent, and not by 'design' processes that are external to the agent.11  
 By placing primary focus on cognitive skills, and by comparing cognitive skills to 
athletic abilities, Greco has embarked on a third basic approach to epistemology. This 
approach does have a number of advantages over those taken by both traditional 
epistemology and Proper Functionalism:  
 Firstly, actions that are executed through the use of motor skills (such as the 
action of hitting a home run) are self-directed but not deliberate. Self-directed actions are 
actions where the beliefs and values of the agent play an appropriate causal role in the 
execution of the action. Deliberate actions are the result of an explicit ends-means 
reasoning process. All deliberate actions are self-directed, but not all self-directed actions 
are deliberate: In all cases of self-directed action, the beliefs and values of the agent play 
an appropriate causal role in the execution of the action, but in some (many) cases of self-
directed action, this ‘appropriate causal role’ does not take the form of a deliberative 
process.  
Since the skill-based approach focuses on self-directed but non-deliberate belief-
forming ‘actions,’ this suggests that this approach is capable of overcoming the over-
intellectualization and regress problems faced by traditional epistemology. This approach, 
by focusing on belief-forming ‘actions’ that are directed by the agent, and not by external 
‘design’ processes, may also overcome some of the problems Proper Functionalism faces. 
                                                     
11 Standard reliabilism may also suffer, but perhaps to a lesser degree, from an over-focus on innate belief-
forming mechanisms. For example, in Epistemology and Cognition, Goldman does spend a chapter 
discussing Anderson's ACT* theory of cognitive skills, but eventually concludes that cognitive skills are an 
example of what he calls secondary epistemology and not primary epistemology, and is therefore not 
deserving of primary focus. 
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It is also worth noting that one of the paradigm cases of a reliable belief-forming 
mechanism, the mechanism used in chicken-sexing, is just such an acquired, self-
directed, but non-deliberate, skill.  
 Secondly, while we humans may have little reflective insight into how our own 
skills (both motor and cognitive) work, this problem has been deeply studied by 
psychology, and this work provides much material for epistemologists and philosophers 
in general to work with. Also, while we may have the greatest reflective insight into 
beliefs and actions that are the result of deliberative processes, the vast majority of our 
actions, and perhaps our beliefs, are the result of skills, and not deliberation. 
 Thirdly, the analogy between motor skills and cognitive skills is a very close one 
– cognitive skills appear to be mechanisms that act on and accept input from working 
memory, while motor skills are mechanisms that act on and accept input from the 
external environment. Other than this, the main difference between motor and cognitive 
skills seems to simply be that motor skills are easier for scientists to study. 
 Fourthly, and perhaps most importantly, the skill-based model of belief-formation 
can be extended to the kinds of belief-forming processes that the other two epistemic 
approaches place primary focus on. While a naturally-evolved instinct is not a skill, I 
would claim that skill-learning provides a better model for understanding the process of 
evolution than the 'design' plan model used by Proper Functionalism. There are important 
differences between skill learning and evolution by natural selection, but the skill model 
can successfully be extended in order to explain naturally evolved instincts and abilities 
in a slightly metaphorical way. It is perhaps more difficult to extend this skill-learning 
model to the process of deliberation, but I believe this can also successfully be done. 
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(After all, the ability to deliberate is itself a skill.) 
 While Greco's basic approach has advantages over those of traditional 
epistemology and Proper Functionalism, it still faces the three problems that face 
reliabilist theories in general. Greco's proposed solutions to these problems are imperfect, 
not so much because they are flawed but because his theory is incomplete: 
 Greco does propose a partial solution to the Generality Problem. This proposal is 
a slightly more generalized version of the one provided by Mark Heller in “The Simple 
Solution to the Generality Problem.”12 Heller’s proposed partial solution to the Generality 
Problem draws on contextualism, the claim that the standards of knowledge (or other 
positive epistemic statuses, such as justification) vary according to conversational 
context.13 Heller notes that, in everyday language, the term “reliable” shows the same 
signs of context-sensitivity as the term “knows” does. Based on this, Heller argues that 
reliabilists should not be required to provide a fixed principle for selecting the correct 
level of generality, and instead, the correct level of generality is fixed by context. Greco 
generalizes this proposed solution by noting that a similar strategy could be adopted by 
subject-sensitive invariantists, not just attributor-contextualists like Heller. 
 As I will discuss in Chapter 2, Heller’s proposed solution to the Generality 
Problem is only partial, and it introduces a new problem for reliabilism about 
justification. This new problem is that, while it may be plausible that the terms “reliable,” 
“knows,” and “justified” are all context dependent, it is also plausible that these terms 
react differently to contextual pressures – under certain contexts, the truth-conditions of 
                                                     
12 Achieving Knowledge, p 78-9. Greco cites Mark Heller, “The Simple Solution to the Generality 
Problem,” Noûs 29, 4 (1995); 501-15 in footnote 15. 
13 More accurately, contextualism claims that the propositions expressed by attributions of knowledge or 
other positive epistemic statuses vary according to conversational context. 
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the propositions expressed by reliability and justification attributions may part company.  
If this is true, then this poses a severe problem for reliabilism about justification. 
However, as Heller notes, only “threshold” reliability (whether or not a mechanism is 
“reliable”) is context-dependent – a mechanism’s overall reliability rating is context-
independent. Similarly, while contextualists claim that the terms “knows” and “justified” 
are context-dependent, they also claim that another epistemic status – the strength of a 
subject’s epistemic position towards a belief – is context-independent. This suggests that 
a reliabilistic account of the strength of a subject’s epistemic position (or some 
component of an epistemic position) may avoid the problem that Heller’s proposed 
partial solution to the Generality Problem introduces. But such an account would need to 
provide a complete solution to the Generality Problem, by providing a principled way of 
specifying the type of belief-forming mechanism whose overall reliability rating is 
relevant to some context-independent epistemic quality of the beliefs that are caused by 
this mechanism. 
 Since Greco proposes only a theory of knowledge, and not a theory of 
justification, he is not required to provide a solution to the Justification Problem, or the 
New Evil Demon Problem. However, a fully developed epistemic theory should provide 
an account of justification, and such a theory would need to provide an explanation of 
New Evil Demon Problem cases. 
 Greco's theory does provide a possible solution to the Strange and Fleeting 
Process Problem. His theory claims that a subject knows a proposition only if the truth of 
the subject's belief in that proposition was arrived at through the use of an intellectual 
virtue. Greco further claims that virtues must be stable and constitutive parts of the 
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agent's character. This claim provides a way of solving the Strange and Fleeting Process 
Problem, since virtues, while they may be strange relative to the rest of society, cannot be 
strange relative to the agent's character. Likewise, virtues must also be stable, ruling out 
the possibility that fleeting belief-forming processes can be a form of intellectual virtue.14   
 While this proposed solution to the Strange and Fleeting Process Problem does 
score over the one provided by the Proper Function theories in at least one case (the 
Autistic Twins case discussed above), it remains in need of further development. In 
particular, Greco needs to provide a fuller account what it means for a belief-forming 
mechanism to be a “stable” part of an agent's cognitive character.15  
 Overall, Greco's basic approach has many advantages over the basic approaches 
used by traditional epistemology and Proper Functionalism, but it needs further 
development if it is to overcome the three problems facing reliabilist theories in general. 
The goal of this dissertation is to further develop this reliablistic epistemic theory. 
 
4. A Skill-based Solution to the Generality Problem, and Some Implications of It 
 The main development this dissertation offers to Greco's basic theory is a solution 
to the Generality Problem. This solution is a very much modified version of Proper 
Functionalism's solution to the Generality Problem, adapted to the skill-based model 
Greco has proposed. Proper Functionalism's solution to the Generality Problem is to 
appeal to the underlying selection mechanism (or 'design' process) that is responsible for 
bringing the target belief-forming mechanism into being. The solution I will propose in 
                                                     
14 Achieving Knowledge, p 150. 
15 Achieving Knowledge, p 151-2. 
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this dissertation is similar, but adapted to the richer and more complex model of belief-
formation provided by the skill-based model. 
 In Chapter 2, I will develop a model of skill-learning, based on psychological 
research into motor learning and cognitive skills. This model is informed by two theories 
in particular. The first theory is J.A. Adams’ open-loop theory of motor learning.16 This 
theory of motor learning is not the most recent theory of motor learning.17 But Adams’ 
theory is simpler than the most recent theories (which are clearly the descendants of 
Adams’ theory), and is accurate enough for our purposes. After all, our goal is not to 
provide a completely accurate theory of motor learning, but to construct a model that 
captures the essence of skill learning in general, and which can be extended in order to 
provide insight into action and belief producing mechanisms that are not literally skills. 
With some exceptions (which I will address in Chapter 4), Adams’ theory is sufficient for 
this task. 
 The second theory that informs this model is J.R. Anderson’s ACT* theory of 
cognition, as explained in his 1983 book, The Architecture of Cognition.18 This theory has 
already been covered in reliabilist literature, since Alvin Goldman dedicated a chapter to 
it in his 1986 book, Epistemology and Cognition. My main aim in incorporating this 
theory into my model of skill-learning is to demonstrate that the lessons learned from 
studying action-producing motor skills also extend to belief-producing cognitive skills. 
According to the model of skill-learning that I will develop based on these 
                                                     
16 J.A. Adams, “A closed-loop theory of motor learning,” Journal of Motor Behavior, 3 (1971), pp 111-
150. 
17 I would recommend the fourth edition of Motor Control and Learning: A Behavioral Emphasis by 
Richard A. Schmidt and Timothy D. Lee for those interested in learning more about the current state of 
motor learning research. 
18 J.R. Anderson, The Architecture of Cognition, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1983. 
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theories, both motor and cognitive skills can be described as consisting of a simple 
control program which is activated under certain conditions by an activation mechanism. 
Both the simple control program and the activation mechanism are the targets of 
maintenance mechanisms and, at least typically, learning mechanisms. These 
mechanisms constrain the extent to which the simple control programs and activation 
mechanisms can vary from time-slice to time-slice and from world to world.  
 Based on this model, my initial proposed solution to the Generality Problem is 
that the epistemically relevant type of a token belief-forming mechanism is its activation 
type. This activation type consists of the set of simple control program tokens (which 
vary as constrained by the relevant maintenance and selection mechanisms) that are 
activated by the 'same' activation mechanism. In the “rough draft” version of this solution 
that I will propose in Chapter 2, I will not specify how to determine the relevant type that 
the activation mechanism belongs to. In Chapter 3, I will propose that the activation 
mechanism itself belongs to a learning type, and that the type a given belief-forming 
mechanism belongs to which is relevant to the epistemic project is its extended activation 
type.  
 
4.1 Skill-based Reliabilism and the Justification Problem 
 This proposed solution to the Generality Problem goes some way towards solving 
the other two major problems facing reliabilism. This proposed solution does not directly 
provide a solution to the Justification Problem, but this failure is itself instructive. 
Modern psychology tells us that humans have two very different ways of processing 
information. The first way is more primitive, more natural, and is used much more often. 
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It has been variously labeled intuitive, automatic, natural, non-verbal, narrative, and 
experiential. The second way has evolved only recently, is much slower, and tends to be 
used much more rarely. It has been variously labeled analytic, deliberative, verbal and 
rational.19  
Both cognitive and motor skills belong to the first, experiential system of 
information processing. But questions of epistemic justification tend to arise when there 
is a conflict between our belief-producing systems (for example, when we have some 
reason to believe that one of our beliefs is false), or when one of our beliefs is challenged 
in a social context. And it is just these kinds of exceptional cases where the second, 
deliberative system of information processing tends to be used. This suggests that, in 
order to provide an account of justification, the skill-based model of belief-formation I 
will develop in this dissertation will need to be supplemented by a deliberative model of 
belief-application and belief-holding. Sadly, developing such a model is outside of the 
scope of this dissertation. 
 Such a model could help explain the regularities in knowledge attribution 
allegedly observed by certain contextualist philosophers. Contextualism is the claim that 
the standards of knowledge (or, more precisely, the propositions expressed by knowledge 
attributions) vary according to context. If contextualism about knowledge is true, then 
this would suggest that the standards of justification (or the propositions expressed by 
justification attributions) might also vary according to context. If justificatory 
contextualism is true, then this might explain at least some of the problems reliabilism 
                                                     
19 Seymour Epstein’s “Integration of the cognitive and the psychodynamic unconscious,” American 
Psychologist, 35 (1994), pp 709-724, is a seminal work on this subject. 
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faces in providing a plausible account of justification. I will not argue for the truth of 
justificatory contextualism in this dissertation, and I will grant that alternatives to 
justificatory contextualism may resolve these problems equally well. 
 With this in mind, in Chapter 3, I will review the problems that have driven the 
evolution of Alvin Goldman’s reliabilist theory of justification. I will also review one 
contextualist theory of knowledge, that proposed by David Lewis in his 1996 article, 
“Elusive Knowledge.”20 While I do not endorse this theory as correct, I do believe this 
theory provides a model for what a correct contextualist theory of knowledge might look 
like. Based on Lewis’ theory of knowledge, I will construct an extremely rough and 
incomplete theory of justification that is both contextualist and reliabilistic. (Again, I do 
not claim that this theory is correct, but merely claim that this theory can serve as a model 
for what a theory of this sort might look like.) 
 With this in hand, I will proceed to propose explanations of the problem cases 
Goldman’s theory of justification has encountered. In the process, I will propose solutions 
to two variants of the New Evil Demon Problem, and a partial solution to a third variant. 
These explanations will rely on the working hypothesis that the absolute reliability of the 
belief-forming mechanism responsible for forming a belief is directly related to the 
belief’s epistemic strength.  Epistemic strength is a term of art which refers to whatever 
positive epistemic qualities a belief may have that are both context and situation 
independent. The epistemic strength of a belief and the epistemic situation of the subject 
(or what Keith DeRose calls ‘subject-factors’) together determine the subject’s epistemic 
                                                     
20 David Lewis, “Elusive Knowledge,” Australasian Journal of Philosophy, Vol. 74, Issue 4 (1996): pp 
549-567. 
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position towards the belief. 
Applying this working hypothesis will require a solution to the Generality 
Problem. With the “rough draft” version of my proposed solution to the Generality 
Problem given in Chapter 2, which is based on the notion of a belief-forming 
mechanism’s “activation type,” I will be able to provide an explanation of versions of the 
New Evil Demon Problem where the ‘demonic’ force interferes with the proximate 
process of belief-formation, but not cases where the ‘demonic’ force interferes with the 
learning process underlying the ‘skill’ used to form beliefs. According to this explanation, 
the epistemic positions of our and our demon-world counterparts’ beliefs have the same 
strength. It is also at least plausible that a theory of justification that is both contextualist 
and reliabilist would predict that both our beliefs and those of our demon-world 
counterparts are justified. 
In order to explain a second kind of New Evil Demon Problem case, where the 
‘demonic’ force interferes with the learning process that forms the skills used to form 
beliefs, I will need to provide a more refined version of this proposed solution to the 
Generality Problem, one based on the notion of a belief-forming mechanism’s “extended 
activation type.” Using this refined version of my proposed solution to the Generality 
Problem, I will be able to provide a similar explanation of this kind of New Evil Demon 
Problem case. 
A third set of New Evil Demon Problem cases, where the ‘demonic’ force actually 
plays a role in the creation of the epistemic agent (this set includes the Artificial Brain-in-
a-Vat and the Swampman cases), are more difficult to explain, but I will sketch two 
possible approaches that an explanation for these kinds of cases could take. 
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4.2 Skill-based Reliablism and the Strange and Fleeting Process Problem 
 The refined version of my proposed solution to the Generality Problem offers a 
more complete version of Greco’s proposed solution to the Strange and Fleeting Process 
Problem. Greco’s solution to the Strange and Fleeting Process Problem claims that, in 
order to count as knowledge, a belief must be formed by an intellectual virtue or ability 
of the epistemic agent. In addition to being reliable, a belief-forming mechanism must 
also be a stable and constituent part of the agent’s cognitive character in order to count as 
an intellectual virtue or ability of that agent. 
 I will use a version of Greco’s “constituent part” condition for intellectual abilities 
to provide explanations of certain problem cases in Chapter 3, but this condition does 
require further development that I will be unable to provide in this dissertation. However, 
the skill-based model of belief-formation I will develop in this dissertation will be more 
successful in formulating Greco’s “stable” condition, since belief-forming mechanisms 
with a reliable extended activation type do appear to be stable in Greco’s sense. In 
Chapter 4, I will use this feature of reliable extended activation types to explain a variety 
of Strange and Fleeting Process Problem cases. The basic strategy used in these 
explanations is that, while the belief-forming mechanisms involved in these cases may 
belong to “commonsense” types that are reliable, they belong to unreliable extended 
activation types, and thus do not produce knowledge.  
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Chapter 1 
Functionalism Without Proper Function 
 
0. Introduction 
Epistemic theories that belong to the Proper Function family are united by the 
claim that a subject’s belief has some theory-specific positive epistemic status (warrant, 
justification, entitlement, knowledge, etc.) only to the extent that the cognitive faculties 
that produced that belief are properly functioning. In order to explain what it is for a 
cognitive faculty to be properly functioning, Alvin Plantinga, the leading Proper Function 
epistemologist, provides a sketch of a ‘design’ plan model of proper function. This model 
relies on the assumption that a blueprint-like set of specifications for how an organism 
should function can be reconstructed. In order to specify this ‘design’ plan, Plantinga 
appeals to the various ‘design’ processes that are responsible for a given type of cognitive 
faculty being present in the cognizer, making this account of proper function a Selected 
Effect theory of function.  
Selected Effect theories of function claim that an effect of an item is the item’s 
function just if the item typically causes that effect, and the item causing that effect 
explains why some domain-specific selection mechanism (such as natural selection or 
intelligent design) has caused that item to be present in its containing system. In this 
chapter, I will review four objections to the Selected Effect theories of function. Two of 
these objections also apply to the Proper Function family of epistemic theories, and 
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versions of these objections have appeared (and were perhaps independently developed) 
in epistemology as objections to the Proper Function family of epistemic theories. Two of 
the objections to the Selected Effect theories of function do not apply to the Proper 
Function epistemic theories.  
This suggests two things. First, these objections suggest that the Proper Function 
family of epistemic theories need to be reformulated on the basis of some alternative 
theory of function. Secondly, the fact that two of the objections to the Selected Effect 
theories of function do not apply to the Proper Function epistemic theories suggest that a 
functionalist epistemic theory can, in some sense, be ‘insulated’ from objections to its 
underlying theory of function. 
One alternative to the Selected Effect theories of function is Christopher Boorse’s 
General Goal Contribution theory. Boorse’s theory of function pursues what he calls an 
“adjectival” strategy of conceptual analysis. This strategy analyzes a concept by first 
providing the broadest plausible analysis of that concept, and then handling any debatable 
cases of overbreadth by ‘adjectival qualification.’ For example, one might provide a 
broad analysis of the concept ‘discrimination,’ which claims that distinguishing between 
good and bad artists is a form of discrimination, and then provide a more narrow analysis 
of ‘unjust discrimination,’ which distinguishes between this acceptable form of 
discrimination, and unacceptable forms of discriminating between artists based on, say, 
the artist’s gender, race, ethnicity, sexuality, religion, etc. 
Boorse’s broad analysis of function simpliciter claims that an effect of an item is a 
token-function of that item just if the effect promotes the goals of the item’s containing 
system. This broad analysis of token-function can accommodate the notion of proper 
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function through adjectival qualification – a function of an item is a proper function of 
that item just if that function is specified in the item’s ‘design’ plan. But the kinds of 
functioning that Boorse is most interested in are normal and healthy functioning. 
According to Boorse, an item is functioning normally just if the item’s output is within a 
statistically typical range of contributions to the goals of the item’s containing system, 
relative to some reference class the containing system belongs to. The functioning of an 
item in an organism is medically normal just if it is functioning normally relative to a 
reference class consisting of organisms of the same species, sex, and age group as that 
organism, and the functioning of an item in an organism is healthy just if the item is 
functioning in a manner which is at least medically normal. 
There is at least one epistemic theory that could be construed as a functionalist 
theory based on Boorse’s theory of function, although this may come as a surprise to the 
epistemologist who developed it. That epistemic theory is John Greco’s trait-theory 
theory of knowledge, which is generally taken to be a competitor of the Proper Function 
epistemic theories. Greco’s theory claims that an epistemic agent’s belief amounts 
knowledge only if that belief is a product of an intellectual virtue of the agent. According 
to Greco, in order for a belief-forming mechanism to be an intellectual virtue, it must 
reliably produce true beliefs, and be a constituent and stable part of the agent’s cognitive 
character. 
In Section 4 of this chapter, I will sketch a very rough and incomplete 
functionalist account of knowledge. According to this account, an epistemic agent knows 
a proposition only if the agent’s belief in the proposition was formed by a belief-forming 
mechanism that is functioning normally, relative to some reference class. I will argue that 
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the agent’s belief being produced by a properly functioning belief-forming mechanism is 
not a necessary condition for knowledge, and that the reference class of belief-forming 
mechanisms and epistemic agents that is relevant to epistemic project is not the one 
Boorse appeals to in his account of healthy or medically normal functioning. This 
account of knowledge is not intended to compete with Greco’s trait-virtue theory of 
knowledge. Instead, it appears that Greco’s theory is a special case of this sketch 
functionalist theory of knowledge. 
 
1. ‘Design’ Plans and Selected Effects 
The reliance of the Proper Function family of epistemic theories on the Selected 
Effect theories of function is perhaps clearest in Peter Graham’s 2011 paper, “Epistemic 
Entitlement,” where he uses the etiological theories of function developed in Larry 
Wright (1973) and Ruth Millikan (1984) to explicate his notion of epistemic 
entitlement.21 As we shall see, the Selected Effect theories of function are a subset of 
etiological theories, and Millikan’s theory of function (but not Wright’s theory) is both an 
etiological and a Selected Effect theory. 
While this reliance is clearest in Graham, it goes back to the earliest and most 
central Proper Function epistemic theory, Alvin Plantinga’s 1993 theory of epistemic 
warrant. According to Plantinga’s account of epistemic warrant, the belief of an epistemic 
agent has warrant to the extent that 1) the cognitive faculties that produced that belief are 
functioning properly – the faculties are functioning in accordance with their ‘design’ plan, 
2) the cognitive faculties are functioning in an environment similar to the one they were 
                                                     
21 Peter Graham, "Epistemic Entitlement," Noûs, Vol 46, Issue 3 (Sep 2011), pp 449-482. 
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‘designed’ for, 3) if the cognitive faculties were functioning properly in the environment 
they were ‘designed’ for, then they would be reliable, and 4) the agent’s cognitive 
faculties are truth-aimed.22 
Plantinga’s talk of ‘design’ and ‘design’ plans relies on the notion that the process 
that goes into making an adult human is, in some sense, similar to how artifacts are 
manufactured – a ‘design’ plan is selected, with some end in mind, and the adult human is 
‘manufactured’ in accordance with this ‘design’ plan. Plantinga pictures this ‘design’ plan 
as being something like a set of specifications for a well-formed, properly functioning 
human being.23 He suggests that this ‘design’ plan can be reconstructed as a set of triples: 
for a given item of a ‘designed’ system, there should be a specification of 1) the response 
or effect the item will cause, in 2) a certain kind of circumstance, and 3) the purpose or 
function of this response or effect.24 
Plantinga’s ‘design’ plan model of proper function bears certain similarities to the 
Selected Effect theories of function. The Selected Effect theories are subset of the 
etiological theories of function. Etiological theories of function in general claim that 
functional attributions help provide a causal explanation of why a functional item is 
present in its system. One simple example of such an Etiological theory of function is the 
                                                     
22 Alvin Plantinga, Warrant and Proper Function, Oxford University Press, 1993, pp 10-22. Warrant is a 
term of art in epistemology, and refers to whatever needs to be added to true belief in order to count as 
knowledge. Prior to the 1960s, it was generally thought that knowledge was justified true belief, but 
Edmund Gettier demonstrated that justified true belief is not sufficient for knowledge. Somewhat 
ironically, this version of Plantinga’s theory does not correctly account for Gettier-style cases. This flaw is 
corrected in later versions, but at the expense of greater complexity. Due to this greater complexity, I will 
not address Plantinga’s later theory here. 
 
23 Plantinga, Warrant and Proper Function, p 14.  
 
24 Plantinga, Warrant and Proper Function, p 22. 
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one offered by Larry Wright. Wright proposed that the function of item X is Z just if “[1] 
X is there because it does Z, [2] Z is a consequence (or result) of X’s being there.”25 
One objection to this simple Etiological account is that it is overly-broad. To give 
one example, a scientist builds a laser which is connected by a rubber hose to a source of 
gaseous chlorine. After turning on the machine he notices a break in the hose, but before 
he can correct it he inhales the escaping gas and falls unconscious. According to Wright’s 
account, the function of the break in the hose is to release the gas. The release of the gas 
is a result of the break in the hose; and the break is there because it releases the gas 
(otherwise, the scientist would fix the break). Yet it seems odd to say that this is the 
function of the break, or even that the break has a function at all.26 
This problem of over-breadth is one motivation for the Selected Effect theory, 
which attempts to handle cases like this by restricting the kinds of causal processes that 
explain why a functional item is present in a system in terms of it causing a certain effect 
to domain-specific selection process. A selection process is a process that selects some 
‘good’ item from a set of possible alternatives. Intelligent design is the selection process 
specific to the domain of artifacts; natural selection is the selection process specific to the 
domain of organism. Versions of this Selected Effect theory of functions have been 
defended by Karen Neander, Ruth Millikan, Paul Griffiths, and Peter Godfrey-Smith. As I 
reconstruct it, theories of this kind claim that: an effect E of item I is a function of I in 
system Z if and only if 1) I generally causes E, 2) I is present in Z due to the selection 
mechanism specific to Z’s domain causing I to be present in Z because I generally causes 
                                                     
25 Larry Wright, “Functions,” The Philosophical Review, Vol. 82, No. 2 (Apr., 1972), p 161. 
 
26 Christopher Boorse, “Wright on Functions,” The Philosophical Review, Vol. 85, No. 1 (Jan., 1976), p 72. 
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E. 
This theory can explain why my computer’s hard drive has the function of storing 
information. My computer’s hard drive (an item) allows my computer (the system that 
contains the hard drive) to store information (a causal effect of the hard drive being 
present in the system of my computer). The reason my computer contains the hard drive 
is because the corporation that built my computer (which can be seen as a collective 
agent that serves the role of an intelligent designer) believed truly that incorporating a 
hard drive would cause this very effect. 
Likewise, this theory can explain why my teeth have the function of chewing 
food. Over the course of the evolutionary history of my ancestors, teeth (an item) had the 
effect of allowing my ancestors to chew food. Because teeth had this effect, natural 
selection selected for the presence of teeth, and selected against the absence of teeth. This 
explains why I (a system) have teeth, and hence why my teeth have the function of 
chewing food. 
The difference between the Selected Effect account of function and Plantinga’s 
‘design’ plan model of proper function appears to be merely one of focus. Plantinga takes 
the central and paradigm cases of proper function to be cases where an item is present in 
the system because an intelligent designer selected that item to perform some function. 
He extends this model, in a somewhat metaphorical sense, to other selection mechanisms 
such as natural selection.27 By contrast, one motivation for Wright’s simple Etiological 
account was to treat artifactual and organismic function in a univocal manner. By 
                                                     
27 Plantinga, Warrant and Proper Function, p 21. 
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restricting the kinds of causal mechanisms that can be used to explain a functional item’s 
presence in its system to domain-specific selection mechanisms, the Selected Effect 
theory sacrifices some degree of unification, but treating artifactual and organismic 
function in a univocal manner remains a motivation. This difference is minor enough that 
I believe we are justified in treating Plantinga’s ‘design’ plan model as a formulation of 
the Selected Effect theory, rather than a competing theory.  
The Selected Effect theory of function remains controversial and many objections 
have been leveled against it in the literature on functions. Given that Plantinga’s ‘design’ 
plan model is one formulation of the Selected Effect theory, it is not surprising that, in 
some cases, similar objections have been leveled at Plantinga’s account of warrant in the 
epistemological literature. In the next section, I will review four objections to the 
Selected Effect theory, and discuss how these objections apply or fail to apply to 
Plantinga’s theory of warrant. In the case of two of these four objections, similar 
objections have been made to epistemic theories based on Plantinga’s ‘design’ plan 
model. In the remaining two cases, to the best of my knowledge, no similar objections 
have been made to Plantinga’s theory of warrant, and it is at least not obvious that an 
objection could be made to Plantinga’s theory on the same basis. The reasons why this is 
the case may prove informative when it comes to the task of constructing an alternative 
functionalist theory of knowledge. 
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2. Objections to the Selected Effect Theory of Function 
The following objections to the Selected Effect theories of function were 
cataloged by Christopher Boorse in his “A Rebuttal on Functions.”28 
The first objection to the Selected Effect theory of functions that we will consider 
is that some systems can intuitively be functional despite the fact that no selection 
mechanism played a role in these systems coming into being. One example of this is 
Kenneth Schaffner’s case of a bursa of Fabricius, an organ which, in birds, performs a 
vital role in the immune system, performing a similar immunological role in a mutant 
sterile human being born near Three Mile Island. Since this human is sterile, this bursa of 
Fabricius is not currently being selected for, and, since it was the product of a mutation, it 
is not present in the human because of natural selection. Nevertheless, Schaffner claims 
that we would say that the bursa is performing an immunological function in the mutant 
human.29 
A similar case is one of the most damaging counterexamples to Plantinga’s theory 
of warrant. This is the even more improbable case of Swampman, an atom-for-atom 
replica of Donald Davidson, which came into being as the highly improbable, but 
nomologically possible, result of a lightning strike in a swamp. Swampman’s cognitive 
faculties are the result of an astronomically improbable accident, and are not the result of 
any selection mechanism. Yet, intuitively, Swampman has the same justification and 
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warrant for his perceptual beliefs that Davidson does.30 
 A second objection to the Selected Effect theory is that an item in a system 
belonging to one domain can be selected for by a process that is isomorphic to a selection 
mechanism belonging to another domain, yet the item intuitively fails to have the 
function this suggests. Kenneth Schaffner gives an example of ball bearings, systems 
which belong to the domain of artifacts, being acted on by a process isomorphic to 
natural selection, the selection mechanism for the domain of organisms. In this case, ball 
bearings of at least three types are rolling down a plane towards a gulf. On the other side 
of this gulf, there is a cloning machine, which, if a ball bearing falls into it, will exactly 
replicate the ball bearing. If a ball bearing is too rough, it will not be moving fast enough 
to clear the gulf, and so will not be replicated. If a ball bearing is too smooth, it will be 
moving too fast, and will overshoot the cloning machine. After a long enough series of 
plane, gulf, and cloning machine, plane, gulf, and cloning machine, ball bearings of a 
type that is neither too rough or too smooth will be differentially reproduced by the 
cloning machines. Yet, intuitively, ball bearings of this type do not have the function of 
rolling off the plane at the optimal speed.31 
 There is a similar objection found in the epistemological literature. This objection 
is not directly aimed at Plantinga’s theory of warrant, but at a theory of justification 
proposed by Michael Bergmann based on Plantinga’s theory of warrant. Brains belong to 
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the domain of organs and organisms, but could, in principle, be constructed using the 
same intelligent design process that is the selection mechanism for the domain of 
artifacts. Earl Conee and Richard Feldman note that “if future cognitive scientists create 
human-like brains in vats for cognitive research, and design them to think as ordinary 
people do but to live in vat environments,” then the cognitive faculties of those brains are 
not truth-aimed, will not reliably produce true beliefs in the environment they were 
designed for, and will not have the function of reliably forming true beliefs.32 However, 
Conee and Feldman state that it still seems that the envatted brains’ beliefs are justified.  
A third objection to the Selected Effect theory is that there are many examples in 
biology of traits that perform a function without currently being selected for it, or even 
ever being selected for it. One example of this is exaption, where a trait was originally 
selected for in order to perform one function, but was later co-opted to perform a 
different function. For example, the females of a species of sea turtle, Chelonia mydas, 
once a year, use their front flippers to drag themselves up on the beach and spend many 
hours laboriously digging holes for their eggs, using their hind flippers as trowels. 
Intuitively, the flippers of these sea turtles perform the function of land locomotion and 
digging, but that is not why those flippers are there. Instead, the flippers are there because 
                                                     
32 Michael Bergmann cites this objection in Justification Without Awareness: A Defense of Epistemic 
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 Bergmann’s own reply to this case is that it is ambiguous. One possibility is that the brain’s proper 
function is determined by the cognitive scientists which created it. In which case, the brain lacks any truth-
aimed proper function, and its beliefs do not admit of justification. (Bergmann seems to think that this 
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they have been selected for the function of swimming.33 
It is not clear that this objection to the Selected Effect theory of function also 
applies to Plantinga’s theory of warrant. However, this is not necessarily to Plantinga’s 
credit, and the reasons why this objection does not clearly apply to his theory of warrant 
demonstrate two non-fatal weaknesses of his theory. 
One reason that this objection does not clearly apply to Plantinga’s theory is that 
there is an ambiguity in how to characterize the ‘interests’ or ‘intentions’ of natural 
selection. In most Selected Effect theories, what is important for whether an effect of an 
item is its function or not is if the selection mechanism is causally responsible for an item 
being present in its system because it has that effect. For Plantinga, what matters is 
whether the ‘designer’ ‘intended’ or had an ‘interest’ in the item having that effect. 
Plantinga grants that there may be certain unintended by-products which arise as a causal 
consequence of a system working as ‘designed,’ but are nevertheless not specified in the 
system’s ‘design’ plan. For example, “I design a refrigerator, one consequence of my 
design is that when a screwdriver touches a certain wire, the refrigerator will emit a loud 
angry spark. I didn’t intend for it to work this way; I have no interest in its doing that 
under those conditions and don’t care whether or it does or not.”34 
In the case of the sea turtle, it is ambiguous whether natural selection ‘intended’ 
for the turtle’s flippers to be used for the purpose of digging and land locomotion or had 
an ‘interest’ in whether or not they could work in this way. It is hardly the case that 
natural selection is ‘disinterested’ in this matter – if by some mischance, a mutation 
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caused a variant turtle flipper that was incapable of even laborious and painful digging 
and land locomotion, but still capable of swimming, that mutation would be selected 
against. However, natural selection does not explain why the turtle’s flippers are capable 
of digging and land locomotion. It does not appear that natural selection ‘intended’ for the 
turtle’s flippers to perform this function – it did not ‘will’ or cause the turtle’s flippers to 
perform that function. If the ‘design’ plan model departs from the Selected Effect theory, 
and declares that the ‘interests’ and not the ‘intentions’ of natural selection matter, then it 
may be able to avoid this objection. If it is the ‘intentions’ of natural selection that are 
important, and not the ‘interests,’ then this objection would apply to the ‘design’ plan 
model of proper function.  
However, even it is ‘intentions’ and not ‘interests’ that matter for Plantinga, it is 
not clear that a counter-example to Plantinga’s theory of warrant can be constructed on 
this basis, even though this would be an objection to his theory of proper function. This 
objection applies when the mechanism that selected an item is purely that of natural 
selection, and not a mechanism that involves any sort of truly intentional and intelligent 
selection. In order to construct a counter-example to Plantinga’s theory of warrant on this 
basis, it would have to be a case involving a belief-forming mechanism 1) that is purely 
the result of natural selection (an instinct), 2) that was originally selected for some non-
truth-aimed effect, but 3) is now used for the purpose of reliably forming true beliefs, and 
4) the beliefs outputted by this mechanism are, intuitively, knowledge. 
It would be difficult to point out a single human belief-forming mechanism that 
meets these criteria. This especially the case if we, like a few philosophers of mind claim, 
think that propositional beliefs are sentences ‘written’ in our heads in our own native 
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language. Since language acquisition is at least partially the result of intentional learning 
and instruction on the part of children and their parents, a case could be made that any 
instinctual cognitive mechanism that outputs propositional beliefs has been at least 
partially modified by an intentional process, and is no longer purely the result of natural 
selection. It might be possible to construct a counterexample using non-human cognizers 
(perhaps Martians who, purely through instinct, communicate with others and construct 
mental sentences in some language), but it is not clear that there would be sufficient 
intuitive pull for the judgment that the output of the Martian’s exapted instinct counts as 
knowledge in order for such a counter-example to be conclusive. 
The difficulty of constructing such a counterexample highlights a weakness of, 
not necessarily Plantinga’s theory of warrant, but rather his formulation of it. Plantinga’s 
‘design’ plan approach centrally focuses on cases of manufactured artifacts, and only 
extends to the functions of intentional ‘aftermarket’ modifications performed on artifacts 
in a metaphorical, extended sense. Yet most paradigm cases of human propositional 
knowledge are not the result of natural instincts, but rather are the result of cognitive 
skills which are acquired as a result of instruction or habit. Humans are not simply made, 
they are grown. Human agency, our capacity to teach others and to be taught by others, 
and our capacity for self-improvement deserve pride-of-place in any functionalist account 
of knowledge.  
This is a separate problem from the difficulties Plantinga’s ‘design’ plan model 
has in cases of exaption. In cases of exaption, it appears that Plantinga must either 
implausibly claim that items do not have exapted functions (or at least that exapted 
functions are not ‘proper’), or else break ranks with the Selected Effect theorists and 
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claim, again implausibly, that it is the ‘interests’ and not the ‘intentions’ of the ‘designer’ 
that matters. In learning, we might say that existing neuronal structures are reused and put 
to a different use than originally called for in their genetic ‘design’ plan (and, as a result, 
these neuronal structures are not being ‘properly’ used). However, I believe that such 
reuse typically means that those structures are being selectively maintained by some 
phenotypic adaptive mechanism. If Plantinga’s ‘design’ plan model is merely one 
formulation of the Selected Effect theory (as I believe it is), then he should be able to 
account for this kind of reuse by saying that the intentional or ‘intentional’ modifications 
and maintenance performed by this phenotypic adaptive mechanism have also modified 
the ‘design’ plan. And Plantinga does, indeed, make this claim.35  
The problem is not that Plantinga’s ‘design’ plan model cannot be extended to 
handle aftermarket modifications in the case of manufactured goods and acquired 
cognitive skills in the case of humans. The problem is that such extensions may well 
prove to be cumbersome, and that, in epistemology, these ‘aftermarket’ modifications are 
the rule, not the exception. So long as we need to reconstruct a functionalist theory of 
knowledge on a new basis (as the preceding two objections suggests), we should attempt 
to formulate the theory in such a way that the human capacity for self-improvement is 
given central focus. I will return to this point in the next chapter. 
It is more obvious that a fourth objection to the Selected Effect theory of function, 
and the final objection I will review in this section, does not apply to Plantinga’s theory 
of warrant, although it still applies to his ‘design’ plan model of proper function. This 
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objection is that there are many different kinds of traits that are maintained by natural 
selection, but are intuitively not functional. For example, a stretch of junk DNA might be 
selected for over a stretch of protein-encoding DNA that has the effect of making the 
organism less fit. However, it would be counter-intuitive to say that junk DNA has the 
function of ‘doing nothing,’ and, indeed, junk DNA is a paradigm case of a non-
functional item. Selfish DNA likewise plays no role in protein synthesis, but has the 
ability to spread itself to other parts of the organism’s genome, and is hence selected for, 
despite the fact that it can sometimes do damage to the organism. Finally, segregation-
distorter genes are selected for because they sabotage gametes that do not have them.36 
This objection does not apply to Plantinga’s theory of warrant, since Plantinga’s 
theory requires that in order for a belief to be warranted, the cognitive faculty responsible 
for forming the belief must not only be properly functioning, but also must be aimed at 
producing true beliefs. Because of this condition, the specter of functional junk DNA, 
selfish DNA, or segregation-distorter genes does not haunt Plantinga’s theory of warrant. 
However, the objection to Plantinga’s ‘design’ plan model of proper function still stands. 
The fact that Plantinga’s theory of warrant is immune to this objection while his 
account of proper function is not is notable for two reasons. First, the requirement that in 
order for a cognitive faculty must be truth-aimed in order to produce knowledge is at 
least consistent with the claim that humans and cognizers in general have goals, and that 
these goals are typically promoted by forming true beliefs. This is important because 
Boorse’s goal-based account of function requires that functional systems must be goal-
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directed. Secondly, this shows that an epistemic theory based on an account of function 
can avoid objections aimed at the account of function the theory is based on. This 
suggests that a functionalist account of knowledge based on Boorse’s account of function 
may be able to avoid some of the objections facing Boorse’s account. 
In this section, I have reviewed four objections to the Selected Effect theory of 
function. Two of these objections, in the form of the Swampman case and the case of 
artificial envatted brains, also applied to Plantinga’s theory of warrant, or at least to 
epistemic theories based on his ‘design’ plan model. Plantinga’s theory of warrant avoids 
a third objection, but in a way that suggests that functionalist epistemic theories should 
place greater focus on the functions of ‘aftermarket’ modifications than on the functions 
of ‘manufactured’ systems. Plantinga’s theory of warrant avoids the fourth objection, in a 
way that demonstrates that his theory is compatible with the claim that all cognizers are 
goal-directed systems and demonstrates that functionalist epistemic theories may be 
immune to some of the objections aimed at the theories of function they are based on. 
In the next section, I will review an alternative theory of function that may avoid 
the objections facing the Selected Effect theories of function, and may prove to be a 
better foundation for a functionalist theory of knowledge. 
 
3. Boorse’s General Goal Contribution Account of Function 
  As I have mentioned, the Selected Effect theory is descended from Wright’s 
Etiological theory of function. One objection to Wright’s theory was that it was overly 
broad, and one motivation for the Selected Effect theory was to narrow Wright’s theory. 
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However, even Wright’s original theory was too narrow to explain the Swampman and 
similar cases. According to Wright’s theory, and the Etiological family of theories in 
general, an item is functional only if attributing a function helps to explain why the item 
is present in the system it belongs to. In the case of Swampman, there simply is no 
explanation of why any of the items in Swampman’s system are present – they are there 
simply due to chance. Yet, intuitively, Swampman’s heart performs the function of 
pumping blood, and his various cognitive faculties perform the function of reliably 
forming true beliefs. In order to explain the Swampman case, as we need to do in order to 
provide a plausible functionalist account of knowledge, we need to look further afield for 
an alternative account of function. 
 One alternative to the Etiological family of theories is Robert Cummins’ Causal 
Role account.37 This account rejects the idea that functional attributions necessarily 
explain why an item is present in its containing system. According to Cummins’ account, 
an item’s function just is its disposition to causally contribute to some output capacity of 
its complex containing system. Unlike the Etiological and Selected Effect theories, the 
Causal Role account does grant that Swampman’s various faculties do have functions. 
For example, Swampman’s eyes do have the disposition of causally contributing to his 
seeing the Sun, so that is one of their functions. 
 A major objection to this account of function is that it has massive problems with 
overbreadth. To give only two examples, this account yields the counterintuitive 
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implications that the function of mists is to make rainbows,38 and that certain genes have 
the function of causing cancerous tumors to grow.39 In both of these cases, these items 
(mists, mutant genes) have a disposition to causally contribute to an output capacity 
(rainbows, having cancer) of the complex, or at least more complex, containing system 
they belong to. 
 Christopher Boorse’s General Goal Contribution account, like Cummins’ theory, 
rejects Wright’s claim that an item’s function necessarily explains its presence in its 
containing system. Unlike Cummins’ account, Boorse’s account requires that a function 
must promote some goal of the system, not merely some output capacity of the system. 
This avoids many of the Causal Role account’s problems with overbreadth, while still 
being broad enough to capture cases of functions that the Etiological and Causal Role 
accounts are too narrow to capture, including the Swampman and artificial envatted brain 
cases. The cognitive faculties of Swampman do perform the function of contributing to 
Swampman’s system goals of forming true beliefs and avoiding false beliefs. Likewise, 
an artificial envatted brain, if implanted in an ordinary human body, would function in 
such a way as to promote these same goals. In formal terms, Boorse’s General Goal 
Contribution account states that: “X is performing the function Z in the G-ing of S at t, 
means at t, X is Z-ing and the Z-ing of X is making a causal contribution to the goal G of 
the goal-directed system S.”40 
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 One objection to this account is that it is difficult to provide a principled way of 
identifying the goals of systems such as organisms.41 In the context of a functionalist 
theory of knowledge, I believe this objection can be avoided. In this context, we do not 
need a full-fledged account of goals. All that needs to be the case is that cognizers, qua 
cognizers, are one kind of goal-directed system, and that forming true beliefs and 
avoiding false beliefs typically promote the goals of cognizers. Plantinga, by requiring 
that cognitive faculties, in order to produce warranted beliefs, must be truth-aimed as 
well as properly functioning, does seem to claim that cognizers of the sort capable of 
having warranted beliefs are systems that have goals, and that these goals are typically 
promoted by the formation of true beliefs. 
It is important to note, for functional systems in general, the goals of the system 
are not necessarily the same as the desires of the system. It is implausible that simple 
organisms such as viruses and microbes have desires, but they are still, intuitively, goal-
directed systems. Boorse suggests that individual survival and reproduction are the apical 
goals of living things, but I would suggest that, at least in the case of humans, the goals of 
humans are best understood in terms of self-actualization or some other account of 
eudemonia or “the human good.”42 Of course, knowledge does not always promote this 
goal or goals, but knowledge at least typically promotes them. So, it makes some sense to 
call an item that typically produces knowledge, and, by producing knowledge, typically 
promotes “the human good,” an “intellectual virtue,” following Greco’s term. 
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A key feature of Boorse’s account, as we have discussed it to this point, is that it 
identifies tokens of functions, not types of functions, in contrast to the Etiological and 
Selected Effect theories. According to the Etiological and Selected Effect theories, the 
reason why my teeth have the function of chewing food is that my ancestor’s teeth, which 
were the same type, belonging to the same kind or category, as my teeth. They had the 
same type of effect as my teeth, that of allowing food to be chewed. As a consequence of 
this, having that type of tooth was selected for, and this explains why I have that kind of 
tooth. 
By contrast, Boorse’s account identifies tokens of function. Every individual 
instance of an item causing a certain effect is a different token of function. According to 
Boorse’s account, every time an item in a system has a causal effect that promotes the 
goals of the system, that item is performing a token function. For example, if a pocket 
bible stops a bullet, saving a soldier’s life, that bible is performing the function of saving 
the soldier’s life. This is true, claims Boorse, even though it seems odd to say that saving 
the soldier’s life by stopping bullets is ‘the’ function of the bible, and the bible performed 
that function only by accident.43 
One of the main motivations for Plantinga’s theory of warrant is the Strange and 
Fleeting Process Problem facing simple reliablism. Simple reliablism is the claim that a 
belief is justified just if it is formed by a reliable belief forming process. Strange and 
Fleeting Processes are belief-forming processes that appear to be reliable, but are used by 
the cognitive agent only by accident. An example of such a strange and fleeting process is 
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Plantinga’s case of the Serendipitous Brain Lesion. In this case, a woman, as a result of 
brain lesion, forms the belief that she has a brain lesion. This process appears to be 
reliable (since whenever she forms a belief by this process, that belief is true), but, 
intuitively, her true belief is not warranted.44 
Given Boorse’s account of function, the serendipitous brain lesion does 
(accidentally) perform the function of producing a true belief. As a result, a theory of 
knowledge based on Boorse’s account, as we have discussed it so far, would not be able 
to explain why true beliefs formed by a reliable but strange and fleeting process are not 
warranted, justified, or known. Fortunately, Boorse addresses a similar issue (the oddness 
of saying that stopping the bullet and saving the soldier’s life was ‘the’ function of the 
soldier’s pocket bible) by pursuing a two-stage “adjectival” strategy of conceptual 
analysis. 
In the first stage of the adjectival strategy, the broadest plausible analysis of the 
concept is found. Boorse claims that the account of function we have discussed to this 
point is such an analysis of function. The second stage of this strategy is to handle “all 
debatable cases of over-breadth by adjectival qualification.”45 This second stage consists 
of arguing that all examples that fit the conditions of the broad analysis are things of that 
kind, and that any intuitions we have otherwise in the debatable cases stem from the fact 
that these examples are not members of some large sub-category within that kind. We can 
qualify what sub-kind we are talking about by applying some adjective to describe the 
sub-category. 
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We have already dealt extensively with one sub-kind of function – proper 
function, function of a type that an item performs when it is performing as ‘designed.’ It 
is clear that functions in general are not specific enough to be an acceptable basis for a 
functionalist epistemic theory. However, there are also cases that demonstrate that the 
sub-kind of functions that Plantinga bases his theory on, proper functions, are also not an 
acceptable basis for such a theory: the Swampman case and the artificial envatted brain 
case.  
Additionally, John Greco also points out that there are cases of improper function 
that actually increases a person’s capacity to know. Greco cites Oliver Sacks’ story of 
autistic twins, who enjoyed incredible mathematical abilities associated with their 
autism.46 Plantinga can respond to this case by claiming that the twin’s mathematical 
abilities are the result of certain cognitive modules that are still properly functioning, 
despite the damage to other areas of the twins’ brains. However, since Plantinga claims 
that beliefs are warranted only to the extent that the environment the cognitive faculty is 
currently functioning in resembles the environment the faculty was ‘designed’ for, this 
counter-intuitively suggests that the twins have less warrant for their mathematical beliefs 
than neuro-typical humans (who would only be able to arrive at the same conclusions 
after long and laborious difficulties).  
Boorse provides accounts of two other sub-categories of functions: Medically 
normal or healthy function, and function that is statistically normal to the individual. In 
the next section, I will argue that medically normal function is not an appropriate basis 
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for a functionalist epistemic theory. A function that is statistically normal to the individual 
is a more plausible basis for such a theory, and a theory of knowledge based on this sub-
category of function would be strikingly similar to John Greco’s virtue theory of 
knowledge, with its appeal to the notion that, in order for a belief-forming mechanism to 
count as an intellectual virtue, it must be a ‘stable’ part of the agent’s cognitive character. 
I will demonstrate these similarities, and show how such a partial functionalist theory 
might correctly handle the various problem cases we have discussed in this chapter. 
 
4. Function and Virtue 
Boorse defines “health” in a member of a reference class as “normal functional 
ability: the readiness of each internal part to perform all its normal functions on typical 
occasions with at least typical efficiency.” In turn, Boorse defines normal function of a 
part of process within members of a reference class as “a statistically typical contribution 
by it to their individual survival and reproduction,” and defines a reference class as “a 
natural class of organisms of uniform functional design; specifically, an age group of a 
sex of a species.”47 
Medically normal or healthy function is not an appropriate basis for a 
functionalist epistemic theory, for several reasons. Firstly, autistic savants are not 
functioning in a medically normal way, but they are functioning in a way that, intuitively, 
is consistent with their beliefs being justified and warranted. Secondly, in the variants of 
the Swampman case where Swampman is infertile (or, perhaps, lacks DNA but is still 
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able to carry on protein synthesis), it is difficult (if not impossible) to even assign 
Swampman to a species, and medical normality, for Boorse, is relative to a reference 
class within a species. Thirdly, medical normal function does not provide an explanation 
of why a merely healthy and medically normal agent does not obtain knowledge when 
they accidentally replicate an intellectual feat that is normal when performed by an 
intellectual superstar. One example of such an accidental replication of an extraordinary 
intellectual feat is John Greco’s Careless Math Student case. In this case, the subject is 
taking a math test, and adopts a correct algorithm for solving a problem on a whim. This 
results in the student getting the problem right, but, intuitively, the student does not know 
the answer. A careful math student, who has internalized this correct algorithm, does 
know the answer to the problem if she uses this correct algorithm to arrive at the right 
answer.48 Yet both students are healthy and medically normal.  
The second sub-category of function Boorse investigates is functioning that is 
statistically normal, relative to the individual – each internal part performs all of its 
statistically typical functions with at least statistically typical efficiency, relative to the 
performance of these parts and functions in the individual.49 In Schaffner’s case of the 
human mutant from Three Mile Island with the immunologically active bursa of 
Fabricius, the function the bursa of Fabricius is performing is by no means medically 
normal in adult male humans. However, this organ does have a good track record of 
performing this function in Schaffner’s mutant, and so we can conclude that it is normal 
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for this organ to perform that function relative to the mutant. An account of this kind of 
function might be: Effect E of item I in system S is a normal function of I, relative to S, if 
and only if 1) E typically promotes the system-goals of S, 2) it is statistically normal in S 
for I to cause E. A partial theory of knowledge, based on this sub-category of function, 
could claim that S knows that p only if S’s belief B that p is the product of a cognitive 
mechanism that typically (statistically speaking, and relative to S) performs the function 
of forming true beliefs and avoids forming false beliefs. 
A functionalist theory of knowledge based on this kind of function, function that 
is normal to the individual, would be strikingly similar to the virtue theory of knowledge 
outlined by John Greco in Achieving Knowledge.50 According to Greco’s theory, a belief 
counts as knowledge only if it is the product of a cognitive virtue. Greco does not provide 
a complete account of virtues or cognitive virtues, but one plausible interpretation is that 
a virtue is a mechanism that reliably performs a function which typically promotes the 
agent’s eudemonia or the human good, and is a stable and constitutive part of the agent’s 
character. This account of virtue refers to trait-virtues, which can be roughly understood 
as an ability whose function tends to promote eudemonia, rather than responsibility-
virtues, such as ‘open-mindedness,’ which can be thought of as subsidiary goals which, if 
pursued, promote the apical goal of eudemonia. A cognitive virtue might plausibly be 
defined as a trait-virtue that has the function of forming true beliefs and avoiding the 
formation of false beliefs.  
If we assume that eudemonia is the apical system-goal of agents, then a 
                                                     
50 John Greco, Achieving Knowledge: A Virtue-Theoretic Account of Epistemic Normativity, Cambridge 
University Press, 2010. 
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functionalist theory of knowledge based on the notion of a cognitive mechanism that is 
functioning normally, relative to the individual, shares many of the same conditions for 
knowledge as Greco’s virtue theory. Each theory does add additional necessary 
conditions. Greco’s virtue theory requires that the cognitive mechanism (whose typical 
function is reliably forming true beliefs, the performance of which typically promotes 
eudemonia) be a constitutive and stable part of the agent’s cognitive character. A 
functionalist theory of this sort requires that the mechanism be functioning normally. This 
last requirement does not seem a heavy additional burden for Greco’s theory to bear – in 
order for a belief to be knowledge, it does seem reasonable to require that the virtue or 
ability that produced it is functioning normally. If Greco’s theory accepts this burden, 
then his theory merely adds some additional necessity conditions to a functionalist theory 
of knowledge based on Boorse’s notion of function normal to an individual. 
Greco’s virtue theory of knowledge handles cases of strange and fleeting 
processes by appealing to the notion that cognitive virtues are stable and constitutive 
parts of an epistemic agent’s cognitive character. For example, he can explain the Autistic 
Twins case by claiming that the twins’ cognitive abilities are a constitutive and stable part 
of their cognitive characters, even if they are the result of cognitive faculties that are 
improperly functioning and not medically normal.51 Similarly, we can claim that the 
function these faculties perform, that of producing true mathematical beliefs, is 
statistically typical for those faculties, relative to the twins. 
There is an ambiguity in the both term ‘stable’ (from Greco’s account of 
                                                     
51 John Greco, Achieving Knowledge: A Virtue-Theoretic Account of Epistemic Normativity, Cambridge 
University Press, 2010, p 150. 
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knowledge) and ‘statistically typical’ (from Boorse’s account of normal function). 
‘Statistically typical’ could mean that the mechanism has a good track record of 
performing a certain function with a certain level of efficiency. It could also mean that the 
mechanism has a propensity towards performing a certain function at a certain level of 
efficiency. Likewise, a mechanism being a ‘stable’ part of an agent’s character might 
mean that it has a good track record of being present in the agent’s character, or it could 
mean that mechanism has a propensity towards being present in the agent’s character, or 
that the agent has a propensity towards possessing the mechanism. 
This ambiguity can be shown in the Swampman case. Since Swampman has just 
come into existence, Swampman’s cognitive faculties have no track record. Yet, 
intuitively, those cognitive faculties are a stable part of Swampman’s cognitive character. 
Likewise, there is a sense in which Swampman’s cognitive mechanisms are functioning 
normally, relative to Swampman. 
This same ambiguity is present in the term ‘reliable,’ and has been addressed in 
the reliablist literature in epistemology. There are at least two possible ways to 
understand ‘reliable’ – as having a high frequency of success in the actual world, or as a 
propensity towards being successful, i.e., of having a high ratio of success across a range 
of possible worlds. Alvin Goldman argues that reliability, at least in the context of 
epistemology, is best understood as a propensity rather than a frequency, since the actual 
use of a process may be too numerically limited or skewed to represent an intuitively 
appropriate ratio.52 A propensity account of reliability plays a role in Greco’s account of 
                                                     
52 Alvin Goldman, Epistemology and Cognition, Harvard University Press, 1986, p 48. 
 
50 
 
ability: “S has an ability A(R/C) relative to environment E [and condition C] = Across the 
set of relevantly close worlds W where S is in [condition] C and in [environment] E, S 
has a high rate of success in achieving R.”53 
If we understand ‘statistically typical’ in the sense of a propensity, then producing 
true beliefs can be statistically typical for Swampman’s perceptual faculties, relative to 
Swampman and some range of possible worlds. If we understand ‘statistically typical’ in 
the sense of a frequency in the history of the actual world, then, since Swampman has no 
history (and might have a short future), producing true beliefs is not a statistically normal 
function of Swampman’s perceptual faculties. Fortunately, I believe that ‘statistically 
typical,’ or at least ‘typical,’ can be understood in the sense of a propensity. 
Exactly how to understand the notion of an item ‘typically’ performing a certain 
function or being a ‘stable’ part of an agent’s character will need to be more thoroughly 
explicated, as Greco notes: “As a number of critics have pointed out, it is not clear why 
the man with the brain lesion does not have a cognitive ability, and therefore not clear 
how the present account addresses the case. Put another way, it is not clear why the 
process associated with the brain lesion is not part of reliable cognitive character. Thus 
we can imagine that the lesion has been there since birth, and that the associated process 
is both stable and reliable in the relevant senses. Again, more needs to be said.”54  
However, it might be premature to attempt to provide an account of what it is for 
a belief-forming ability to be a ‘stable’ part of an agent’s cognitive character, or to 
attempt to provide an account of which reference class is relevant for judging whether or 
                                                     
53 Greco, Achieving Knowledge, p 77. 
 
54 Greco, Achieving Knowledge, p 151. 
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not a belief-forming mechanism is functioning ‘normally.’ That is because we have 
neglected to provide an account of a more basic concept – what it is for a belief-forming 
mechanism to be reliable. One of the major problems facing reliabilist theories in 
general, which claim that being formed by a reliable belief-forming process is a necessary 
condition for knowledge, is the Generality Problem. This problem, which faces both 
Greco’s original trait-virtue theory and our own Boorsean functionalist theory, arises 
because reliability is a property of a type of process, and not a token of a process, and a 
given belief-forming process belongs to as many different types as it has properties.55  
The Generality Problem consists of the problem of specifying which of the 
multitude of types a given belief-forming process belongs to is relevant to the epistemic 
project. Without providing a solution to this problem, it is impossible to formally judge 
the reliability of a given belief-forming process. And both the Boorsean functionalist 
theory and Greco’s trait-virtue theory need to provide an account of reliability, since, 
even if a belief-forming mechanism is a ‘stable’ part of its agent’s cognitive character, 
and it is functioning ‘normally,’ it would not be able to produce knowledge or count as an 
intellectual virtue if it only produced true beliefs by accident, even when functioning 
‘normally.’ 
In the next chapter, I will develop a model of skill-learning, which will provide a 
picture of cognitive skills. This model can be expanded to include innate cognitive 
abilities that are the result of evolution by natural selection or intelligent design. It can 
                                                     
55 The Proper Function epistemic theories are reliabilist, but are largely immune to the Generality Problem. 
This is because the relevant type of belief-forming process whose reliability these theories are concerned 
with may not include an actual world process, but only processes that count as activations of properly 
functioning versions of actual-world cognitive faculties. The set of properly functioning versions of a given 
cognitive faculty is specified by that cognitive faculty’s ‘design’ plan. 
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also be expanded, with some difficulty, to include deliberative belief formation. Based on 
this model of skill learning, I will propose a rough-draft of a solution to the Generality 
Problem.  
In Chapter 3, I will use a refined version of this proposed solution to the 
Generality Problem to provide an account of a belief’s epistemic strength. This account, 
along with accounts of justification and anti-Gettier conditions (which, sadly, are outside 
the scope of this dissertation), could be used to construct a complete theory of 
knowledge.  
In Chapter 4, I will demonstrate that the proposed solution to the Generality 
Problem also provides at least a partial solution to the Strange and Fleeting Process 
Problem. The basis of this partial solution is that belief-forming mechanisms that are 
reliable, relative to the type that the proposed solution claims is relevant to the epistemic 
project, are also ‘stable’ parts of an agent’s cognitive character in Greco’s sense. This 
result means that the kinds of belief-forming processes involved in Strange and Fleeting 
Process Problem cases often are reliable, relative to some ‘commonsense’ process-type, 
but are unreliable, relative to the process-type that is actually relevant to the epistemic 
project. 
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Chapter 2 
A Skill-Based Solution to the Generality Problem 
 
0. Introduction 
One of the major obstacles facing reliablism (the claim that a belief being formed 
by a reliable belief-forming process or mechanism is a necessary condition for the belief 
to amount to knowledge) is the Generality Problem. The Generality Problem arises 
because reliability is generally thought to be a property of a type of process, and not a 
property of a one-time process token. Given this, in order to judge the reliability of a 
process, we must first specify which of the types the process belongs to is relevant to the 
project at hand, and a given token of a process belongs to as many different types as the 
process has properties. The Generality Problem consists of the problem of providing a 
principled method of specifying which type of the multitude a given belief-forming 
process token belongs to is relevant to the epistemic project.  
 The solution to the Generality Problem I will propose in this chapter has two 
major sources of inspiration. The first source of inspiration is the trait-virtue theory of 
knowledge proposed by John Greco in his 2010 book, Achieving Knowledge. In this 
book, Greco claims that a belief counts as knowledge only if it is the product of an 
intellectual virtue or ability, and compares intellectual virtues to athletic skills. This skill-
based model of belief-formation has several virtues. First, the kinds of cases that help 
motivate reliabilism often involve forming beliefs on the basis of an acquired cognitive 
54 
 
skill, which the epistemic subject has little reflective access to. The skill-based model 
places central focus on just these kinds of cases. Secondly, while as epistemic subjects we 
have little reflective access to just how our belief-forming or motor skills operate, these 
kinds of skills have been closely studied by psychologists. This study has provided a rich 
store of literature to draw on. 
 The second source of inspiration for this proposed solution is the Proper Function 
family of epistemic theories. These theories claim that a belief is warranted, justified, 
counts as knowledge, or has some other form of positive epistemic status only if it is 
formed by a properly functioning cognitive faculty. A cognitive faculty or other 
mechanism is properly functioning just to the extent that it is 1) functioning as 
‘designed,’ 2) is functioning in an environment similar to the one it was ‘designed’ for, 3) 
was ‘designed’ to perform the function it is performing, and 4) it would be reliable in 
performing this function if it was functioning as ‘designed’ and in the environment it was 
‘designed’ for. 
 Theories belonging to the Proper Function family are reliabilistic, but are largely 
immune to the Generality Problem. This is because, according to these theories, the type 
of mechanism whose relevance is relevant to the epistemic project does not necessarily 
include the token mechanism that was activated in the actual world. Instead, the relevant 
type whose reliability matters is the set of mechanisms that are functioning within 
‘intended’ environment and ‘tolerances’ specified by the ‘design’ plan of the actual world 
mechanism. Thus, if the ‘design’ plan of the mechanism that was activated in the actual 
world can be reconstructed, this reconstructed ‘design’ plan will also provide an answer 
to the Generality Problem. 
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 While the Generality Problem is not an important problem for the Proper Function 
family of epistemic theories, these theories do face a variety of other problems. As I 
argued in the previous chapter, some these problems arise from the Proper Function 
family’s reliance on the Selected Effect theory of function. In the previous chapter, I 
suggested that it may be possible to construct a functionalist epistemic theory based on an 
alternative theory of function (such as Christopher Boorse’s General Goal Contribution 
theory). Such a theory may be able provide a similar solution to the Generality Problem, 
by appealing to the various selection mechanisms that underlie the mechanisms that form 
our beliefs, while avoiding the problems the Proper Function theories face due to their 
reliance on the Selected Effect theory of function. 
 In this chapter, I will propose a skill-based model of belief-formation, and use this 
model to develop a solution to the Generality Problem. This proposed solution will 
follow the lead of the Proper Function family by appealing to the underlying mechanisms 
that shape our belief-forming mechanisms. However, this model and this solution will 
avoid the Proper Function family’s reliance on the Selected Effect theory of function, and 
will instead be at least compatible with Christopher Boorse’s General Goal Contribution 
theory of function (as described in the previous chapter).  
Additionally, the skill-based model of belief-formation will abandon the ‘design’ plan 
model used by the Proper Function family, which implicitly compares the processes 
which form our cognitive faculties to manufacture goods which are produced according 
to a blueprint. I will argue that not only does the skill-based model more closely capture 
the paradigm cases of beliefs formed through the use of a cognitive skill; it also provides 
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a better model for understanding natural, innate belief-forming abilities that are the 
product of evolution by natural selection. 
 In this chapter, my proposed solution to the Generality Problem will take the form 
of a rough working hypothesis. According to this working hypothesis, the belief-forming 
mechanism-type that is relevant to the epistemic project is what I will call the “activation 
type.” This type of mechanism consists of 'a' cognitive program stored at a certain 
address, and is activated by an activation mechanism under certain conditions. The 
activation mechanism is only responsible for activating whatever cognitive program 
token happens to be stored at that address when certain activation conditions obtain. The 
exact nature of the cognitive program stored at that address can vary from world to world 
and from time-slice to time-slice, but this variation is constrained by certain learning 
mechanisms, maintenance mechanisms, etc. 
 This working hypothesis is rough and in need of further development. I will argue 
that this version of my proposed solution satisfies two of the three adequacy conditions 
for a solution to the Generality Problem proposed by Richard Feldman and Earl Conee in 
their 1988 paper, “The Generality Problem for Reliabilism”, and partially satisfies the 
third adequacy condition. In the next chapter, I will provide a further developed version 
of this proposed solution that fully satisfies this third adequacy condition and also 
provides a way of specifying the epistemically relevant type of a given activation 
mechanism (a question I will leave unanswered in this chapter). 
 In the first section of this chapter, I will review the Generality Problem, and four 
previously proposed solutions to it. In the second section, I will discuss two 
psychological theories that have investigated the nature of skills, and develop a model 
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skill-based model based on these two theories. In the third section, I will use this skill-
based model of belief-formation to propose a rough draft of a solution to the Generality 
Problem. And in the fourth section, I will argue that this proposed rough draft of a 
solution to the Generality Problem satisfies two of the three adequacy conditions 
provided by Feldman and Conee, and partially satisfies a third. 
 
1. The Generality Problem, and Previously Proposed Solutions to It 
 In their 1998 paper “The Generality Problem for Reliabilism,” Earl Conee and 
Richard Feldman describe the Generality Problem for reliabilism and provide three 
adequacy conditions for any solution to the problem. As an illustration of the Generality 
Problem, Conee and Feldman offer the following case: Smith looks out his window, sees 
a maple tree, and forms the belief that a maple tree is nearby. Assuming conditions are 
normal, Smith intuitively appears to be justified in his belief. The token process 
responsible for Smith's belief is a member of several process types: 
1) process of a retinal image of such-and such- specific characteristics 
leading to a belief that there is a maple nearby 
2) process of relying on a leaf shape to form a tree-classifying judgment 
3) the visual process 
4) vision in bright sunlight 
5) perceptual processes that occurs in middle-aged men on Wednesdays 
6) processes which result in justified beliefs 
7) perceptual process of classifying by species a tree behind a solid 
obstruction. 
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8) Etc., etc., etc.....56 
 As this list demonstrates, any given belief-forming process belongs to many 
different types – in fact, a token belief-forming process will belong to as many different 
types as it has properties. These different types are, of course, not all equally reliable. In 
order for the reliabilist project to succeed, reliabilists must provide a principled method of 
specifying which of this multitude of types a given belief-forming process token belongs 
to is relevant to the epistemic project.  
 Conee and Feldman provide three necessary conditions for an adequate solution to 
this Generality Problem: 1) The solution must be principled, rather than making ad hoc 
case-by-case selections of types that match our intuitions. 2) The solution must make 
defensible epistemic classifications, and the types identified must have a reliability that is 
plausibly correlated with the justification of the resulting beliefs. 3) The solution must 
remain true to the spirit of the reliabilist approach – it should not identify the relevant 
type for a process in a way that smuggles in a non-reliabilist epistemic evaluation into the 
specification of the relevant types. For example, a proposed solution should not sort 
belief-forming processes into “basing a belief on sufficient  evidence” and “basing a 
belief on insufficient evidence,” since this would involve smuggling an evidentialist 
epistemic evaluation into a reliabilist theory.57 
 Since the publication of Conee and Feldman’s paper, many reliabilists have 
                                                     
56 The list of types, as well as the description of the case, is drawn from James R. Beebe, “The Generality 
Problem, Statistical Relevance and the Tri-Level Hypothesis,” Noûs 38:1 (2004), p 178. The case originally 
appears in Earl Conee and Richard Feldman, “The Generality Problem for Reliabilism,” Philosophical 
Studies, Vol. 89, No. 1 (Jan., 1998), pp. 1-2. 
 
57 Conee and Feldman, “The Generality Problem,” Philosophical Studies, Vol. 89, No. 1 (Jan., 1998), pp 3-
5. 
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attempted to provide solutions to the Generality Problem. I will review four of these 
proposed solutions below. This is by no means a complete list of the solutions that have 
been proposed, but it should give the reader some notion of the current field of play 
regarding this problem. 
 
1.1 A Quick Solution to the Generality Problem (Token Reliabilism)58 
 In his 2006 paper, “A Well-Founded Solution to the Generality Problem,” Juan 
Comesaña addresses one objection to a previously proposed solution to the Generality 
Problem, before supplying an objection of his own to it. (This was preliminary to 
Comesaña’s presentation of his own proposed solution to the Generality Problem, which I 
will address in the next sub-section.) This “quick” solution to the Generality Problem is 
token reliabilism: 
Token reliabilism: a belief is epistemically justified if and 
only if it was produced by a reliable token process. 
One objection to token reliabilism is that there appears to be no sense in asking what 
truth-value most of the outputs of a token process will have or would have. A type of 
process can be performed many times, so it clearly makes sense to ask what the ratio of 
successes and failures of a process-type is or will be. By contrast, a token process is a 
dated entity which takes place at a particular time. As a result, it appears that a token 
process cannot be repeated, and, as a result, it impossible to judge how reliable it is – it 
will either succeed or fail, and there is no ratio of successes and failures to measure.  
                                                     
58 This sub-section closely follows Juan Comesaña’s discussion of token reliablism in  "A Well-Founded 
Solution to the Generality Problem," Philosophical Studies, Vol. 129, No. 1, Selected Papers from the 2004 
Bellingham Conference (May, 2006), presented on pages 28-30. 
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 Comesaña argues that, while on the frequentist view of reliability (where the 
reliability of a process is just its ratio of successes to total number of trials over the 
history of the actual world) it is impossible to measure the reliability of a token process, it 
is possible to judge the reliability of a token process on a modal view of reliability. As 
Comesaña explains, just as we can meaningfully ask what would have happened to you 
(you, not merely someone very much like you) had you pursued a different career, we can 
also meaningfully ask what truth value your belief would have had if the token process 
that produced it (that very same process, not merely a different process of the same type) 
had operated in different circumstances. In order for this kind of token reliabilism to 
work, all that is required is that a given token process could have had different properties. 
If processes are extremely “modally fragile” and can only have exactly the same 
processes as it actually has, then token reliabilism will not work. But Comesaña argues 
that this view of processes is prima facie implausible: Intuitively, that fire could have 
burned down the entire house, although it didn’t. 
 Unfortunately for token reliabilism, Comesaña argues that, in order for token 
reliability to provide an adequate solution to the Generality Problem, we must also select 
a subset of those worlds in which the token process exists, and see what the truth-ratio of 
the beliefs produced by the token process is in those worlds. And the problem of 
specifying this subset of possible worlds is just the Generality Problem in a different 
guise. 
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1.2 A Well-Founded Solution to the Generality Problem 
 Comesaña’s own proposed solution to the Generality Problem is not so much a 
complete solution to the Problem as a way of arguing that Conee and Feldman must be 
committed to there being a solution to it, since (Comesaña argues) a form of the 
Generality Problem exists for their own epistemic theory, evidentialism. 
Evidentialism: Doxastic attitude D toward proposition p is 
epistemically justified for S at t if and only if having D 
towards p fits the evidence S has at t.59 
 Evidentialism does need to spell out what is meant for a belief to “fit” some 
evidence, or for a subject to “have” some evidence, but Comesaña suggests that we can 
ignore this point for now. He does note that Conee and Feldman think that a subject’s 
sensory states and beliefs count as part of the subject’s evidence. A common evidentalist 
claim is that, in order for a piece of information to count as part of a subject’s evidence, 
that information must be available to the subject upon reflection.  
 Comesaña provides a counterexample to naïve evidentialism: I do have the 
sensory state of seeming to perceive a computer in front of me, but that is not why I 
believe there is a computer in front of me. Instead, I believe that there is a computer in 
front of me on the basis that I see something gray in front of me. Intuitively, my belief is 
not justified, but my belief does fit evidence that I have. Comesaña explains that Conee 
and Feldman respond to cases like this by granting that my belief is justified, but only in 
an impersonal sense (what Comesaña calls “propositionally justified”) – my belief is 
                                                     
59 Comesaña, p 31. 
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justified in the sense that it fits with my evidence. However, my belief is not justified for 
me (it does not possess what Comesaña calls “doxastic justification”). This is because my 
belief is not well-founded – it is not based on the evidence which fits with my belief. 
Conee and Feldman’s account of well-foundedness is as follows: 
WF: S’s doxastic attitude D at t toward proposition p is 
well-founded if and only if 
i) having D toward p is justified for S at t: 
and 
ii) S has D toward p on the basis of some body of evidence 
e, such that 
a) S has e as evidence at t; 
b) having D toward p fits e; and 
c) there is no more inclusive body of evidence e’ had by S 
at t such that having D towards p does not fit e’.60 
 Comesaña claims that every adequate epistemological theory (including 
evidentialism) must appeal to the basing relationship which Conee and Feldman appeal to 
in their account of well-foundedness. He then argues that the notion of a basing 
relationship is all that is needed to solve the Generality Problem. 
 The key to Comesaña’s proposed solution to the Generality Problem is that, if 
there is always some evidence that the belief is based on, then the process that generates 
                                                     
60 Comesaña, p 33. 
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that belief will always instantiate a case of the type-schema producing a belief that p 
based on evidence E.61 With this starting point, Comesaña provides the following 
reliabilist theory of justification: 
Well-Founded Reliabilism: A belief that p by S is 
epistemically justified if and only if: 
i) S has evidence E; 
ii) the belief that p by S is based on E; and 
iii) the type producing a belief that p based on evidence E 
is a reliable type.62 
Comesaña argues that well-founded reliabilism satisfies Conee and Feldman’s 
three adequacy conditions for any solution to the Generality Problem. Of particular 
interest is his argument that it satisfies Conee and Feldman’s third adequacy condition – 
that the solution must be true to the spirit of reliabilism. Comesaña explains that his 
proposed solution does not consist of saying that a belief is justified if and only if it is 
based on good evidence. Instead, his solution provides a way of characterizing what it is 
for a piece of evidence to be good evidence for a proposition. (Namely, a piece of 
evidence is good evidence for a proposition just if, if you base your belief that p on that 
evidence, then your belief would tend to be true.) 
 Comesaña provides a possible counterexample to well-founded reliabilism: 
Ms. Accurate and Mr. Sloppy: “Suppose that both Ms. 
Accurate and Mr. Sloppy are in the following situation: 
                                                     
61 Comesaña, p 37. 
62 Comesaña, p 38, emphasis Comesaña’s. 
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they are facing a many-sided black figure against a white 
background under good lighting conditions (and while both 
are sober, etc.). The figure has 386 sides. Both Ms. 
Accurate and Mr. Sloppy have the capacity, to some degree 
or other, of telling how many sides a figure has just by 
briefly looking at it (without counting). For Mr. Sloppy, as 
for you and me, this capacity gets worse when the number 
of sides reaches five or six, and is just completely worthless 
when there are more than, say, eleven sides. But Ms. 
Accurate has the capacity to an extraordinary degree: she 
can tell how many sides a figure has just by briefly looking 
at it for figures with up to a thousand sides.”63 
Intuitively, Mr. Sloppy is unjustified in his belief, and Ms. Accurate is justified in 
her belief, yet it at least appears that they have the same evidence for their beliefs. 
Comesaña provides two possible replies to this possible counterexample. The first 
possible reply is to deny that Ms. Accurate and Mr. Sloppy have the same evidence. For 
example, we could claim that Ms. Accurate is basing her belief on the sensory experience 
of seeing clearly that a figure has 386 sides, while Mr. Sloppy is basing his belief on the 
sensory experience of seeing that a figure has many sides. Making this move would 
require the claim that any difference in the justification of subjects’ beliefs arising from 
different levels of ability to discriminate has to be explained in terms of a capacity to 
acquire better evidence. Comesaña notes that whether or not this claim is true is an 
                                                     
63Comesaña, p 40.  
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empirical question. 
The other possible reply Comesaña provides is to grant that Ms. Accurate and Mr. 
Sloppy have the same evidence, and modify the relevant type schema in response to this 
counterexample. One modification we could make is to say that, instead of the relevant 
type-schema being “producing a belief that p based on evidence E,” the relevant type-
schema is “producing a belief that p based on evidence E using method M.” The obvious 
objection to this move is that by introducing the notion of “using method M,” we are also 
reintroducing the Generality Problem – what do we mean by “method M”? Comesaña’s 
only reply to this objection is to note that it is an objection to the notion of well-
foundedness itself, and is therefore a problem for evidentialists as well. 
In addition to Comesaña’s proposed “well-founded” solution to the Generality 
Problem facing a serious counterexample, and his most important reply to this 
counterexample being a somewhat unsatisfactory “well, it’s a problem for evidentialists 
too,” it also departs significantly from reliabilist traditions.  
In constructing his theory of well-founded reliabilism, Comesaña relies on the 
crucial assumption that, for any justified belief, there is “always some evidence that the 
belief is based on.” In general, reliabilists think that what matters for the justification of a 
belief, or other positive epistemic statuses of a belief, is what caused that belief to come 
into being – namely, whether or not the belief was formed by a reliable belief-forming 
mechanism. For reliabilists, evidence matters only to the extent that the evidence forms a 
part of an appropriate causal chain that lead to the formation of the belief in question. 
This is especially true when the term “evidence” is narrowly defined (such as consisting 
only of information that is reflectively accessible to the subject), or when the reliabilist 
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theory places primary focus on cognitive skills (since skills may be activated in response 
to reflectively accessible information, but subjects typically have very limited reflective 
access to how skills actually work – the subject may have no idea what part of her 
sensory experience activated the skill). Some reliabilists even go so far as to claim that, in 
principle, it would be possible to have a justified belief that lacked any evidence 
whatsoever. 
Modifying Comesaña’s proposed relevant type-schema in response to this 
consideration leaves only “producing a belief that p using method M.” This modified 
type-schema leaves the inadequacy of Comesaña’s proposed solution to the Generality 
Problem quite exposed. Regardless of whether or not Comesaña has demonstrated that 
the Generality Problem is also a problem for evidentialists, his approach provides little 
traction for actually solving the problem. 
 
1.3 The Tri-Level/Statistical Relevance Solution to the Generality Problem 
A more promising approach towards solving the Generality Problem is proposed 
by James R. Beebe in his 2004 paper, “The Generality Problem, Statistical Relevance and 
the Tri-Level Hypothesis.”64 Beebe proposes a two-stage solution to the Generality 
Problem. In the first stage, Beebe proposes a “tri-level condition,” as a necessary but 
insufficient condition for a cognitive process token to belong to an epistemically relevant 
and reliable cognitive process type. This tri-level condition is based on the tri-level 
hypothesis, which has become the orthodox way cognitive scientists use to understand 
                                                     
64 James R. Beebe, “The Generality Problem, Statistical Relevance and the Tri-Level Hypothesis,” Noûs 
38:1 (2004), p 177-195. 
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explanations of cognitive behavior. According to this hypothesis, there are three basic 
levels at which any cognitive behavior can and should be explained. An item of cognitive 
behavior cannot be adequately explained at only one (or even two) of these levels, and, 
indeed, some cognitive scientists go so far as to claim that, if one could omit one of these 
levels of explanation without losing any predictive or explanatory power, then the system 
being explained is not an information processor. 
 These three levels are as follows: the computational level, the algorithmic level, 
and the implementation level. Explanations at the implementation level answer questions 
about how the cognitive behavior is implemented at the physical level, and are grounded 
in “hard” sciences such as physics and neurophysiology. A limitation of this level is that 
cognitive functions are multiply realizable at the implementation level. 
 Algorithimic explanations provide non-physical procedural explanations of the 
information-processing steps that are being carried out on particular systems, so can 
provide a certain kind of explanatory power that implementation explanations are unable 
to. But algorithmic explanations also have their limits: these kinds of explanations 
explain how the system processes information, but are silent on the matter of what that 
information is about – a system that is playing a game of chess and a system that is 
directing the course of an actual war could be using the very same algorithms. 
Computational level explanations, by providing an explanation of the system’s semantics, 
and not just how it processes syntax, provides a way of understanding how these two 
systems differ. 
 With this in mind, Beebe’ Tri-Level Condition is as follows:  
The Tri-Level Condition: The reliability of a cognitive 
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process type T determines the justification of any belief 
token produced by a cognitive process token t that falls 
under T only if all of the members of T: 
a) Solve the same type of information-processing 
problem i solved by t; 
b) Use the same information-processing procedure or 
algorithm t used in solving I; and 
c) Share the same cognitive architecture as t.65 
Beebe claims that Tri-Level Condition is not a complete solution to the Generality 
Problem – he notes that different sub-types of cognitive processes could all belong to the 
same computational and algorithmic types (being of the same implementation type is not 
necessary for satisfying the tri-level condition). I grant this claim is true, but whether or 
not this is relevant needs to be shown. In order to show that satisfying the Tri-Level 
Condition is even a necessary condition for cognitive process to be reliable (in the 
epistemically relevant sense), Beebe must pass two further hurdles. First, he should 
provide a principled way of specifying the computational, algorithmic, and 
implementation type a given computational process token belongs to. Secondly, he 
should provide some reason for why we should think that the reliability of these types, 
out of the all of the multitude of types a given cognitive process token belongs to, are 
relevant to the epistemic project. (For example, why should the exact algorithmic nature 
of the cognitive process an epistemic subject uses to produce a belief matter, if the 
subject has no reflective access to the exact algorithm she used to produce the belief?) 
                                                     
65 Beebe, p 180. 
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If these two hurdles can be cleared, then Beebe’s Tri-Level Condition would be an 
important step towards solving the Generality Problem. And, indeed, this Condition may 
even be a sufficient condition for a cognitive process to be reliable in the epistemically 
relevant sense, if the differences between the cognitive processes that are lumped together 
under the same three level-types turn out to be epistemically irrelevant.  
But if these hurdles prove to be difficult to clear, then Beebe’s Tri-Level 
Condition may merely be a multiplication of the Generality Problem, which replaces a 
single, difficult problem (that of specifying the epistemically relevant type a given belief-
forming process belongs to) with three, perhaps equally difficult, problems: those of 
specifying what computational, algorithmic, and architectural types a given cognitive 
process token belongs to. 
The Tri-Level Condition may be consistent with my own proposed solution to the 
Generality Problem which I will propose below – but I suspect that it is not. Belief-
forming mechanisms which belong to the same activation type do, I think, try to solve the 
same kind of information-processing problem. However, I strongly suspect that they will 
vary wildly at the algorithmic level, and perhaps even more so at the architectural level. 
Determining whether or not these suspicions are correct will require a further-fleshed out 
version of the Tri-Level Condition. 
As previously mentioned, Beebe claims that satisfying the Tri-Level Condition is 
a necessary but insufficient condition for a cognitive process being reliable in the 
epistemically relevant sense. Beebe believes this to be the case since there could be 
different sub-types of cognitive processes that belong to the same computational, 
algorithmic, and architectural types. To deal with this, the second stage of Beebe’s 
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proposed solution to the Generality Problem is to claim that we should distinguish 
between two sub-types that belong to the same tri-level types if and only if there are 
statistically relevant differences between those two sub-types. To put it more formally, 
Beebe claims that “the relevant process type for some t is the subclass A which is the 
broadest objectively homogeneous subclass A within which t falls. A subclass S is 
objectively homogeneous if there are no statistically relevant partitions of S that can be 
effected.”66 
Beebe’s Statistical Relevance strategy is motivated by two problems that constrain 
solutions to the Generality Problem. Any solution to the Generality Problem will need to 
provide a principled way of specifying the type a given belief-forming process token 
belongs to whose reliability is relevant to the epistemic project. If this type is specified 
too narrowly, then the possible solution will fall victim to the Single Case Problem: 
Belief-forming processes of that type will only produce a single belief-token, and that 
belief will either be true or false. If the belief is true, then this will suggest, implausibly, 
that the belief-forming process is perfectly reliable. Likewise, if the belief is false, then 
this will suggest, again, implausibly, that the belief-forming process is perfectly 
unreliable. 
If a possible solution to the Generality Problem specifies too broad of a type, then 
it will fall afoul of another problem: the No Distinction Problem. This problem arises 
when tokens of belief-forming processes that clearly have epistemically relevant 
differences between them are grouped together under the same type of process. For 
example, if the process type is “inferring,” then this would suggest (implausibly) that the 
                                                     
66 Beebe, p 188, emphasis Beebe’s. 
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inference processes of a mathematical genius and a freshman math student are equally 
reliable, and that these two epistemic subjects are equally justified in their conclusions. 
Beebe’s Statistical Relevance strategy avoids one of these problems – it clearly 
avoids the No Distinction Problem. However, in “Is There a Statistical Solution to the 
Generality Problem?,” Julien Dutant and Erik J. Olsson persuasively argue that the 
statistical approach either does not yield a determinate result, or else it leads to 
trivialization – meaning that reliability collapses into truth and anti-reliability collapses 
into falsehood.67 This strongly suggests that Beebe’s Statistical Relevance strategy has 
fallen prey to the Single Case Problem, and that a correct solution to the Generality 
Problem requires a ‘looser’ approach.  
However, even if Beebe’s Statistical Relevance does succeed in staying clear of 
both extremes, this mere fact would not be enough to demonstrate that this strategy is a 
correct solution to the Generality Problem. In order to demonstrate that his strategy 
provides a correct solution to the Generality Problem, Beebe would also need to show 
that all statistically relevant differences between sub-types of belief-forming mechanisms 
are also epistemically relevant. And I suspect that this is not the case. 
My own proposed solution to the Generality Problem does, I believe, avoid both 
of these problems. I believe it will become obvious, as I explain this solution, that it does 
not fall prey to the No Distinction Problem. And I will argue in the next chapter that it 
does not fall prey to the Single Case Problem, even in cases where the belief produced is 
a necessary truth. Yet the type of belief-forming mechanism specified by this solution is 
                                                     
67 Julien Dutant and Erik J. Olsson, “Is There a Statistical Solution to the Generality Problem?,” Erkenntnis, 
Vol 78, Issue 6 (Dec 2013): p 1347-65. 
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not as fine-grained as the type specified by Beebe’s Statistical Relevance strategy, or even 
his Tri-Level Condition. There will be statistically relevant differences between sub-types 
of belief-forming mechanisms belonging to the same activation type, and different 
mechanism-tokens belonging to the same activation type will, I believe, belong to 
different algorithmic types.  
I believe that this ‘looseness’ is a virtue of my proposed solution, since it better 
enables this possible solution to avoid the Single Case Problem, and since this provides a 
better partial solution to the Strange and Fleeting Process Problem. (I will briefly 
demonstrate how my proposed solution to the Generality Problem provides a partial 
solution to the Strange and Fleeting Process Problem in this chapter, and in more detail in 
Chapter 4.) I strongly suspect that, in some cases, some sub-types of cognitive processes 
that belong to the same three tri-level types will be more reliable than their fellow 
members of the same tri-level type-triad, due to some kind of external interference. If 
reliability is a sufficient as well as necessary condition for justification, then Beebe’s 
Statistical Relevance strategy would implausibly suggest that beliefs produced by these 
sub-types would be more justified than those produced in the absence of this external 
interference. By contrast, my proposed solution would not yield this prediction, and 
beliefs produced by these sub-types would not be justified unless belief-forming 
mechanisms of the same activation type would be reliable in the absence of this 
doxastically beneficial interference. 
Providing a solution to the Strange and Fleeting Process Problem is not an 
adequacy condition for solutions to the Generality Problem, since a common strategy 
reliabilistic theories use to deal with the Strange and Fleeting Process Problem is to claim 
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that reliable belief-formation is a necessary but insufficient condition for justification. 
And Beebe’s Tri-Level Condition may provide some traction towards a partial solution to 
the Strange and Fleeting Process Problem, since many Strange and Fleeting Process 
Problem cases (including the Serendipitous Brain Lesion case, which I will describe 
below) quite plausibly involve belief-forming processes that do not belong to any 
algorithmic or computational type. However, to the degree that killing two birds with one 
stone is a virtue of any theory, I believe that my proposed solution comes out ahead of 
Beebe’s on points, even if Beebe’s has not been knocked out of the running. 
 
1.4 A Simple Solution to the Generality Problem 
 The final existing proposed solution to the Generality Problem I will review is the 
one provided by Mark Heller, in his 1995 paper, “A Simple Solution to the Generality 
Problem.”68 In this paper, Heller points out that 1) the Generality Problem is related to the 
Relevant Alternatives Problem and, 2) contextualism may offer a partial solution to the 
Generality Problem, in addition to offering a solution to the Relevant Alternatives 
Problem. However, Heller also points out an additional problem for reliabilism: While the 
propositions expressed by reliability attributions may be sensitive to context, in the same 
way that contextualists claim that the propositions expressed by knowledge and 
justification attributions are sensitive to context, it appears that reliability attributions do 
not respond in the same way to contextual pressures as knowledge and justification 
attributions do. This casts serious doubt on the claim that whether or not a belief is 
justified is solely determined by the reliability of its formation. 
                                                     
68 Mark Heller, “The Simple Solution to the Generality Problem,” Noûs 29, 4 (1995); p 501-15 
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 Heller notes that a description of a given belief-forming process token can be 
decomposed into two parts: the process or belief-forming mechanism itself, and the 
environment in which this process takes place or in which the mechanism operates. 
Possible descriptions of a belief-forming process token lie along a spectrum. At one end 
of this spectrum, the process or mechanism is so completely described that any 
description of the environment adds no additional information. At the other end of the 
spectrum, the process or mechanism is described only as “the process of forming a 
belief,” and all of the information about the overall belief-forming process is provided by 
the description of the environment. To the extent that a description of a belief-forming 
process token approaches the second, environmentally-concerned, end of this spectrum, 
the Generality Problem begins to resemble the Relevant Alternatives Problem. 
 The Relevant Alternatives Problem is a problem for the relevant alternatives 
family of epistemic theories, which are closely related to the reliabilistic family of 
epistemic theories. According to the relevant alternatives theories, in order for a subject 
to know a proposition, the subject must be able to eliminate alternatives to the 
proposition being true. (These alternatives are best imagined as possible worlds where the 
proposition is false.) The relevant alternatives approach can be combined with 
reliabilism. For example, it could be claimed that a belief-forming mechanism eliminates 
an alternative to a belief being true just if, in the possible world that constitutes that 
alternative, the mechanism would not produce a false belief.  
An important claim that the relevant alternatives theories make is that, in order to 
know a proposition, it is not necessary to eliminate all alternatives. Instead, the epistemic 
subject only needs to eliminate all relevant alternatives. For example, in order to know 
75 
 
that you have hands (on the basis of you seeing your hands, and receiving sensory 
information from them), it is not necessary to eliminate the possibility that you are a 
handless brain-in-a-vat, and are receiving this sensory input from a supercomputer, via 
electrodes hooked up to your brain. While the basis for your belief is unable to eliminate 
this possibility, it is not necessary to eliminate this possibility in order for your belief to 
count as knowledge, since this possibility is irrelevant. 
This central claim of the relevant alternatives theories leads directly to the 
Relevant Alternatives Problem – the problem of providing a principled way of specifying 
which alternatives are relevant, and which are irrelevant. As Heller points out, the 
Relevant Alternatives Problem overlaps and interacts with the Generality Problem. A 
complete specification of a belief-forming mechanism would also contain information 
about the conditions under which that mechanism would fail and produce a false belief. A 
mechanism is reliable just if it would not fail under any relevant possible world. (That is, 
possible worlds that are relevant to reliability attributions – which, as Heller later points 
out, may separate from possible worlds that are relevant to knowledge or justification 
attributions.) 
Contextualism is an epistemic theory that claims that the propositions expressed 
by knowledge attributions, or attributions of other epistemic statuses, such as 
justification, vary according to conversational context (typically, that of the attributor). 
Contextualism offers a solution to the Relevant Alternatives Problem, by suggesting that 
the set of worlds which count as relevant in a given conversational context is determined 
by such things as the interests of the attributor. To the extent that the Generality Problem 
overlaps with the Relevant Alternatives Problem, contextualism may also offer a way of 
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determining what standards a belief-forming process must met in order to count as 
“reliable.” 
However, this gift that contextualism offers to reliabilism comes at a price. The 
term “reliable” does appear to be sensitive to contextual pressures, in the same way that 
terms like “flat” and “tall” appear to be. Unfortunately, “reliable” also may react to these 
contextual pressures in way that causes this term to part company with “knowledge” and 
“justification.” This consideration is a serious problem for reliabilism about justification. 
This concern extends only to what Alvin Goldman calls “threshold reliability” – 
reliability in the sense that a mechanism is either reliable, or it is not. It does not extend to 
what Mark Heller calls a mechanism’s “overall reliability rating,” which is not a binary 
property, but a matter of degrees. Even according to contextualists, a mechanism’s overall 
reliability rating is context-independent, unlike whether or not a mechanism is “reliable.” 
Similarly, contextualists claim that there is an epistemic status – the strength of a belief’s 
epistemic position – which remains constant across contexts, unlike epistemic statuses 
such as “knowledge” or “justification.”  
This suggests that the reliability of a belief-forming mechanism is more closely 
related the strength of the epistemic positions of the beliefs it produces than it is to 
whether or not those beliefs are justified or amount to knowledge. In the next chapter, I 
will propose an account that (indirectly) links what I will call the “absolute reliability” of 
a belief-forming mechanism to the strength of the subject’s epistemic positions towards 
the beliefs it produces. (I will also sketch a partial and highly incomplete relevant 
alternatives account of knowledge and justification.) But, in order to perform this task, it 
is necessary to provide a principled way of specifying the relevant type a given belief-
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forming mechanism belongs to, so that the overall reliability rating of that mechanism 
type, across a broad range of possible worlds, can be determined. I will now turn to this 
task. 
 
2. Two Theories of Skill-Learning 
 In order to develop my proposed solution to the Generality Problem, I will 
develop a model of how skills are learned, maintained, and activated, and extend this 
model in order to apply it to belief-forming mechanisms that are not literally skills. In 
order to develop this model, I will first turn to two theories of skill-learning.  
The first theory is Jack A. Adams' 1971 open-loop theory of motor learning. This 
theory is somewhat inaccurate and out of date, but it is also relatively simple, and it is 
accurate enough for our purposes here. Later, in Chapter 4, I will need to supplement this 
theory with lessons learned from more modern theories of motor learning, but for now, 
the goal is to provide a model that captures the basics of skill-learning and which can be 
extended in order to be applied to belief-forming mechanisms that are not literally skills. 
Adams’ theory is sufficient for this task. 
The second theory I will investigate is John R. Anderson's 1983 ACT* theory of 
cognitive architecture. The ACT* theory is intended to explain how cognitive skills work, 
or, as Anderson calls them, how cognitive “productions” operate. The ACT* theory 
demonstrates that the lessons learned from investigating motor skills also extend to 
cognitive skills, as well as providing a slightly more complex model of skills that still 
follows the same basic outlines provided by Adams’ theory of motor learning.  
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2.1 Adams’ Open-Loop Theory of Motor Learning 
 Jack A. Adams’ 1971 open-loop theory of motor learning was motivated by 
differences between how humans and animals perform motor learning, which 
conventional Stimulus-Response psychology was unable to explain. First, the delay of 
reinforcement in animals and humans does not work in the same way, since the delay of 
reward for animals has a depressing effect on performance, but has little or no effect on 
humans. Secondly, the withdrawal of reinforcement leads to the extinction effect in 
animals, but this effect is much less in humans. Thirdly, experiments with humans had 
revealed that, unlike animals, humans do not merely repeat rewarded behaviors, unlike 
animals. Instead, humans, in the next trial, attempt to correct errors. An unsuccessful 
movement results in a variation in the response just made, not its repetition. Fourthly, it is 
known that humans covertly guide their motor behavior with verbal response, at least in 
early stages of learning. Fifthly, with humans, the correctness or incorrectness of the 
response is known by the performer. The movement continues until the performer 
“knows” that she is correct.69 
 According to Adams theory, which was intended to explain these features of 
human motor learning, humans control their motor responses with a construct that 
Adams’ calls “the perceptual trace.” The perceptual trace is the aggregated perceptual 
memory of what it was like to perform a certain movement in the past. According to 
Adams, the subject controls the movement of a motor routine by comparing perceptual 
feedback of the actual movement in progress with the perceptual trace provided by 
previous performances of the movement. For example, the subject (tacitly) remembers 
                                                     
69 Jack A. Adams, "A closed-loop theory of motor learning," Journal of Motor Behavior, 3 (1971), p 114-5. 
79 
 
how it felt to perform the task of drawing an eight-inch-long line in the past, and 
compares this remembered perceptual trace with her current perceptions of her own 
movements. Since sensory feedback is used to control the movement (closing the loop 
between the subject and the environment), this theory is a “closed-loop” theory. 
 Early in the subject’s learning, when the subject is still making many errors, the 
subject does not merely match the current movement to the perceptual trace, since that 
would merely cause the subject to repeat previous mistakes. Instead, the subject uses the 
error-reports from the previous trial to modify the next response relative to the perceptual 
trace obtained from previous trials. Adams refers to these error-reports as “Knowledge of 
the Result.” Adams himself does not define this phrase, but a recent motor-learning 
textbook provides the following definition: Knowledge of the Result is a form of 
feedback. Feedback is information about what has been done. Knowledge of the Result is 
verbalized (or verbalizable) post-movement feedback about the outcome of the 
movement in the environment.70  
This “Knowledge of the Result” is a belief the subject has about whether or not 
the previous trial failed, and (at least in some cases), if it failed, how the motor response 
might be modified in order to succeed.71 The Knowledge of the Result might be the result 
of the subject's own judgment, or it might come from some external source. For example, 
the experimenter might tell the subject: “an eighth of an inch too short,” “a bit too long,” 
or even just “correct” or “incorrect.” At this stage of motor learning, the subject uses 
overt and presumably covert verbal self-instruction, based on the Knowledge of the 
                                                     
70 Richard A. Schmidt and Timothy D. Lee, Motor Control and Learning: A Behavioral Emphasis, Fourth 
Edition, Human Kinetics, 2005, p 366. 
71 Note that “Knowledge of the Result” may not amount to true knowledge – it is best thought of as a belief. 
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Result, to adjust her performance in the next trial. (“Okay, this time, I need to make the 
line just a bit longer.”) Because of this verbal self-instruction, this stage of motor learning 
is known as the Verbal-Motor Stage. The process by which the subject modifies their next 
motor response in the next trial, relative to the perceptual trace and in response to the 
subject’s Knowledge of the Result provides a paradigm example of what I will call a 
“learning mechanism.” 
 At an advanced stage of training, when the errors reported in the Knowledge of 
the Result have become acceptably small for some sufficient number of trials, this verbal 
self-instruction ceases, and the subject enters the Motor Stage of learning. If no errors are 
detected (and detection of an error would prompt an orientating reflex, restarting the 
learning process), performances of the movement become guided solely by the perceptual 
trace, which, as I have stated, consists of the aggregated memory of how it felt to perform 
the motor routine on previous occasions.  
 Adams’ theory differs from an earlier closed-loop theory developed by P.K. 
Anokhin and E.N. Sokolov by distinguishing between the mechanism that initiates a 
motor response and the mechanism that controls that response. According to Adams’ 
theory, a separate construct, the memory trace, is responsible for selecting the appropriate 
perceptual trace and initiating the motor response. This precedes the use of the perceptual 
trace, which controls and guides the execution of the response. The memory trace must 
be cued to action, and, according to Adams’ theory, the strength of the memory trace is a 
function of the stimulus-response contiguity of practice trials (this last may merely be a 
simplifying assumption). 
 Adams’ theory provides four constructs that I will use to develop my model of 
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skill-learning. First, Adams’ construct of the “perceptual trace,” the aggregated memory 
of what it feels like to perform a motor routine, which, according to Adams’ theory, 
humans use to control and guide their motor responses, provides an example of what I 
will call a “simple control program.” Simple control programs guide the execution of a 
routine, including motor routines.  
Secondly, Adams’ construct of the “memory trace” provides an example of what I will 
call an “activation mechanism.” An activation mechanism is responsible for activating a 
given simple control program whenever certain environmental conditions obtain. The 
simple control program and the activation mechanism jointly constitute a “skill.” 
Thirdly, Adams’ construct of the “Knowledge of the Result,” and the manner in 
which the subject uses the Knowledge of the Result to modify her motor response in the 
next trial, provide an example of what I will call a “learning mechanism.” A learning 
mechanism can be decomposed into two sub-mechanisms. The first sub-mechanism 
(which we can call the “detector”) gathers feedback or Knowledge of the Result – 
information about the success or failure of a trial of routine. I will continue to refer to this 
information as “Knowledge of the Result,” even though this feedback can contain more 
information than just whether a trial was successful or failed (such as Knowledge of the 
Response – verbalizable feedback about how the routine was executed, independent of 
whether or not the routine was successful). This is, at least in part, because of the 
evocative nature the phrase should have for epistemlogists. 
The second sub-mechanism of a selection mechanism modifies (at least 
temporarily) its target mechanism (such as the simple control program) in response to the 
Knowledge of the Result gathered by the first sub-mechanism. We can call this sub-
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mechanism “the modifier.”  
The learning mechanism that has the simple control program responsible for 
guiding the execution of a motor routine is only one example of a learning mechanism. A 
second example of a learning mechanism is the Stimulus-Response mechanism which 
Adams postulates as being responsible for controlling the strength of the memory trace. 
This learning mechanism has the activation mechanism provided by the memory trace as 
its target. 
Fourthly, the process of memory aggregation which Adams claims brings the 
perceptual trace into being provides an example of what I will call a “maintenance 
mechanism.” Maintenance mechanisms are responsible for ensuring that different time-
slices of their target mechanisms (such as the simple control program constituted by the 
perceptual trace) closely resemble each other, unless the maintenance mechanism is 
overridden by a selection mechanism, or overwhelmed by damage to the target 
mechanism that the maintenance mechanism is unable to prevent. 
With this model of motor learning in hand, we can extend it to a theory of cognitive skill 
learning: Anderson's ACT* Theory of Cognitive Architecture. 
 
2.2 Anderson’s ACT* Theory of Cognitive Architecture 
 Adams' model of how we acquire motor skills is roughly similar to John R. 
Anderson’s model of how we acquire cognitive skills, provided by his ACT* theory of 
cognitive architecture, and as described in his 1983 book, The Architecture of Cognition. 
This theory conceptualizes human cognition in terms of action-condition pairs, called 
“productions.” According to this theory, when a data pattern that matches a certain 
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condition is present in working memory, a production is applied and a certain action is 
performed that might result in a proposition being deposited in working memory (which 
can be understood as forming a belief). The mechanism that applies the production and 
results in a cognitive action being performed can be compared to Adams' memory trace, 
and the cognitive program that controls that action can be compared to Adams’ perceptual 
trace (which, again, is one kind of motor program). 
 ACT* describes four ways that a production-condition pair can be adaptively 
modified (in other words, four kinds of what I call learning mechanisms): generalization, 
action discrimination, condition discrimination, and strengthening. Generalization and 
action discrimination modify the action component of a production; condition 
discrimination and strengthening modify the condition component of a production. 
Strengthening and both kinds of discrimination depend on what Anderson refers to as 
“feedback.” Interestingly, at least in the case of the ACT computer model that instantiates 
Anderson’s ACT* theory, this feedback appears to meet all of the conditions for 
Knowledge of the Result. Generalization is something of the odd-man-out, since it does 
not directly depend on feedback, but feedback still plays an indirect role, since 
discrimination is required in order to correct over-generalization once it occurs. 
  Generalization creates new productions from existing ones, in ways that make the 
new productions more general and hopefully successful over a greater range of cases than 
the old productions. A rough example might be a dog that is trained to fetch a tennis ball 
might extend the production that controls that behavior to the task of fetching a baseball. 
Generalization works by enlarging the set of conditions that will activate a given 
production, or by creating a new production with a large set of activation conditions from 
an existing production.72 
  Discrimination modifies existing productions, making them more narrow and 
                                                     
72 John R. Anderson, The Architecture of Cognition, Harvard University Press, 1983, p 242-4. 
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specific and is aimed at increasing reliability. It operates on a production in response to 
feedback. If the system receives feedback that an action was incorrect, that it failed, then 
the system can either modify how the action was performed (action discrimination) or the 
conditions under which that production will be applied (condition discrimination).73  
 Condition discrimination works by narrowing the set of conditions which can 
activate a given production, in response to feedback about unsuccessful applications. For 
example, if a dog received feedback that suggested that fetching a frisbee is not exactly 
like fetching a tennis ball, the dog might learn to not use the tennis-ball ‘program’ to fetch 
Frisbees, and instead develop a separate response for fetching a frisbee. Or, if the dog’s 
owner is in the habit of “faking out” the dog, the dog may learn to not chase after the ball 
unless he actually sees the ball leave the owner’s hand. 
 Alternatively, while there might be some minor differences between fetching a 
tennis ball and fetching a baseball, or fetching a tennis ball on a calm day versus fetching 
a tennis ball on a windy day, it would probably be more practical to develop a single 
‘program’ that could take this variation into account, but vary the response according to 
these environmental variables. Action discrimination handles this task, by modifying 
productions so that they take the environment into account in how they guide an action. I 
will return to the notion of a control program that takes environmental variables into 
account in Chapter 4, since this is the distinction between what I will call a 
“environmentally-sensitive control program” and a “simple control program.” 
  The fourth learning mechanism, strengthening, modifies the “strength” of a 
production in response to feedback.74 The strength of a production affects how a system 
that implements ACT* resolves the conflicts that arise when the conditions for multiple 
productions are at least partially matched. ACT* provides four principles for resolving 
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74 Anderson, Architecture of Cognition, p 249-254. 
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these kinds of conflicts: 1) Productions that refer to the current goal are preferred over 
other productions that might apply. If more than one production refers to the current goal, 
then the other principles are uses as tie-breaker. 2) Productions whose conditions are fully 
matched are preferred over productions whose conditions are only partially matched, and 
more complete matches are preferred over less complete matches. 3) More specific 
conditions are preferred over more general conditions. 4) “Stronger” productions are 
preferred to “weaker” productions.75  
 In Anderson’s ACT computer model that implements the ACT* theory, a new 
production initially has a strength of 1. This strength is increased by 1 every time the 
production is applied, but is decreased by 25% every time it is applied and feedback 
reports that the application failed. This feature suggests certain things about the 
importance of detecting failure that I will return to in the next chapter. This strengthening 
mechanism is similar to the Stimulus-Response mechanism that is responsible for 
strengthening or weakening the memory trace in Adams’ theory of motor learning. 
 
3. A Model of Skill-Learning 
 Adams' theory, with its four constructs, Knowledge of the Result, the perceptual 
trace, the process of reinforcement that maintains the perceptual trace, and the memory 
trace, provides a model of how a subject acquires, executes, and maintains, and activates 
a motor skill. Analogues to these constructs also appear in Anderson’s ACT* theory. 
These shared constructs can be used to construct a model of 'skill-learning,' which can be 
extended in order to model the evolution and development of traits belonging to naturally 
evolved organisms, as well as the design and production of intelligently designed 
artifacts, including belief-forming plans of action developed through deliberation. This 
generalized model contains a variety of adaptive mechanisms. In the slightly simplified 
                                                     
75Anderson, Architecture of Cognition, p 126-137. 
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version of this model I will discuss in this chapter, these adaptive mechanisms perform 
four different kinds of functions. I will call mechanisms that perform these functions 
learning or selection mechanisms, maintenance mechanisms, simple control programs, 
and activation mechanisms. In Chapter 4, I will add a fifth kind of mechanism to the 
model, which I will call an environmentally-sensitive control program. 
 Ideally, a model of belief-formation should be able to extend to any possible case 
of belief-formation that any possible cognizer could perform. It is possible that the skill-
based model developed here could eventually be extended enough to perform this feat. 
But, for now, I will settle for a model of belief-formation that covers at least the vast 
majority of belief-forming mechanisms used by humans, and I believe that this skill-
based model achieves this goal. I will now discuss this model in more detail. 
 
3.1 Learning and Selection Mechanisms 
 In Adams' theory of motor learning, subjects modify their motor performances 
during the Verbal-Motor Stage, relative to the perceptual trace and in response to the 
subject's Knowledge of the Result of the previous trial. This process of modification 
provides a paradigm example of what I will call a learning mechanism. ACT*'s 
mechanisms of discrimination, generalization, and strengthening are also examples. 
Natural selection provides an example of a related, but slightly different kind of 
mechanism: a selection mechanism. 
 A selection mechanism selects some ‘good’ (relative to a set of selection criteria) 
target item out of a set of competing items for inclusion in a containing system, in 
response to some kind of information about how ‘good’ that target mechanism is. A 
learning mechanism, by contrast, does not select a target item from a set of competing 
items, but, instead, modifies a single target item, in response to some kind of information 
(“Knowledge of the Result”) about how well the target item does in achieving its goal.  
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 Selection mechanisms and learning mechanisms are very similar, and, in recent 
years, it has become commonplace to use selection mechanisms (such as the one involved 
in evolution by natural selection) as models for learning mechanisms. What I propose to 
do here is the opposite – to extend our model of skills formed by learning in order to 
capture innate abilities that became fixed in the population through evolution by natural 
selection. 
 In motor learning, the subject's Knowledge of the Result plays a central role in 
how a perceptual trace or motor program is progressively modified during the Verbal-
Motor Stage. This Knowledge of the Result consists of the output of some error-detection 
mechanism, either internal to the subject or external to the subject. In ACT*'s theory of 
cognitive architecture, discrimination uses feedback (Knowledge of the Result by another 
name) to modify how an action is performed or the conditions which will result in that 
action being performed. Additionally, the effective application or activation conditions 
for a production are affected by the strength of the production, since the strength of the 
production affects the system's preference for applying that production instead of others. 
This strengthening mechanism also depends on feedback. Generalization does not 
directly depend on feedback or Knowledge of the Result (making it a somewhat unusual 
example of selection mechanism), but systems that implement ACT* rely on 
discrimination in order to avoid over-generalization, making up for this lack. 
 Learning mechanisms can generally be broken down into two sub-mechanisms. 
The first sub-mechanism gathers information about the successes and failures of the 
target item – Knowledge of the Result. We can call this sub-mechanism “the detector.” 
The second sub-mechanism modifies the target item based on the Knowledge of the 
Result provided by the detector, and can be called “the modifier.” Both generalization and 
random chance can be seen as learning mechanisms that provide a “modifier” 
mechanism, but lack a “detector” mechanism. But generalization, unlike random chance, 
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relies on discrimination (which does have a detector component) to keep the target item 
functioning well. 
 This model can be extended to evolution by natural selection. It could be said (in 
a metaphorical sense) that natural selection ‘detects’ the success or failure of a trait to 
promote the goal of reproductive success, and ‘modifies’ the frequency of that trait in the 
next generation in response to this ‘Knowledge’ of the Result. Of course, in reality, this is 
not how evolution by natural selection works: It is not literally the case that the success or 
failure of a trait to promote reproductive success causes (via a detector mechanism) the 
modification of the frequency of the trait in the next generation. Instead, the success or 
failure of a trait to promote reproductive success constitutes the modification of the 
frequency of the trait in the next generation. I will return to this point in the next chapter. 
 This model can also be extended, to some degree, to foresightful intelligent 
design. While the ‘detector’ used in skill learning can only detect the results of trials in 
the actual world, a foresightful designer can imagine the results of a hypothetical trial, 
and use the Knowledge of the ‘Results’ of this trial to modify her design.  
 
3.2 Maintenance Mechanisms and Simple Control Programs 
 In addition to learning mechanisms, Adams' theory of motor learning provides 
examples of what I will call maintenance mechanisms and simple control programs. 
According to Adams' theory, a process of memory aggregation helps form the perceptual 
trace, and ensures that, once the Motor Stage has been achieved, different time-slices of 
the same perceptual trace will closely resemble each other. This provides an example of 
what I will call a maintenance mechanism. In general, a maintenance mechanism can be 
defined as a mechanism that performs the function of ensuring that different time-slices 
of the same target mechanism closely resemble each other, except in cases where the 
target mechanism has been modified by some selection mechanism, or has been damaged 
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by some factor the maintenance mechanism was unable to prevent or repair. 
 Adams' theory also provides a paradigm example of what I will call a simple 
control program. Once the Motor Stage has been achieved, the process of comparing 
perceptual feedback with the perceptual trace as the motor routine is being performed and 
controlling the motor action in response to this feedback ensures that different 
performances of the same motor routine closely resemble each other.  
 The concept of a simple control program (and its relative, the environmentally-
sensitive control program) provides a telling difference between our skill-learning based 
model and Proper Functionalism's design-based model. A simple control program can be 
defined as a program or mechanism which has the function of ensuring that different 
activations closely resemble each other, except in cases of interference. Different 
activations of the same simple control program are processes that belong to the same type 
(they share the property of being controlled by the same program), and they should 
closely resemble each other, if the simple control program performs its function well. 
 Maintenance mechanisms and simple control programs are important because, as I 
mentioned in the last chapter, there are cases of items that 'normally' (to use Boorse's 
term) and 'stably' (to use Greco's term) perform some function, despite never having been 
selected to perform that function. The Selected Effect theories of function and the Proper 
Function epistemic theories can handle these cases only with difficulty, if at all. In these 
cases, we can use maintenance mechanisms help explain why that item normally and 
stably performs that function. Similarly, simple control programs help explain why 
different activations of the program normally and stably perform a function, even if the 
program itself was not selected for. 
 One such case is Swampman. Swampman is atom-for-atom copy of Donald 
Davidson, formed through the massively improbable accident of a lightning strike in a 
swamp. It is, of course, a cosmically ('astronomically' would be an understatement) 
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improbable accident that Swampman possesses the same cognitive programs as Donald 
Davidson, including, say, a cognitive program that allows him to reliably identify maple 
trees. However, it is not an accident that Swampman persists in being able to reliably 
identify maple trees. According to ACT*, the mechanism that constitutes this ability (the 
program that controls how he forms maple-tree-beliefs) and the mechanism that 
maintains this ability (the mechanism that ensures that different time-slices of this 
cognitive program remain similar, in the absence of some error-detection that would 
trigger a discrimination or strengthening mechanism) are intact. These simple control 
programs and maintenance mechanisms help explain why, even given Swampman's 
accidental origin, it is normal for Swampman to be able to reliably identify maple trees, 
and why this ability is a stable part of Swampman's cognitive character. While it is 
strange that Swampman has this ability, it is not an accident that Swampman persists in 
having this ability, any more than it is an accident that Swampman does not suddenly 
sprout tentacles from his face. 
 Another example of a case where maintenance mechanisms play a central role in 
the absence of selection is exaption. An example of exaption is the case of the flippers of 
a sea-turtle, which normally and stably perform the functions of digging and land-
locomotion, despite never having been selected for this. In this case, natural selection 
played no direct role in ensuring that the sea-turtle's flippers are able to perform these 
functions. The fact that the sea-turtle's flippers are able to perform these functions is an 
accidental by-product of their ability to swim, so natural selection was never directly 
responsible for differentially maintaining variants of the flipper that could better perform 
these functions over variants that were not as able to perform these functions. 
 However, natural selection does play a role in ensuring that the sea-turtle's 
flippers continue to be able to perform these functions. Sea-turtles can be said to have a 
'developmental program,' which plays a role similar to motor programs and cognitive 
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programs: organisms with the same developmental program will tend to have similar 
developmental outcomes. Natural selection, along with other evolutionary factors, play a 
role in ensuring that the developmental programs of sea-turtles remain similar. If, by 
some unfortunate mutation, a variant of the sea-turtle development program resulted in 
the development of a flipper that was unable to perform its exapted functions ably, that 
variant would be selected against. Other evolutionary factors, such as the resistance of the 
DNA of sea-turtles to mutation and the resistance of large populations to genetic drift, 
also play a role in ensuring that the sea-turtle's flippers 'normally' and 'stably' perform 
their exapted functions.  
 These evolutionary factors, excluding natural selection between actually existing 
variant traits, play a role of maintaining developmental programs that is analogous to the 
role that the process of reinforcement plays in maintaining perceptual traces. The process 
by which a developmental program controls the development of an organism can be said 
to be similar to the process by which a perceptual trace or motor program controls the 
execution of a motor action - in both cases, it could be said that different activations of 
the same program will result in similar outputs.  
 I say, 'it could be said,' because, in both cases, the model we are using in this 
chapter is overly simplistic. In Chapter 4, I will refer to certain objections Richard 
Lewontin has made against this “genetic program” model of biological development, a 
certain difference between Adams' closed-loop theory and Schmidt's schema theory of 
motor learning, and certain effects of action discrimination in Anderson's ACT* theory of 
cognitive architecture in order to develop a model of what I will call “environmentally-
sensitive control programs.” A key feature of developmental programs is that different 
activations of even a good developmental program (one that performs its function well) 
will not necessarily closely resemble each other. Instead, different activations of a good 
developmental program will tend to be successful, and a good developmental program 
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may execute differently in response to different environmental conditions or even due to 
developmental noise. But, for the purposes of this chapter, our current model of simple 
control programs will suffice.   
 
3.3 Activation Mechanisms 
 The last kind of adaptive mechanism I will discuss in this chapter are what I will 
call activation mechanisms. An activation mechanism is responsible for activating a 
functional item that is already present in the containing system, at a certain time and 
place, or under certain conditions, or in a certain environment. In Adams' theory of motor 
learning, the memory trace plays the role of activation mechanism, activating a given 
perceptual trace whenever certain conditions in the perceptual environment hold. In 
ACT*, the condition component of a production, together with the principles which 
resolve conflicts when multiple productions could be applied, plays the role of activation 
mechanism (or application mechanism, to use Anderson's terminology). In biological 
development, any number of inputs may activate a given developmental 'action' at a 
given time or in response to a certain set of conditions. 
 An activation mechanism can be pictured as activating the functional item (such 
as an action-guiding or belief-forming program) present at a certain 'address' in the 
containing system when a certain set of activating conditions hold. The activation 
mechanism does not directly control what functional item populates that address – that is 
the purview of the relevant selection, maintenance, simple control and/or developmental 
control mechanisms. Instead, the activation mechanism activates whatever functional 
item is located at that address when certain activating conditions hold.  
 Activation mechanisms are present in Plantinga's 'design' plan model, but I would 
say that they play an obscure supporting role as a result of Plantinga's basic metaphorical 
approach. Plantinga compares our cognitive faculties to manufactured artifacts, and, with 
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most manufactured artifacts, it is the user that determines when they are used, not any 
mechanism internal to the artifact itself. As a result, activation mechanisms do play a role 
in Plantinga's theory, but only as one of the many cognitive faculties that might be 
causally responsible for the formation of a given belief. By contrast, according to my 
proposed solution to the Generality Problem, activation mechanisms play a central role in 
specifying the epistemically relevant type of the cognitive process or mechanism 
responsible for forming a given belief. 
 
4. A Skill-Based Solution to the Generality Problem 
4.1 The Activation Type and the Activation Mechanism 
 In the previous section, I developed a model of how we acquire, maintain, 
execute, and apply skills. This model contained several different kinds of “adaptive 
mechanisms”: learning mechanisms, selection mechanisms, maintenance mechanisms, 
simple control programs, and activation mechanisms. Each of these kinds of mechanisms 
can be used to specify one or more types their target mechanism belongs to. The working 
hypothesis I am developing in this chapter is that all of these types are relevant to the 
project of epistemology. These types are united by the activation type. This type of target 
mechanism (which might include a belief-forming mechanism) consists of a “program” 
that is located at a certain address, and is activated by an activation mechanism under 
certain conditions. The function of the activation mechanism is to activate whatever 
program is stored at that location. However, the exact nature of the program stored at that 
location is constrained by a learning, selection, and/or maintenance mechanism – the 
program itself belongs to a learning, selection, and/or maintenance type.  
 Given this hypothesis, we can use the following procedure to specify the relevant 
type of belief-forming mechanism that is responsible for forming a given belief: First, 
'reverse engineer' the activation conditions for the relevant activation mechanism. 
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Secondly, identify any adaptive mechanisms that have the relevant cognitive program for 
a target mechanism. Given the activation conditions for the cognitive program, and the 
constraints provided by the various adaptive mechanisms that have the cognitive program 
for a target mechanism, we can predict the kinds of worlds in which the cognitive 
program would activate, and how the cognitive program will vary from world to world. 
With this information in hand, we can evaluate the reliability of the cognitive program 
across a range of worlds. 
 The environmental conditions a mechanism is operating in will, of course, affect 
the operation of that mechanism. Given our current model, we can divide environmental 
effects into two categories. First, certain environmental conditions will have the causal 
effect of triggering the mechanism. We will call these environmental conditions the 
“activation conditions” for the mechanism. Some environmental conditions may have the 
effect of producing variations in the execution of the mechanism's performance (whether 
these conditions also trigger the mechanism or not). According to the simplified model 
we are using in this chapter, this kind of environmental effect will be treated as 
interference which maintenance mechanisms and simple control programs will have the 
task of overcoming. 
 For the purposes of this chapter, I will suggest that empirical methods can be used 
to 'reverse engineer' a specification for the conditions under which a given activation 
mechanism will activate its associated program. If we want to investigate under which 
conditions the cognitive program responsible for forming the subject's belief (such as 
“That is a maple tree”) will activate, we can “freeze” the subject's head, and then “clone” 
as many atom-for-atom copies of it as we want. We could then subject the head to a 
variety of tests in order to determine the exact conditions under which the maple-tree 
identifying program is activated. How much can the light levels vary before the program 
no longer activates? How much can the shape of the leaves vary? How obscured can the 
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tree be? Etc., etc. (In principle, it is necessary to perform this “freeze and clone” step in 
order to perform these tests, since repeated tests could cause a learning mechanism to 
activate and modify the activation mechanism or the simple control program that, 
together, constitute the belief-forming mechanism, which would result in our team of 
scientists chasing a moving target.)  
 Of course, there may be complications to this method (in addition to the difficulty 
of developing a “freeze and clone” process) – for example, there might be several belief-
forming mechanisms which, while they are never activated at the same time (at least 
according to ACT*), are activated under very similar conditions. (See ACT*'s rules for 
conflict-resolution.) But I think that whatever empirical method we develop would be 
able to resolve these complications, enough that we could reverse engineer a specification 
of the conditions under which the given activation mechanism will activate its belief-
forming program. 
 The activation mechanism itself belongs to an adaptive type. I will not explain 
how to specify this type in this chapter, but I will note in passing that, in typical 
containing systems, the activation mechanism is, itself, the product of various adaptive 
mechanisms, including learning mechanisms, selection mechanisms, maintenance 
mechanisms, developmental programs, etc. For example, in Adams' theory of motor 
learning, the memory trace is formed by stimulus-response training; and in Anderson's 
ACT* theory of cognitive learning, the application conditions for a production are 
formed by generalization, application discrimination, and strengthening. The fact that 
activation mechanisms are typically the product of some adaptive mechanism suggests 
that the adaptive type of an activation mechanism can be specified by referring to this 
underlying adaptive mechanism. I will explore this notion in more detail in the next 
chapter. 
 The typical main effect the activation mechanism has on the overall belief-
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forming mechanism's reliability is that it makes it more reliable. One possible definition 
of reliability is that a mechanism is reliable just if, across a range of possible worlds, the 
mechanism does not fail in a high ratio of worlds. If the activation conditions for a belief-
forming mechanism seldom obtain, then, given this definition of reliability, that 
mechanism will be quite reliable – it will seldom form any belief, so it will seldom form 
any false beliefs. Such a mechanism would lack power (it will seldom form any belief, so 
it will seldom succeed in forming a true belief), but it would be reliable. 
 In some containing systems, the belief-forming mechanism may be less likely to 
activate than its activation mechanism's activation conditions might suggest. This is 
because other mechanisms in the containing system may act as “preemption 
mechanisms.” Systems that instantiate ACT* provide an example of this. ACT* allows 
for productions to be applied even when their application conditions are only partially 
matched. This would suggest that ACT*'s productions are often unreliable. However, the 
application conditions for multiple productions could be partially matched at the same 
time. ACT* has a conflict-resolution procedure that determines which production will be 
applied, and only one production will be applied at a time.  
 The effect of this conflict-resolution system is that the effective application 
conditions for productions are usually much more restrictive than their “official” 
application conditions (that is, the set of conditions under which the production would be 
applied if not preempted). Since ACT*’s conflict-resolution principles give higher 
precedence to productions whose application conditions are more completely matched, 
one of the overall effects of the conflict-resolution process is to make the containing 
system more reliable in forming “beliefs.” 
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4.2 Selection and Learning Types 
 As I said above, a selection mechanism is a mechanism that selects a ‘good’ 
(relative to a set of selection criteria) target item out of a set of competing items, in 
response to some sort of information about those competing items. A learning mechanism 
is a mechanism that modifies a single target item, in response to how successful that 
target item is in achieving its goals. 
 Both selection mechanisms and learning mechanisms allow us to specify at least 
one type that its target item or items belongs to. I will first address how selection 
mechanisms allow us to assign its target items to two types. 
 In order for a selection mechanism to select some ‘good’ target item, it must be 
able to detect differences between the various items that are competing for selection. This 
ability of the selection mechanism allows us to divide the competing target items into 
what I will call “selection micro-types.” If the relevant selection mechanism is powerful 
enough to correctly determine, in high ratio of a range of possible worlds, which of two 
functional items are more likely to succeed or more likely to fail, then the two functional 
items belong to two different selection micro-types. If the selection mechanism is unable 
to reliably determine which of the two mechanisms are more likely to succeed, then the 
two target mechanisms belong to the same selection micro-type.  
 Appealing to a selection mechanism also allows us to specify a second adaptive 
type a functional item belongs to. This adaptive type, the “selection macro-type,” is 
simply the set of selection micro-types that are competing for selection for the same niche 
in the containing system. It should be noted that the reliability of the selection macro-type 
is not simply the average of the reliability of the selection micro-types, since a good 
selection mechanism will typically select some functional item of a good selection micro-
type, and reliability is a good-making feature of a functional item. Even if most of the 
competing selection micro-types are unreliable, a good selection mechanism will tend to 
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select one of the better (and more reliable) options available. As a result, the reliability of 
the selection macro-type will tend to be higher than the average reliability of the 
competing selection micro-types. 
 As the detector sub-mechanism gathers more information, it will be able to 
distinguish finer and finer differences between competing target items. Or, in some cases, 
the detector sub-mechanism may actually lose information, meaning that the detector will 
be less able to distinguish differences between competing target items.  
 There are at least two ways of describing this, using our concept of selection 
micro-types and, optionally, our concept of selection macro-types. We could define a 
selection micro-type as the target mechanism-type that the selection mechanism could 
reliably distinguish from others given a sufficient number of trials. On this view, the 
different target items belong to a set of selection micro-types that remain constant over 
time. As time goes by, the selection mechanism becomes better and better at selecting 
target items of some good micro-type. As target items of bad micro-types become 
selected against, good micro-types take up a larger and larger portion of the macro-type, 
until, eventually, one micro-type becomes co-extensive with the macro-type. 
 Alternatively, we could define the micro-type as the set of target item-tokens that 
the selection mechanism can reliably distinguish from others given the information it has 
to date. On this view, when the selection process first begins, and the selection 
mechanism’s detector has yet to collect any information about the performance of the 
various target item-tokens that are competing for selection, the selection micro-type 
includes all of the competing target item-tokens. This selection micro-type is co-
extensive with the selection macro-type, and will remain so as the selection process 
continues. As the selection process continues, and the detector gathers information about 
the competing target item-tokens, more and more item-tokens are discarded from the 
“acceptable” selection micro-type, and this micro-type will become progressively 
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“better” and more reliable. 
 My first thought when I compared these two ways of understanding the selection 
macro-type was that they were predicatively equivalent. After reflecting on the Autistic 
Twins case (which I will discuss in more detail in Chapter 4), I now prefer the second 
way of understanding the selection macro-type, or selection type. Given this 
understanding, all of the children a pair of parents could potentially have belong to the 
same selection type, and this constitutes a sufficiency condition for membership in that 
selection type. This set of possible offspring might include an autistic child and his neuro-
typical counterpart. It might be possible that the selection macro-type, over this time 
interval, could include even more possible children (the condition I have given is a 
sufficiency condition, not a necessity condition), but such possible children, given the 
“splitting” strategy I will propose in Chapter 3, would not be the ‘same’ agent as the 
actual autistic child. Instead, they would be other-worldly half-siblings or cousins of the 
autistic child, unlike the neuro-typical counterpart, who could be considered an instance 
of the autistic child rather than just a sibling. Over generational time, we might expect 
that individuals of the same genotype as the autistic child and his neuro-typical 
counterpart would experience different rates of reproductive success. If so, these 
genotypes would become members of different selection types. But within the current 
generation, both genotypes should be considered members of the same selection type. 
 The learning type defined by a learning mechanism is very similar to the selection 
macro-type defined by a selection mechanism. At first, the learning mechanism has no 
control over the nature of its target item, and the nature of the target item will vary wildly 
from world to world (assuming that no other adaptive mechanism intervenes). Over time, 
the learning mechanism gathers information about the successes and failures of the target 
item, and will modify the target item in response. At first, these modifications may cause 
drastic changes in the target item, but eventually, the different time-slices of the target 
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item will tend to converge on some ‘good,’ and therefore reliable, form. As this 
convergence continues, the learning type will settle down to some equilibrium, which 
may occasionally be punctuated by new error reports. 
 Learning types and selection types can play a role in defining a belief-forming 
mechanism's activation type. They do this because they help constrain how much the 
cognitive program that populates the address a given activation mechanism points to can 
vary from world to world. In order to illustrate this, let's consider the Serendipitous Brain 
Lesion case, a case which involves a “strange” belief-forming process of the kind 
involved in the Strange and Fleeting Process Problem. In this case, a subject is suffering 
from a brain lesion that is directly causing her to form the belief that she has a brain 
lesion. The subject has no evidence for this belief and no defeater for it. Intuitively, the 
subject does not know and is not justified in believing that she has a brain lesion.76 
 In order to apply our model of 'skill-learning' to this target system, we must 
identify mechanisms in the target system that correspond to the various constructs in our 
model. In this target system, the closest analogue to an activation mechanism is the fact 
that there is a region in the subject's brain that, when traumatized, has a certain effect on 
the subject's cognition. This effect is analogous to a cognitive program and, in the actual 
world, results in the subject forming the belief that she has a brain lesion. One possible 
candidate for the learning or selection mechanism that caused the subject to 'acquire' this 
'cognitive program' is that it is simply the result of random chance. (As previously 
mentioned, random chance can be seen as a kind of selection or learning mechanism 
which lacks a detector mechanism, and is therefore extremely unreliable in selecting or 
producing a 'good' target item.) But it is at least possible that this belief-forming 
                                                     
76 This case appears in Alvin Plantinga’s Warrant and Proper Function, New York: Oxford University 
Press, 1993, p 4. Plantinga credits this case to Alvin Goldman. Oddly, the Stanford Encyclopedia of 
Philosophy’s article on Reliabilism, which was written by Alvin Goldman, credits this case to this passage 
in Plantinga. 
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mechanism has been shaped by natural selection, so let's investigate what this would 
imply about its selection type(s). 
 Suppose that there is a possible world where a different cognitive program is 
stored at the same address as this “brain lesion” cognitive program is in the actual world. 
For example, the address might be populated by a cognitive program that causes the 
subject to form the belief that there are chirping birds orbiting her head. Despite the fact 
that these two cognitive programs appear to be very different, according to our model 
they are of the same selection micro-type if natural selection would be unable to 
distinguish between them. 
 Possessing a cognitive program that, when activated by a brain lesion, causes the 
belief that the possessor has a brain lesion would, quite plausibly, be a trait that promotes 
reproductive success (since truly believing that you have a brain lesion would encourage 
you to seek life-saving medical attention). Possessing a cognitive program that, when 
activated by a brain lesion, causes the belief that there are chirping birds orbiting the 
possessor's head would probably not have an effect that would promote reproductive 
success. However, if the relevant brain region is relatively small (which would mean that 
the activation conditions for the relevant activation mechanism are relatively narrow), 
this cognitive program would not be activated often. As a result, natural selection would 
not be powerful enough to 'know' that the brain-lesion cognitive program better promotes 
reproductive success than the chirping-bird cognitive program. This means that the two 
cognitive programs fail to meet the sufficiency condition I have provided for being of two 
different selection micro-types. Therefore, we can conclude that they are of the same 
selection micro-type. They are also of the same selection macro-type, and of the same 
activation type. 
 Because the chirping-bird cognitive program and the brain-lesion cognitive 
program are of the same selection micro-type (and of the same activation type), the 
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belief-forming mechanism responsible for forming the subject's true belief is of a type 
that is unreliable and relevant to the epistemic project. There are worlds where the subject 
formed a belief using a belief-forming mechanism of the same relevant type as she did in 
the actual world, and that belief was false (since that belief was the product of the 
chirping-bird program). This can explain why the subject does not know and is not 
justified in believing that she has a brain tumor. 
 
4.3 Maintenance and Production Types 
 Although maintenance mechanisms play no role in selecting or producing the 
target mechanism, they do ensure that future time-slices of a target mechanism closely 
resemble the original time-slice of the mechanism. Because of this, maintenance 
mechanisms, in conjunction with an “origin token” (or range of origin tokens), can define 
an adaptive type the target mechanism belongs to – the maintenance type. This 
maintenance type can help define a relevant type of target mechanism, both in the 
presence or the absence of a selection or learning mechanism. Similarly, simple control 
programs also play no role in selecting a given kind of performance, but different 
activations of the same simple control program will result in similar performances. Thus, 
a simple control program specifies a type that different activations of the program belong 
to, both in the presence or the absence of a selection or learning mechanism. 
 In order to explain how simple control programs and maintenance mechanisms 
can specify a relevant type of target mechanism in the presence of a selection mechanism, 
it is helpful to look at the case of manufactured artifacts. The 'design' plan model of 
proper function focuses on manufactured artifacts as paradigm cases of items with a 
proper function. The Proper Function family of epistemic theories extends this model to 
cognitive faculties. Our model of 'skill learning' can be extended in the opposite direction, 
from systems where cognitive and motor programs are the target items to systems where 
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artifacts are the target items.  
 One difference between these two approaches is that, unlike intelligent design, the 
mechanism at work in skill learning does not simply produce a representational design 
plan that is used to 'manufacture' a cognitive faculty. Instead, the learning mechanism at 
work in skill learning directly produces an actual mechanism which is used to control the 
execution of motor or cognitive actions – it produces the simple control program which 
controls those actions.  
 The closest analogy in the domain of artifacts to what the learning mechanism 
involved in skill learning produces is not a mass-produced artifact but an experimental 
prototype that is constantly being modified in response to the results of ongoing testing. 
We can extend this analogy to mass-produced artifacts, but the immediate product of the 
learning mechanism in that case is not the manufactured artifact itself, but the set of 
routines that are used in manufacturing the artifact. This set of manufacturing routines is 
analogous to the simple control programs involved in our model of skills, and each 
individual manufactured artifact can be seen as an analogue to different executions of the 
same skill. 
 For a manufacturing firm, the relevant type of the products they manufacture is 
the production type. The production type consists of all product-tokens that are the result 
of the ‘same’ production routine, a kind of simple control program. The target mechanism 
for the firm’s ‘learning’ mechanism (its team of engineers and managers) is the 
production routine, so the firm’s ‘learning’ mechanism defines the learning type a given 
production routine belongs to. 
 For a good manufacturing firm, the relevant type of their products must not 
consist merely of manufactured artifacts that are fresh off the assembly lines and have 
just passed the Quality Control tests. This is because artifacts do age. If the artifacts 
become unreliable shortly after they are sold, they will quickly earn a reputation for 
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unreliability. For example, it might be that a certain DVR is highly reliable in recording 
certain shows immediately after it comes off of the assembly line. But if, in order for the 
DVR to remain functional, the owner must often reset the correct time, and if the 
instructions for how to do that are in a manual written in Japanese when the DVR is 
mainly sold in America, that DVR will quickly earn a reputation for being an unreliable 
lemon. A good manufacturing firm will design and produce manufactured artifacts that 
age well and will provide quality documentation and after-market service and repair – all 
of which is part of the “maintenance mechanism” that has that line of products as a target 
item.  
 With this in mind, it is clear that the relevant type of manufactured goods for such 
a firm does not consist of just the set of manufactured artifacts that pass the firm's final 
Quality Control tests. Instead, the relevant type consists of this set of “origin-tokens” and 
the set of “decay tokens” that result from these origin-tokens aging under the watch of 
some maintenance mechanism, up until some expiration date. (And it is the responsibility 
of some activation mechanism – such as an owner armed with quality documentation – to 
ensure that the artifacts are not used passed their expiration date.) This after-market 
maintenance package (with the partial exception of the activation mechanism) can be 
considered to be an extended part of the production routines that produced the artifact. 
These production routines, in turn, are the target mechanism for the firm’s ‘learning’ 
mechanisms, so the firm’s ‘learning’ mechanisms defines the learning type a given 
production routine (including the after-market maintenance mechanism) belongs to. This 
chain of adaptive mechanisms, with each link in the chain constraining how much the 
next link in the chain (the link closer to the customer) can vary, will play a central role in 
the next chapter. 
 A Proper Functionalist who is wed to the 'design' plan model of proper function 
might argue that, if this relevant type of manufactured artifact (that is, the set of artifacts 
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that are actually being used in the field) is a good one, then the set of artifact-tokens will 
certainly tend to be within the tolerances of their design plan, and that artifacts are 
properly functioning only to the extent that they resemble the firm's blueprints for that 
model. However, applying this ‘blueprint’ metaphor becomes overly burdensome in the 
case of environmentally-sensitive control programs (which, as recent developments in the 
field of evolutionary development tell us, includes the developmental ‘programs’ that 
produce biological organisms) whose different activations, unlike simple control 
programs (such as the sequence of factory routines that produce a given model of 
manufactured artifact), do not necessarily closely resemble each other. I will discuss this 
more in Chapter 4. 
 Maintenance mechanisms and simple control programs can also help specify a 
type of target mechanism or performance in the absence of selection or learning 
mechanisms. The clearest example of this is Swampman. Swampman's cognitive faculties 
are not the result of any selection mechanism. But it is still the case that his maple-tree 
identifying cognitive program (a simple control program, at least according to the model 
we're currently applying) is the result of a certain origin-token (the time-slice of that 
program as it came into being, in the moment of the lightning strike) aging under the 
watch of 'a' certain maintenance mechanism. These two properties specify a type that the 
simple control program that controls how Swampman forms maple-tree beliefs belongs 
to. Given this specification, we can measure the reliability of this belief-forming simple 
control program across a range of possible worlds, where this origin-token (or origin-
tokens not too dissimilar) existed in the history of that world, and where the same 
maintenance mechanism (or maintenance mechanisms not too dissimilar) maintains this 
simple control program. 
 It is, of course, true that there are worlds, not terribly distant, where this maple-
tree identifying program had a very different origin-token – for example, worlds where 
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the neurons that form that mechanism instead came into being in the form of a lump of 
muddy goo, slightly charred by lightning. There are also not terribly distant worlds where 
that maintenance mechanism also has a very different, perhaps unreliable, nature. In those 
worlds, the nature of that simple control program will vary wildly from time-slice to 
time-slice. In those worlds, Swampman, may of course, be highly unreliable in 
distinguishing maple trees from other objects – if he is capable of identifying maple trees 
or forming any kind of beliefs at all. But there is still a range of worlds, in which his 
maple-tree identifying cognitive program and the maintenance program that maintains it, 
had origin-tokens not too dissimilar than the ones they had in the actual world. Across 
this (albeit very narrow) range of worlds, Swampman is reliable in forming beliefs about 
maple trees. And that may be enough for Swampman to be justified in his maple tree 
beliefs, and to know that he sees a maple tree. I will return to this issue in the next 
chapter. But, for now, I will argue that the method of specifying the activation type of a 
belief-forming mechanism we have developed in this chapter meets the two of the three 
adequacy conditions for a solution to the Generality Problem provided by Conee and 
Feldman, and partially satisfies a third.  
 
5. Conee and Feldman’s Adequacy Conditions 
 As mentioned above, in their 1998 paper “The Generality Problem for 
Reliablism,” Earl Conee and Richard Feldman describe the Generality Problem for 
reliabilism and provide three adequacy conditions for any solution to the problem. In this 
section, I will argue that the rough draft solution I have proposed in this chapter satisfies 
these adequacy conditions. As an illustration of the Generality Problem, Conee and 
Feldman offer the following case: Smith looks out his window, sees a maple tree, and 
forms the belief that a maple tree is nearby. Assuming conditions are normal, Smith 
intuitively appears to be justified in his belief. The token process responsible for Smith's 
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belief is a member of several process types: 
1) process of a retinal image of such-and such- specific characteristics 
leading to a belief that there is a maple nearby 
2) process of relying on a leaf shape to form a tree-classifying judgment 
3) the visual process 
4) vision in bright sunlight 
5) perceptual processes that occurs in middle-aged men on Wednesdays 
6) processes which result in justified beliefs 
7) perceptual process of classifying by species a tree behind a solid 
obstruction. 
8) Etc., etc., etc.....77 
 In order for the reliablist project to succeed, reliablists must provide a principled 
method of specifying which of the multitude of types a given belief-forming process 
token belongs to is relevant to the epistemic project. Conee and Feldman provide three 
necessary conditions for an adequate solution to this Generality Problem: 1) The solution 
must be principled, rather than making ad hoc case-by-case selections of types that match 
our intuitions. 2) The solution must make defensible epistemic classifications, and the 
types identified must have a reliability that is plausibly correlated with the justification of 
the resulting beliefs. 3) The solution must remain true to the spirit of the reliablist 
approach – it should not identify the relevant type for a process in a way that smuggles in 
a non-reliabilist epistemic evaluation into the specification of the relevant types. For 
example, a proposed solution should not sort belief-forming processes into “basing a 
belief on sufficient  evidence” and “basing a belief on insufficient evidence,” since this 
                                                     
77 The list of types, as well as the description of the case, is drawn from James R. Beebe, “The Generality 
Problem, Statistical Relevance and the Tri-Level Hypothesis,” Noûs 38:1 (2004), p 178. The case originally 
appears in Earl Conee and Richard Feldman, “The Generality Problem for Reliabilism,” Philosophical 
Studies, Vol. 89, No. 1 (Jan., 1998), pp. 1-2. 
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would involve smuggling an evidentialist epistemic evaluation into a reliabilist theory.78 
 I will argue that the rough draft version of the solution to the Generality Problem I 
have proposed in this chapter satisfies adequacy conditions 1) and 3), and partially 
satisfies adequacy condition 2). The model we have developed in this chapter provides a 
non-ad hoc method of specifying the epistemically relevant type a given belief-forming 
mechanism belongs to. To review, this method is as follows: First, 'reverse engineer' the 
activation conditions for the relevant activation mechanism. Secondly, identify any 
adaptive mechanisms that have the relevant cognitive program for a target item. Given 
the activation conditions for the cognitive program, and the constraints provided by the 
various adaptive mechanisms that have the cognitive program for a target item, we can 
predict the kinds of worlds in which the cognitive program would activate, and how the 
cognitive program will vary from world to world. With this information in hand, we can 
evaluate the reliability of the cognitive program across a range of possible worlds. 
 Conee and Feldman's test case is, of course, somewhat underspecified. But we can 
outline the information we would need to specify the type of belief-forming mechanism 
involved, and make informed guesses about the kinds of adaptive mechanisms involved. 
Presumably, the environmental conditions that triggered the relevant cognitive program 
consisted of a retinal image with certain characteristics. With some experimentation 
(perhaps aided by such super-science measures as “freezing” and “cloning” atom-for-
atom copies of Smith), we could learn the exact kind of retinal image that would serve as 
a trigger. For example, we could determine how opaque a solid obstruction (such as a 
window) could be before the cognitive program would no longer be triggered. 
 We can also make an informed guess that Smith's maple-tree identifying cognitive 
program is a literal, non-metaphorical, learned skill. It was produced in response 
                                                     
78 Conee and Feldman, “The Generality Problem,” Philosophical Studies: An International Journal for 
Philosophy in the Analytic Tradition, Vol. 89, No. 1 (Jan., 1998), pp 3-5. 
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Knowledge of the Results of a series of trials (which Smith probably now only dimly 
remembers), under the control of some learning mechanism. (This learning mechanism 
was itself the product of further adaptive mechanisms – more on this in the next chapter.) 
With an understanding of the nature of the learning mechanism (including the nature of 
its detector and modifier sub-components), we can gain an understanding of how it would 
have reacted to a different history of trials. We can predict what Knowledge of the Result 
this learning mechanism would have gleaned from these other-wordly trials, and we can 
predict how the learning mechanism would have modified the cognitive program would 
vary from world to world in response to this Knowledge of the Result. 
 Once we have this information, we could then make further predictions about 
what kind of environmental interference might have been able to overcome the 
maintenance mechanisms that protect the cognitive program.  
 All of this, together with our understanding of the activation conditions for the 
cognitive program, would allow us to predict the behavior of this cognitive program 
across a range of possible worlds, and yield a judgment about the reliability of the 
cognitive program 
 Based on this understanding of the activation type the relevant cognitive program 
belongs to, we can say which of the various properties possessed by this activation of it 
are relevant to the activation type. Since a certain kind of retinal image presumably 
serves as an activation condition for the cognitive program, we can assume that the 
property of being triggered by a retinal image of such-and-such specific characteristics is 
a relevant property. Given that Smith may have become near-sighted as he aged, the 
cognitive program's property of being used by a middle-aged man may actually be 
relevant as well. (However, the underlying adaptive mechanisms would probably have 
modified the cognitive program in response to any failures this degradation in eye-sight 
may have caused in the past.)  
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 Since the fact the cognitive program was used on a Wednesday did not affect 
whether or not the cognitive program was triggered, or executed, or maintained in 
procedural memory, or provide Knowledge of the Result that would cause the program to 
be modified, etc., we can say, with some reasonable degree of assurance, that this 
property of this particular execution of the cognitive program is an irrelevant property. 
 This method also at least partially satisfies Conee and Feldman's second adequacy 
condition: that the solution must make defensible epistemic classifications, and the types 
identified must have a reliability that is plausibly correlated with the justification of the 
resulting beliefs. This method provides a way of predicting the reliability of the relevant 
belief-forming mechanism type across a range of possible worlds. In order to make 
epistemic classifications, we must also be able to specify what range of possible worlds is 
relevant for a given epistemic classification. I will discuss this task in the next chapter. 
Additionally, I should also provide a reason why it is at least plausible that the reliability 
of this type, of all the types a given belief-forming mechanism token belongs to, is the 
one that is relevant to a given epistemic classification. I will also address this task in the 
next chapter. 
 Finally, this proposed solution to the Generality Problem is in the spirit of the 
reliabilist project. Its main difference from other, competing reliabilistic theories is how it 
appeals to adaptive mechanisms and what kind of target mechanism it places primary 
focus on. But many complex reliablist theories have appealed to adaptive mechanisms in 
one form or another.  
 It is clear that this approach is not a form of evidentialism. There are two 
constructs in our model which might be related to evidence: the environmental conditions 
that trigger activation mechanisms and the Knowledge of the Results which enables 
selection mechanisms to function. In ACT*, the patterns that satisfy application 
conditions are located in working memory. This suggests that, if humans are systems that 
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instantiate ACT*, then the environmental conditions that satisfy the application 
conditions for our productions are phenomenal experiences, beliefs, or other mental states 
that are reflectively accessible. However, nothing in our generalized model requires that 
the things that satisfy the activation conditions for cognitive programs must be things in 
working memory or things that are reflectively accessible. It may well be the case that, in 
humans, the only thing that satisfies the activation conditions of our belief-forming 
mechanisms are phenomenal experiences, beliefs, or other mental states that are 
reflectively accessible. However, given our model, that may simply be a contingent fact 
of human psychology. Thus, it might not be the case (according to this model) that only 
evidence can trigger the activation of a belief-forming mechanism. 
 The other construct in our model that might be related to evidence is Knowledge 
of the Result. However, Knowledge of the Result is information possessed by a selection 
mechanism, and not necessarily the subject herself. Organisms are rarely aware of the 
history of the successes and failure of the various traits present in their population. Even 
in paradigm cases of skill-learning, Knowledge of the Result is information that is 
possessed by the subject, but this information only needs to persist long enough to guide 
his action in the next trial. After the next trial, the Knowledge of the Result of the 
previous trial will generally be forgotten. So, not only are there many cases of 
Knowledge of the Result not being reflectively accessible, the Knowledge of the Result 
that played a role in the formation of a subject's skill will generally not be reflectively 
accessible to the subject at the time the skill is used. 
 Given the above, it appears that this proposed solution to the Generality Problem 
is more in keeping with the traditions of reliabilism than Comesaña’s Well-Founded 
Solution, which assumes that all justified beliefs are based on evidence. 
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6. Conclusion 
 In this chapter, I have presented a ‘rough draft’ version of a proposed solution to 
the Generality Problem. While I have argued that this version of the proposed solution 
satisfies two out of three of the adequacy conditions provided by Conee and Feldman, 
and partially satisfies a third, it remains incomplete in two ways. First, I did not provide, 
in this chapter, a way of specifying the epistemically relevant type that a given activation 
mechanism token belongs to. Secondly, I gave no reason to think that the reliability of a 
belief-forming mechanism’s activation type is plausibly related to a given positive 
epistemic status (such as justification or knowledge). I will turn to these tasks in the next 
chapter. 
 These tasks are complicated by a consideration that Mark Heller brings up in “A 
Simple Solution to the Generality Problem.” Contextualists claim that certain epistemic 
terms, such as “knows” and “justified,” are sensitive to conversational context. 
Contextualists compare these terms to everyday terms, such as “flat” and “tall,” which 
also show some signs of changing meaning relative to context. “Reliable” is a term that 
also shows some signs of changing meaning relative to context. The problem that Heller 
raises is that while, according to contextualists, “knows,” “justified,” and “reliable” are 
all sensitive to conversational context, they may not respond to contextual pressures in 
the same way. This casts some doubt on the notion that reliability of belief-formation is 
closely related to the justificatory status of the resulting beliefs. 
 While contextualists claim that the meaning of terms like “knows,” “justified,” 
and “reliable” vary according to conversational context, they do admit that other things, 
like a mechanisms overall reliability rating, or the strength of a belief’s epistemic 
position, remain invariant across conversational contexts. In the next chapter, I will use a 
more refined version of the solution to the Generality Problem I proposed in this chapter 
to argue that what I will call the absolute reliability of a belief-forming mechanism’s 
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extended activation type is directly related to the epistemic strength of the beliefs that 
result from that mechanism.  
 This account will provide an explanation to a variety of New Evil Demon 
Problem cases, including cases where the ‘demonic’ force involved interferes with the 
proximate process of belief-formation, and cases where the ‘demonic’ force involved 
interferes with the underlying process of skill-learning. It will prove more difficult to 
provide an explanation of cases where the ‘demonic’ force interferes with the process that 
created the epistemic agent itself, but I will provide two strategies that may be able to 
handle them. 
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Chapter 3 
Absolute Reliability and Epistemic Strength 
 
Section 0:  Introduction 
 One of the major problems facing reliablism is the problem of plausibly linking 
reliability of belief-formation to the justification of the resulting beliefs. This difficulty is 
reflected in Alvin Goldman’s reliablistic theory (or theories) of justification, which, as I 
will relate in the first section of Part 1, has become increasingly more complicated and 
baroque over time, in response to a series of problem cases.  
 One possible reason for some of this complexity is that Goldman’s theory of 
justification assumes that the norms of knowledge and justification attributions do not 
vary according to context. Since Goldman developed his theory of justification, several 
theories have arisen that attempt to explain about how the norms of knowledge attribution 
vary according to context. The one that I will focus on in this chapter is contextualism, 
which claims that the standards of knowledge (or, more accurately, the propositions 
expressed by knowledge attributions) vary according to the conversational context of the 
attributer. 
 If contextualism is true, then this could be of some aid to the problem of 
simplifying Goldman’s theory of justification. But, as Mark Heller notes in his “A Simple 
Solution to the Generality Problem,” contextualism may also be a mixed blessing for 
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reliabilism.79 This is because, while the terms “reliable,” “knows,” and “justified” all 
show signs of being context-sensitive (at least according to contextualists), it also may be 
the case that the terms “reliable” and “justified” respond to contextual pressures in 
different ways. This problem could be called the Problem of Contextual Divergence.  
 It is by no means clear just how much of a problem this Problem of Contextual 
Divergence poses for justificatory reliabilism. After all, contextualism faces many 
competing theories, and, even if contextualism is true, it could still be the case that there 
is a close correlation between a belief-forming mechanism being “reliable” and the 
beliefs it produces being “justified” in a given conversational context. But, given the 
possibility that the Problem of Contextual Divergence is a problem, and the various 
problems that already confront reliabilistic accounts of justification, it is perhaps not too 
early to begin looking for epistemic theories that honor the motivations for reliabilism by 
linking reliability to some other positive epistemic status than justification. 
 One candidate for this role is the strength of a subject’s epistemic position 
towards a belief or proposition. According to contextualists, a subject’s epistemic 
position may, in some cases, be stronger than ‘mere’ knowledge – the subject’s belief 
would amount to knowledge even in contexts more demanding than the present one. The 
strength of a subject’s epistemic position towards a belief is a constant across 
conversational contexts. Similarly, while whether or not a mechanism is “reliable” may 
vary according to conversational context, a mechanism’s overall reliability rating remains 
constant across conversational contexts. This suggests that a belief-forming mechanism’s 
overall reliability rating (or what I will call its absolute reliability) may somehow be 
                                                     
79 Mark Heller, “The Simple Solution to the Generality Problem,” Noûs 29, 4 (1995); p 501-15 
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related to the strength of the epistemic positions of the beliefs produced by the 
mechanism. 
 Of course, even given contextualism, whether or not a subject knows a 
proposition is not solely determined by the absolute reliability of the belief-forming 
mechanism used by the subject and by the conversational context of the attributor. 
According to Keith DeRose, what DeRose calls ‘subject factors’ (or what I will here call 
the subject’s ‘epistemic situation,’ for the sake of greater clarity) also helps determine 
how strong the subject’s epistemic position is, and by extension, whether the subject 
knows or not.  
 The Fake Barn case provides an example of how a subject’s epistemic situation 
can help determine whether or not a subject knows. In the Fake Barn Case, an epistemic 
subject, Henry, is driving down a country road, sees what looks like a barn, and forms the 
true belief that there is a barn in front of him. But, unbeknownst to Henry, he is driving in 
Fake Barn Country. The rural inhabitants of Fake Barn Country are too poor to afford 
real barns, but are also too proud to admit this. As a result, these inhabitants are in the 
habit of building elaborate barn-facades which are indistinguishable from real barns from 
the road, but are completely unable to perform the function of a barn. Henry, purely by 
luck, happens to be looking at the only real barn in Fake Barn Country. Henry’s belief 
that there is a barn in front of him is justified and true, but intuitively, Henry does not 
know that there is a barn in front of him. By contrast, if Henry were not driving through 
Fake Barn Country, and he formed the same true belief based on the same visual 
experience as he had in the Fake Barn Case, then, intuitively, Henry would know that 
there was a barn in front of him.  
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The standard reliabilist explanation of this case is that while the belief-forming 
mechanisms shared by the two versions of Henry are equally reliable in a global sense, 
Henry’s belief-forming mechanism was not reliable in Fake Barn Country in the local 
sense – it was not reliable in the situation it was actually used. Since local reliability is a 
necessary condition for knowledge, but not for justification, Henry is justified in his 
belief that there is a barn in front of him, but does not know there is a barn in front of 
him. The explanation DeRose gives of this case is that the two versions of Henry do not 
share the same epistemic position, and that ‘subject factors’ affect a subject’s epistemic 
position. This difference in epistemic position explains why one version of Henry has 
knowledge and the other lacks it, despite there being no apparent difference in attributor-
context between the two cases.80 
 Because the strength of a subject’s epistemic position is partially determined by 
the subject’s epistemic situation, it is clear that the strength of this epistemic position is 
not solely determined by the absolute reliability of the belief-forming mechanism the 
subject used to produce her belief. But it is still plausible that the absolute reliability is 
somehow related to strength of epistemic position. With this in mind, in this chapter, I 
will propose that a belief is epistemically strong just to the extent that the belief-forming 
mechanism responsible for forming it is absolutely reliable.  
‘Epistemic strength’ is a term of art which refers to any positive epistemic status 
of a belief that is both context and situation independent. The epistemic strength of a 
belief, together with the epistemic position of the subject, determines the epistemic 
                                                     
80 Keith DeRose, The Case for Contextualism: Knowledge, Skepticisim, and Context, Vol. 1, Clarendon 
Press, 2009, p 32. 
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position of the subject with regards to that belief. The ‘absolute reliability’ of a belief-
forming mechanism is identical to its overall reliability rating. In turn, this is equal to the 
ratio of worlds within a very large range of objectively possible worlds (such as the entire 
set of logically possible worlds) where the ‘same’ mechanism used by the ‘same’ subject 
fails to form a false belief over the total number of worlds in this range.  
Explaining what it means for two mechanism-tokens to be the ‘same’ will require 
a solution to the Generality Problem. In the previous chapter, I provided a slightly 
incomplete ‘rough-draft’ version of a solution to the Generality Problem. In this chapter, 
I will apply this solution to the Generality Problem, along with the account of epistemic 
strength I have just proposed, towards solving many of the problems that confront 
Goldman’s reliabilistic theory (or theories) of justification. In doing so, I will propose 
solutions to two versions of the New Evil Demon Problem, and a partial solution to a 
third version. In the process of this, I will also further refine my proposed solution to the 
Generality Problem.  
 This chapter will consist of four sections. In Section 1, I will review the evolution 
of Alvin Goldman’s reliabilistic theory (or theories) justification, and the various problem 
cases that have driven this evolution. I will also review one contextualist theory of 
knowledge, that provided by David Lewis in “Elusive Knowledge.” While I do not 
personally endorse this theory as correct, I do believe that it provides a model for what a 
correct contextualist theory of knowledge might look like. Based on this theory of 
knowledge, I will sketch a highly incomplete contextualist theory of knowledge and 
justification. This theory may or may not be compatible with justificatory reliabilism, 
depending on how serious the Problem of Contextual Divergence actually is. 
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 In Section 2, I will develop a rough draft reliabilistic account of the epistemic 
strength of a belief. This rough draft account will draw on the similarly rough draft 
solution to the Generality Problem I proposed in the previous chapter. This rough draft 
account of epistemic strength, while imperfect, will be able to explain many of the 
problem cases confronting justificatory reliabilism, including one version of the New Evil 
Demon Problem. This version of the New Evil Demon Problem involves cases where the 
“demonic” force involved interferes with the proximate process of belief-formation, but 
not the deeper process of cognitive skill learning. 
 In Section 3, in order to develop an account of epistemic strength that is able to 
handle versions of the New Evil Demon Problem where the “demonic” force does 
interfere with the process of skill learning, I will develop a more refined version of the 
solution to the Generality Problem I proposed in the previous chapter. According to this 
more refined proposed solution, the one type among the multitude of types that a given 
belief-forming mechanism belongs to which is relevant to the epistemic project is its 
extended activation type. Like the simple activation type, the extended activation type 
consists of the entire set of belief-forming programs which could potentially be activated 
by the ‘same’ activation mechanism. (And, again, the set of belief-forming programs that 
can be activated by a given activation mechanism is constrained by the learning, 
selection, and/or maintenance mechanisms that act on ‘that’ belief-forming program.) 
The extended activation type model differs from the simple activation type model by 
explicitly recognizing that the activation mechanism is itself defined by a chain of 
adaptive mechanisms, which, crucially, at least typically includes learning mechanisms 
and selection mechanisms. 
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In Section 4, I will further investigate the nature of epistemic strength. In 
particular, I will suggest one adequacy condition for any account of epistemic strength 
(that any account of epistemic strength should not yield the prediction that an unjustified 
belief can have maximum epistemic strength) and one less critical desiderata for such an 
account (it is desirable that an account of epistemic strength will not predict that a 
justified belief has zero epistemic strength). I will argue that my proposed account of 
epistemic strength does satisfy my suggested adequacy condition, but I will leave the 
question of whether it also satisfies my suggested desiderata open.  
Finally, also in Section 4, I will suggest two strategies that might be used to 
explain a third version of the New Evil Demon Problem. This version of the New Evil 
Demon Problem involves cases where the “demonic” force interferes with the creation of 
the epistemic agent itself. Cases of this sort include the Artificial Brain-in-a-Vat case and 
the Swampman case. Both of my suggested strategies appeal to the notion that, in 
evaluating the reliability of a belief-forming mechanism, we are not interested in all of 
the possible organisms that could have been outputted by the various underlying selection 
and/or learning mechanisms that played a role in forming that mechanism, but only in 
organisms that, in some sense, have the ‘same’ cognitive character as the epistemic agent 
in the actual world. 
 
Section 1: On the Shoulders of Giants 
 1. The Evolution of Goldman’s Theory of Justification 
 As mentioned in the introduction, the difficulty reliabilism faces in linking 
reliability of belief-formation to traditional notions of justification can be illustrated by 
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how Alvin Goldman’s theory of justification has become more and more complex over 
time, in response to certain problem cases. Goldman’s theory of justification was 
originally introduced in his 1979 article, “What is Justified Belief?”. In this article (which 
I will review in greater detail in Section 1.1), Goldman addresses two problem cases: the 
Benevolent Demon case (a variant of the New Evil Demon Problem), and what I will call 
the Lying Parent case. Goldman responds to these cases by proposing a “natural” or 
“normal worlds” (Goldman uses the terms ‘natural’ and ‘normal’ interchangeably) 
understanding of reliability and a “non-undermining” necessity condition for justification.  
 A modified and more complex version of this theory would appear in his 1986 
book, Epistemology and Cognition. This work (which I will review in Section 1.2) 
provides more developed versions of “natural worlds” reliabilism and the non-
undermining necessity condition for justification. Goldman also proposes a distinction 
between acquired belief-forming “methods” and innate belief-forming “processes.” (The 
terms “acquired” and “innate” are my own.) This distinction is made in response to the 
“Humperdink-Fraud” case. Versions of this case appear in “What is Justified Belief?” as 
counter-examples to competing theories of justification, but also serves in this work as a 
counter-example to the relatively naive version of Goldman’s own theory as proposed in 
“What is Justified Belief?”. Goldman responds to this case by claiming that belief-
forming methods must not only be reliable but also “meta-reliable” in order to produce 
knowledge or justified beliefs. 
 In his 1988 article, “Strong and Weak Justification” (which will be reviewed in 
Section 1.3), Goldman admits the failure of his “natural worlds” reliablism and the 
response it provided to the New Evil Demon Problem. In response to this failure, 
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Goldman proposes a multi-vocal account of justification, which describes two kinds of 
justification. Roughly speaking, a belief is “strongly” justified if and only if it satisfies 
the justification conditions Goldman proposed in Epistemology and Cognition, and 
merely “weakly” justified if it only satisfies Goldman’s non-undermining necessity 
condition for justification (also as proposed in Epistemology and Cognition). According 
to this theory, the beliefs of subjects in New Evil Demon cases are only weakly justified. 
 
1.1 “What is Justified Belief?” (1979) 
 Alvin Goldman’s initial theory of justification, as originally stated in his 1979 
article “What is Justified Belief?,” is relatively straightforward. His initial “base clause” 
positive account of a justification principle is as follows: 
5) If S's believing p at t results from a reliable cognitive 
belief-forming process (or set of processes), then S's belief 
in p at t is justified.81  
As formulated, this principle 5) is given as merely a sufficiency condition, but it appears 
to be intended as a necessity condition as well. As Goldman notes, this initial principle is 
too strong to serve as a necessity condition, since some belief-forming processes are 
belief-dependent. For example, the process of retrieving stored beliefs from memory is a 
“Garbage In, Garbage Out” process. Even if the retrieval process itself is perfectly 
reliable in the sense that it does not corrupt the stored beliefs it retrieves, the reliability of 
the overall process of belief-formation still depends on the ratio of true beliefs going into 
                                                     
81 Alvin Goldman, “What is Justified Belief?”, Epistemology: An Anthology, Ernest Sosa and Jaegwon 
Kim, ed., Wiley-Blackwell: 2000,  p 347. 
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storage in the first place. Justification principle 5) would require such processes to be 
reliable regardless of the beliefs inputted into them. In response to this concern, Goldman 
introduces a slightly more complicated and weaker requirement: 
6A) If S's belief in p at t results ("immediately") from a 
belief-independent process that is (unconditionally) 
reliable, then S's belief in p at t is justified. 
6B) If S's belief in p at t results ("immediately") from a 
belief-dependent process that is (at least) conditionally 
reliable and if the beliefs (if any) on which this process 
operates in producing S's belief in p at t are themselves 
justified, then S's belief in p at t is justified.82  
 Goldman notes (in endnote 10) that this justification principle is vulnerable to the 
Lottery Paradox, but suggests that our ordinary notion of justification is also vulnerable 
to the Lottery Paradox. The Lottery Paradox was first introduced Henry Kyburg, Jr., in 
1961, and is as follows: You have bought a ticket in a million ticket lottery, whose 
winner will be determined by a fair drawing at a future date. For any given ticket x in this 
lottery, it seems rational to accept the proposition that “ticket x will not win the lottery.” 
But from the million-fold conjunction of these propositions about all of the million 
tickets in the lottery, along with the proposition that there are only a million tickets in the 
lottery, it is possible to derive the proposition that none of the million tickets will win the 
lottery – a proposition that you know to be false. This suggests that either it is not rational 
to accept that a given ticket will not win the lottery, or that rational acceptance is not 
                                                     
82 Ibid. 
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closed over known entailment. (Kyburg preferred the later explanation.)83 
 This paradox can be generalized to other epistemic statuses, including 
justification and knowledge. It is worth noting that resolving a version of this paradox is 
one of the motivations for contextualism. In the version of the paradox as it normally 
appears in contextualist literature, intuitively, you do know some ordinary proposition, 
such as ‘I will not be able to afford that African safari this year.’ This ordinary 
proposition logically entails a lottery proposition, such as ‘I will not win the lottery, even 
though I have bought a ticket.’ Aside from some holdouts (who think that you do know 
that you will not win the lottery, and are not hesitant to assert this proposition), it is 
generally thought that you do not know the lottery proposition is true. Contextualism 
endorses both of these intuitions as well as the claim that knowledge is closed over 
known entailment by claiming that introducing the lottery proposition changes the 
conversational context, which, in turn, destroys your knowledge of the ordinary 
proposition. Hence, knowledge is closed over known entailment – but only within a 
single conversational context. But this explanation of the lottery paradox came about well 
after the publication of Goldman’s paper. 
 Once Goldman has laid out this initial simple theory of justification, he introduces 
two problem cases which will motivate more complex versions of his theory: the 
Benevolent Demon case, and what I will call the Lying Parent case. 
 
 
                                                     
83 Henry E. Kyburg, Jr., Probability and the Logic of Rational Belief, Wesleyan University Press, 1961, p 
197. 
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1.1.1 The Benevolent Demon 
 The first of these two problem cases is a variant on the Cartesian Evil Demon 
case. In the original Evil Demon case, a demon with all of the powers of God, but none of 
God’s benevolence, is trying to fool the subject into forming false beliefs. In this variant 
case, there is instead a Benevolent Demon, a helpful demon who uses its powers to make 
wishes come true. This has the side-effect of making wishful thinking a belief-forming 
mechanism that is reliable in worlds where this Demon exists. This provides a counter-
example to Goldman’s initial justification principle, since beliefs produced by wishful 
thinking are paradigm cases of unjustified belief. This original problem case later 
developed into the New Evil Demon Problem for reliabilism.84 
 Goldman proposes four possible responses to this case.85 His first proposed 
response is just to accept that, in the Benevolent Demon world, beliefs produced by 
wishful thinking are, in fact, justified. His second proposed response is that the proper 
criterion of justifiedness is the propensity of a process to generate beliefs that are true in a 
“natural,” non-manipulated environment. This response does mean that we would need a 
way of spelling out just what it means for an environment to be “natural.”  
 His third proposed response that the proper criterion of justifiedness is the 
propensity of a process to generate beliefs that are true in our world. Goldman himself 
provides an objection to this third proposal: It is possible that our world is a Benevolent 
Demon World - that there already exists a Benevolent Demon that, until just now, has 
been too lazy to interfere in human affairs, but has recently decided to become involved. 
                                                     
84 The New Evil Demon Problem for reliabilism seems to have first appeared in Stewart Cohen, 
“Justification and Truth,” Philosophical Studies, Vol. 46, No. 3 (Nov., 1984), pp 279-295. 
85 Alvin Goldman, “What is Justified Belief?,” p 349. 
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Over the long run, wishful thinking will be a reliable belief-forming mechanism, despite 
its lack of reliability until the present moment.  
 Goldman finds it difficult to put his fourth proposed reply into the terms of 
standard conceptual analysis, but the gist of it is that what we want from an account of 
justification is an explanation of why we count, or would count certain beliefs as justified 
and other as unjustified. Such an account must necessarily refer to what we believe about 
reliability, which may differ from the actual facts about reliability. The fact that we 
believe wishful thinking to be an unreliable process may be sufficient to explain why we 
count beliefs formed by wishful thinking to be unjustified. 
 While these last three proposals, particularly the last one, may be somewhat 
unrefined, they appear to be the seeds of Goldman’s “normal worlds” reliabilistic account 
of justification, which he would propose in Epistemology and Cognition.  
 
1.1.2 The Lying Parent 
The second of the two problem cases Goldman addresses in this work is what I will call 
the Lying Parent case: 
Lying Parent: “Suppose that Jones is told on fully reliable 
authority that a certain class of his memory beliefs are 
almost all mistaken. His parents fabricate a wholly false 
story that Jones suffered from amnesia when he was seven 
but later developed psuedo-memories of that period. 
Though Jones listens to what his parents say and has 
excellent reason to trust them, he persists in believing the 
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ostensible memories from his seven-year-old past. Are 
these memory beliefs justified? Intuitively, they are not 
justified. But since these beliefs result from genuine 
memory and original perceptions, which are adequately 
reliable processes, our theory says that these beliefs are 
justified.”86  
 This case re-appears in a slightly variant, but apparently equivalent, form in 
Epistemology and Cognition. I will refer to these two cases as Lying Authority cases. 
Lying Neurologist: “Millicent in fact possesses her normal 
visual powers, but has cogent reasons to believe these 
powers are temporarily deranged. She is a subject of a 
neurosurgeon’s experiments, and the surgeon falsely tells 
her that current implantations are causing malfunction in 
her visual cortex. She is persuaded that her present visual 
appearances are no guide at all to reality. Yet despite this 
belief, she continues to place credence in the incapacitation 
of her visual faculty; she persists in believing, on the basis 
of visual appearances, that a chair is before her, that the 
neurosurgeon is wearing a yellow smock, and so on. Now 
these beliefs are all, in fact, true. Moreover, they are 
formed by the usual, quite reliable, perceptual processes. 
But are they specimens of knowledge? Intuitively, no. The 
                                                     
86 Goldman, “What is Justified Belief?,” p 350. 
128 
 
reason is that Millicent is not justified in holding these 
beliefs; they contravene her best evidence.”87  
Goldman, in reaction to Lying Parent case, develops justification principle 10): 
10) If S's belief in p at t results from a reliable cognitive 
process, and there is no reliable or conditionally reliable 
process available to S which, had it been used by S in 
addition to the process actually used, would have resulted 
in S's not believing p at t, then S's belief in p at t is 
justified.88 
 While Goldman finds this proposal to be roughly acceptable, he does point out 
two minor problems with it. First, “one cannot use an additional belief-forming process 
as well as the original process if the additional one would result in a different doxastic 
state. One wouldn’t be using the original process at all."89 Goldman admits that a more 
accurate counterfactual needs to be formulated, but believes that basic idea is clear 
enough. Secondly, this proposal invokes the notion of a belief-forming process that is 
“available” but not used. Goldman asks if scientific procedures were “available" to 
people living in pre-scientific ages - a point that Goldman seems to return to in the 
Astrologer case presented in “Strong and Weak Justification."  
 At the end of “What is Justified Belief?,” Goldman accepts justification principle 
10) as a sketch of an account of certain kind of justification - ex post justification, an 
account of what it is for an already existing belief to be justified. Goldman does 
                                                     
87 Epistemology and Cognition, p 53-4. Emphases are Goldman’s, the “Lying Neurologist” label for this 
case is my own. 
88 Alvin Goldman, “What is Justified Belief?,” p 351. 
89 Ibid. 
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supplement this account of ex post justification with an account of ex ante justification 
(what conditions a potential belief must satisfy such that an epistemic agent would be 
justified in holding it). Ex ante justification was largely relevant to Goldman’s discussion 
due to the role it played in determining what beliefs or mechanism are ‘available’ to the 
subject in the sense intended by justification principle 10) However, Epistemology and 
Cognition appears to have pursued a more generalized form of the ‘non-undermining’ 
condition, and as a result, ex ante justification is not relevant for the purposes of this 
chapter. The question of ex ante justification aside, justification principle 10) provides a 
clear illustration of Goldman’s view on justification at the time “What is Justified 
Belief?” was published. 
 
1.2 Epistemology and Cognition (1986) 
 The theory of justification that Goldman proposes in Epistemology and Cognition 
can be seen as a more refined but also more complex version of justification principle 10) 
from “What is Justified Belief?”. The theory proposed in Epistemology and Cognition 
has three main features of interest: First, Goldman proposes that a “normal worlds” 
reliability condition is a necessary but not sufficient condition for justification. The seeds 
of this understanding of reliability were planted in Goldman’s response to the Benevolent 
Demon case in “What is Justified Belief?”. Secondly, Goldman suggests that satisfying a 
“non-undermining” condition is also a necessary condition for justification. This 
condition is a more generalized version of a condition provided by justification principle 
10) from “What is Justified Belief?”. Thirdly, Goldman distinguishes between “primary 
justification” and “secondary justification,” with primary justification being a property of 
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beliefs formed by innate belief-forming “processes” and secondary justification being a 
property of beliefs formed by acquired belief-forming “methods.”  
 
1.2.1 “Normal Worlds” Reliablism 
 The first feature of the theory of justification Goldman presents in Epistemology 
and Cognition involves what it means for a belief-forming mechanism to be reliable in 
the first place. To paraphrase Goldman, the truth-ratio of the beliefs formed by a 
mechanism may vary from world to world.90 This suggests at least two ways of judging 
the reliability of the mechanism: First, reliability could be a ‘rigid’ designator, and the 
mechanism’s successes and failures across all possible worlds all count for or against the 
reliability of the mechanism. Secondly, reliability could be relativized towards a single 
possible world, such as the actual world. One drawback of this actual-world chauvinistic 
account of reliability is that it can yield implausible results in cases where the mechanism 
seldom activates. As a result of this drawback, reliability is more plausibly understood as 
some kind of counter-factual supporting disposition. 
 Goldman’s approach comes between these two extremes. Instead of defining 
reliability as a ‘rigid’ designator or relativizing it to the actual world, Goldman relativizes 
reliability to what he calls “normal worlds,” which is loosely defined as the set of 
possible worlds which are consistent with our general beliefs about the actual world. 
Goldman admits that the notions of “normal” and “general” are vague, but claims that our 
ordinary notion of justification is also vague. 
                                                     
90 Epistemology and Cognition, p 106. Goldman actually makes this point about the truth ratio produced by 
rule systems that permit or allow belief formation, and the resulting rightness of those rule systems. 
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 The normal worlds approach towards reliability is designed to handle the cases 
involving the New Evil Demon Problem, and is a more refined version of the set of 
approaches proposed by Goldman in “What is Justified Belief?” in response to the 
Benevolent Demon case. The basic New Evil Demon Problem case involves a victim of a 
Cartesian Evil Demon, an entity with all the powers of God, but lacking God’s 
benevolence, who is trying to fool its victims into forming false beliefs. The beliefs of 
this victim are formed by ordinary mechanisms, such as through perception, and are, 
according to our intuitions, justified. However, these mechanisms are unreliable due to 
the Demon’s interference, and, as a result, reliabilism implies that the victim’s beliefs are 
unjustified. The Benevolent Demon case which Goldman addressed in “What is Justified 
Belief?, is a variation on this case. The “normal worlds” approach proposed by Goldman 
handles both of these kinds of Demon worlds, since Demon worlds are not normal 
worlds. 
  
1.2.2 “Non-Undermining” Condition 
 A second feature of Goldman’s theory of justification, as presented in 
Epistemology and Cognition, is his generalized “non-undermining" condition. 
Justification principle 10) from “What is Justified Belief?" provides a relatively specific 
condition that satisfies this more general condition. 
 Goldman begins his investigation of justification in Epistemology and Cognition 
with justification principle P1), which, according to Goldman, is intended to express a 
semantic truth about the language of justified belief, and to be a formal, largely neutral, 
principle. This principle is as follows: 
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P1) S's believing p at time t is justified if and only if 
S's believing p at t is permitted by a right system of 
justificational rules (J-rules).91  
Goldman admits that P1 may need to be strengthened, and in response to this, develops 
justification principle P3): 
P3) S’s believing p at t is permitted if and only if 
a) S’s believing p at t is permitted by a right system 
of J-rules, and 
b) this permission is not undermined by S’s 
cognitive state at t.92  
Goldman’s justification principle 10) from “What is Justified Belief?” appears to be a 
justification principle that satisfies P3): 
10) If S's belief in p at t results from a reliable cognitive 
process, and there is no reliable or conditionally reliable 
process available to S which, had it been used by S in 
addition to the process actually used, would have resulted 
in S's not believing p at t, then S's belief in p at t is 
justified.93  
 Goldman’s motivation for strengthening P1) is not immediately clear in the 
chapter in which this move is proposed, but earlier in the book, Goldman uses two 
problem cases to argue that “global” reliability (which appears to be a necessary 
                                                     
91 Alvin Goldman, Epistemology and Cognition, p 59. 
92 Epistemology and Cognition, p 63. 
93 “What is Justified Belief?,” p 351. 
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condition for justification) and “local” reliability (which can be used as an anti-Gettier 
condition) are not jointly sufficient for knowledge, and that justification is also a 
necessary condition for knowledge. The first of these two problem cases is the Lying 
Neurologist case I have described above, which appears to be functionally equivalent to 
the Lying Parent case Goldman discusses in “What is Justified Belief?”. The second case 
is the Two Heuristics case: 
Two Heuristics: “Maurice uses a reliable – but not perfectly 
reliable – heuristic to arrive at a certain belief p. Now the 
fact that the process is not perfectly reliable does not by 
itself preclude knowledge. I do not assume that perfect 
reliability is required. But there is another heuristic 
Maurice knows, which is more reliable than the first 
(though still not perfect), and Maurice believes it is more 
reliable. He even suspects, in this case, that the better 
heuristic might yield a different result, since it has differed 
from the first in similar cases before. But despite these 
beliefs, Maurice neglects the superior heuristic. Had he 
used it, it would indeed have led him to a different 
conclusion: to believe not-p rather than p. But in this 
particular case the first heuristic gets things right: p 
happens to be true. Does Maurice know p? Intuitively, no.” 
(p 54) 
 Justification principles P3) and, more specifically, 10), provide an explanation for 
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why Millicent and Maurice’s beliefs lack justification and hence do not amount to 
knowledge. Millicent has a reliable belief-forming process or method available to her 
(namely, listening to an authority figure, like the neurosurgeon that has been 
experimenting on her, whose testimony she trusts) which, if she used it, would have 
caused her to not form beliefs based on her visual experience. Likewise, Maurice has an 
available heuristic which, if used, would have caused Maurice to not just fail to believe p, 
but would cause him to believe not p. However, according to P3) and 10), reliability is a 
necessary but not sufficient condition for justification - in order for a reliably formed 
belief to be justified, the cognitive state of the agent must not undermine the 
“permission” this reliable formation provides. The testimony Millicent received from a 
‘trusted’ authority and the fact that Maurice had easy access to a more reliable heuristic 
undermined the “permission” they received for their beliefs from the reliable mechanisms 
responsible for forming them. 
 
1.2.3 Primary Justification vs. Secondary Justification 
 A third feature of Goldman’s theory of justification, as it appears in Epistemology 
and Cognition, is his distinction between primary justifiedness, which results from the 
use of innate “processes” which are permitted by some correct justifiedness principle, and 
secondary justifiedness, which results from the use of acquired “methods" which, again, 
are permitted by some correct justifiedness principle.94 (The terms ‘innate’ and ‘acquired’ 
are my own.) This distinction is motivated by the Humperdink-Fraud case: 
Humperdink-Fraud: “Suppose our friend Humperdink has 
                                                     
94 Epistemology and Cognition, p 93. 
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attended a series of talks on mathematics by a certain Elmer 
Fraud. These talks are not under the auspices of any 
certified educational institution, and Humperdink has been 
warned that Fraud has no credentials in mathematics. 
Humperdink hears Fraud enunciate numerous principles 
and algorithms, almost all of them defective. Nonetheless, 
being a complete novice - and a gullible one at that - 
Humperdink blindly accepts and applies them all. In one 
case, however, Fraud happens to teach a perfectly correct 
algorithm. Humperdink internalizes this one along with the 
others, and applies it to a relevant class of problems. In 
using this algorithm to solve a problem, Humperdink gets 
the answer right and forms a true belief in the answer. This 
belief is the result of a reliable process, namely, the 
algorithm.  [...] Clearly, though, Humperdink should not be 
credited with knowledge.95  
 In Epistemology and Cognition, Goldman deploys the Humperdink-Fraud case as 
a counter-example for a competing, non-reliablistic theory of justification, C4): 
C4) [A system R of Justification-rules is right if and only 
if] R permits doxastic attitudes proportioned to the strength 
of one’s evidence.96  
                                                     
95  Epistemology and Cognition, p 51-2. 
96  Epistemology and Cognition, p 66. 
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Similarly, Goldman had employed a variant of the Humperdink-Fraud case in “What is 
Justified Belief?" as a counterexample to justification principle 4): 
(INC) Proposition p is incorrigible if and only if: 
necessarily, for any S and any t, if S believes p at t, then p 
is true for S at t. 
4) If p is an incorrigible proposition, and S believes p at t, 
then S’s belief in p at t is justified.97   
This variant case involved Humperdink believing a disjunction of forty propositions, on 
the basis of a principle elucidated by Elmer Fraud, namely the faulty principle that a 
disjunction of forty propositions is very likely to be true. The seventh disjunct is the 
proposition, “I exist,” so for Humperdink, the disjunct is incorrigible, yet Humperdink is 
not justified in believing the disjunction on the basis of the faulty principle elucidated by 
Fraud.98 
 In both “What is Justified Belief?" and Epistemology and Cognition, Goldman 
deploys the Humperdink-Fraud case as a counter-example for competing non-reliablistic 
theories of justification, but it seems he failed to realize that this case is also a counter-
example to simple versions of reliablism until Epistemology and Cognition. Goldman’s 
reaction to this realization is to distinguish between innate belief-forming processes and 
acquired belief-forming methods.   
 Goldman claims that the natural theory of full justifiedness requires the use of 
both approved (innate) processes and approved (acquired) methods, but argues that the 
                                                     
97  “What is Justified Belief?,” p 343. 
98  “What is Justified Belief?,” p 344. 
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proper use of processes is more fundamental for at least two reasons99: First, as the 
Humperdink-Fraud case demonstrates, in order for a belief formed through the use of an 
acquired method to be justified, it is not sufficient for the method to be “correct” (that is, 
to be reliable). The method must also have been properly acquired. Goldman claims that 
the proper acquisition of methods ultimately rests on the use of right processes, so an 
understanding of right processes is needed for an understanding of right methods. 
 Secondly, the “non-undermining” clause of Goldman’s account of justification 
relies on the notion of methods that are in some sense “available” but not used. This 
includes methods that the epistemic agent had plenty of opportunity to acquire, but failed 
to do so. Goldman claims that cases of this sort involve processes that are defective 
because they fail to add things to the cognitive repertoire that ought to be added. 
 Goldman does not provide a single criterion of rightness for either primary 
justifiedness or secondary justifiedness, but instead provides a range of possible criteria 
of rightness for both kinds of justifiedness. For primary justifiedness, Goldman suggests 
that a right criterion might be resource-independent (“a rule system is right only if its 
realization would produce a truth ratio (the ratio between true beliefs and all beliefs 
produced by the system) of at least .90“), or resource relative. Resource relative criteria 
of primary justification might be a maximizing criterion (“a rule system is right if and 
only if the process it permits would maximize truth ratio relative to humanly available 
processes”) or a satisficing criterion (“a rule system is right just in case the processes it 
permits have a truth ratio of a level humans commonly attain, or that it is easy for them to 
                                                     
99 Epistemology and Cognition, p 91-2 
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attain”).100   
 Goldman provides an even wider range of criterion of rightness for secondary 
justifiedness. For example, Goldman provides a culturally relative criteria of rightness for 
methods: 
Culturally Relative Criteria of Rightness for Methods: A 
method M is right for culture C at time t just in case M is 
widely believed by members of C to be the best method (or 
a good method) for the class of problems at issue.101  
Goldman also provides a set of objective and resource-independent criterion of rightness 
for secondary justifiedness which require that the second-order processes responsible for 
producing a belief-forming method must be meta-reliable.102 One way of understanding 
meta-reliability is to say that a second-order process is meta-reliable if, among the 
methods it outputs, the ratio of those that are reliable meets some specified level. For 
example, a second-order process could be considered meta-reliable if and only if at least 
80% of the methods it produces are at least 80% reliable.  
 A second, weaker, way of understanding meta-reliability is that meta-reliable 
second-order processes merely need to produce increases in reliability, and does not need 
to produce methods that meet some absolute ratio of reliability. For example, a second-
order process could be considered meta-reliable if the modifications or replacements it 
produces always (or, more weakly, usually) are more reliable than the original methods it 
modifies or replaces. 
                                                     
100 Epistemology and Cognition, p 104. 
101 Epistemology and Cognition, p 95. 
102 Epistemology and Cognition, p 115. 
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 In addition to these variations on the theme of objective and resource-independent 
criteria of rightness for secondary justifiedness, Goldman briefly sketches parallel criteria 
of rightness that are resource-dependent and are either maximizing or satisficing.   
 
1.2.4 Post-Mortem 
 While there are many variations on the exact details of the possible criterion of 
rightness that are compatible with Goldman’s full theory of justification, the overall 
shape of his theory is clear. I reconstruct Goldman’s theory of full justification, as it 
appears in Epistemology and Cognition, as follows: 
S’s belief B in proposition p at time t is justified if and only if: 
 P-bi) S’s belief B was formed by an innate, belief-independent process P, 
and: 
  1) P is reliable, and 
  2) S’s cognitive state at t does not undermine S’s belief B. 
 or 
 P-bd) S’s belief B was formed by an innate, belief-dependent process P, 
and: 
  1) P is conditionally reliable, 
  2) the beliefs inputted into P (if any) were justified, and  
  3) S’s cognitive state at t does not undermine S’s belief B. 
 or 
 M-bi) S’s belief B was formed by an acquired, belief-dependent process 
M, and: 
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  1) M is reliable, 
  2) M was formed by a meta-reliable second-order process, and 
  3) S’s cognitive state at t does not undermine S’s belief B. 
  or 
  M-bd) S’s belief B was formed by an acquired, belief-dependent process 
M, and: 
  1) M is conditionally reliable, 
  2) M was formed by a meta-reliable second-order process, 
  3) the beliefs inputted into M (if any) were justified, and 
  4) S’s cognitive state at t does not undermine S’s belief B.   
As the multiple disjuncts of this account demonstrate, Goldman’s theory is quite 
complex, due to Goldman’s distinctions between different kinds of belief-forming 
mechanisms. Some of these complicating distinctions, such as Goldman’s distinction 
between belief-dependent and belief-independent processes, appear to me to be necessary 
and well-motivated. Other complicating distinctions, such as Goldman’s distinction 
between processes and methods, appear to me to be less so.  
 Goldman’s distinction between processes and methods is motivated by the 
Humperdink-Fraud case, but it is not clear to me that even the drastic step of providing a 
disjunctive account of justification is sufficient to solve the basic problem this case 
presents. This is because the Humperdink-Fraud case appears to belong to the set of 
Strange and Fleeting Process problem cases. These problem cases involve belief-forming 
mechanisms that are reliable but, intuitively, are not the sort of mechanism that can give 
rise to justified belief or knowledge due to their “strange” or “fleeting” natures.  
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 A standard tactic that reliabilistic theories use to deal with these kinds of cases is 
to claim that reliability is a necessary but insufficient condition for the relevant positive 
epistemic status. For example, Proper Functionalism claims that the relevant cognitive 
faculty must be properly functioning, and John Greco’s trait-virtue theory of knowledge 
claims that knowledge is the result of a cognitive ability, and, in order for a belief-
forming mechanism to constitute a cognitive ability, it must be a stable and constituent 
part of the epistemic agent’s cognitive character. Goldman’s requirement that methods 
must be the product of a meta-reliable second-order process serves this role in the case of 
secondary justifiedness. However, there is no such condition in the case of primary 
justifiedness, leaving Goldman’s theory vulnerable to the possibility of “strange and 
fleeting” reliable processes. This potential vulnerability is not helped by Goldman not 
providing a clear way of distinguishing processes from methods - even the terms “innate” 
and “acquired” I have used to distinguish between these two kinds of belief-forming 
mechanisms have been mine own. 
 As complicated as this version of Goldman’s theory of justification is, his theory 
would grow even more complicated in “Strong and Weak Justification,” in response to 
the failure of Goldman’s “normal worlds” reliablism. 
 
1.3 “Strong and Weak Justification” (1988) 
 In “Strong and Weak Justification,” Goldman further complicates his theory of 
justification in response to the failure of his “natural worlds” solution to the New Evil 
Demon Problem. The New Evil Demon Problem, as previously stated, is that belief-
forming mechanisms whose products are paradigm cases of justified beliefs can become 
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unreliable due to ‘demonic’ interference, or, similarly a belief-forming mechanism whose 
products are paradigm cases of unjustified beliefs can become reliable, also due to 
‘demonic’ interference. To help motivate his new proposed solution to this problem, 
which claims that our notion of justification is multivocal, Goldman introduces yet 
another example of a belief that is formed through an unreliable method, but where we 
have at least some (but not overwhelming) intuitive pull towards the notion that the belief 
is justified: 
Astrologer: “Consider a scientifically benighted culture, of 
ancient or medieval vintage. This culture employs certain 
highly unreliable methods for forming beliefs about the 
future and the unobserved. Their methods appeal to the 
doctrine of signatures, to astrology, and to oracles. 
Members of the culture have never thought of probability 
theory or statistics, never dreamt of anything that could be 
classed as ‘experimental method.’ Now suppose that on a 
particular occasion a member of this culture forms a belief 
about the outcome of an impending battle by using one of 
the aforementioned methods, say, by consulting zodiacal 
signs in a culturally approved fashion. Call this method M. 
Is this person’s belief justified, or warranted?”103  
Goldman’s interpretation of this case is that we have intuitive pull for both the position 
that the astrologer is justified in his belief the outcome of the impending battle, and the 
                                                     
103  “Strong and Weak Justification,” p 51-2. See note 2. 
143 
 
position that the astrologer is unjustified in this belief.  
 This bold step, of arguing that our everyday notion of justification is multivocal, 
is made necessary by the failure of Goldman’s previous solution to the New Evil Demon 
Problem, “natural worlds” reliabilism. This solution claimed, in essence, that a 
mechanism is reliable if and only if it is reliable over the set of “natural” worlds. Loosely 
speaking, “natural” worlds are worlds where our “general” beliefs about our world are 
true. In “Strong and Weak Justification,” Goldman further elucidates some motivations 
for ‘natural’ worlds reliabilism: In addition to providing a solution to the New Evil 
Demon Problem, it is natural to expect that reliability should be assessed in normal 
situations (or worlds) rather than all possible situations - a car doesn’t need to start and 
run smoothly in all weather conditions (including at -50 degrees Fahrenheit, or at 3 
Kelvins), but only in the car’s normal operating conditions.104  
 While natural worlds reliablism has some motivations in its favor, Goldman does 
admit that it has some problems: First, there is the basic problem of defining which 
worlds are “natural.” If natural worlds are fixed by “our” “general” beliefs about our 
actual world, which beliefs should count as “general,” and which community should 
count as “we”? Secondly, while Goldman initially thought that the reliability of 
mechanisms would remain fairly constant across the set of natural worlds, on closer 
inspection, this appears to not be the case. Should a mechanism count as reliable only if it 
is reliable in all natural worlds? Thirdly, it appears that even non-natural worlds may be 
relevant for the purposes of justification, as the following case demonstrates: 
Properly Acquired Clairvoyance: Consider a possible non-
                                                     
104 “Strong and Weak Justification,” p 61. See note 16. 
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natural world W, where, unlike in our actual world or any 
natural world, clairvoyance works - having clairvoyant 
seeming states (“hunches”) is a reliable guide to truth. 
Using scientific methods, the inhabitants of this world 
carefully confirm this correlation, until it is established 
beyond any reasonable doubt. With this knowledge in hand, 
the inhabitants of this world begin using clairvoyance to 
form beliefs. Intuitively, these beliefs are justified.105  
A fourth objection to normal worlds reliabilism that arose after the publication of “Strong 
and Weak Justification” is that the belief-forming mechanisms that output our general 
beliefs about the world may trivially satisfy Goldman’s justification condition.106 
 In response to these problems with natural worlds reliablism, Goldman takes the 
bold step of proposing a multi-vocal account of justification. Goldman distinguishes 
between “strong” justification (which the Astrologer and the victims of the Evil Demon 
lack) and “weak” justification (which the Astrologer and the Demon’s victims do have). 
Goldman’s account of strong justification is essentially the account of justification he 
provided in Epistemology and Cognition. Goldman provides only some sufficient 
conditions for weak justification, and not necessary conditions. Other than requiring that 
the belief in question not satisfy the conditions for strong justification (and is thus merely 
                                                     
105 Adapted from “Strong and Weak Justification,” p 62. See note 20. 
106 Christopher Peacocke, The Realm of Reason, Oxford University Press, 2004, p 133. I would note that 
this objection would hold only if the belief-forming mechanism typically only produced general beliefs 
within the set of normal worlds. A belief-forming mechanism that typically produced false particular 
beliefs, but did occasionally produce a general belief, would not produce justified beliefs according to 
Goldman’s original theory of justification. 
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weakly justified), these sufficiency conditions are essentially equivalent to Goldman’s 
“non-undermining” condition, provided in both Epistemology and Cognition and “What 
is Justified Belief?” 
 While this extreme step does provide a possible solution to the New Evil Demon 
Problem, it still leaves another problem unsolved - that of providing an account of what it 
is for a mechanism to be reliable. In Epistemology and Cognition, Goldman presented a 
range of options of how to evaluate the reliability of a mechanism in addition to the 
“natural worlds” approach, including fixing reliability relative to all possible worlds, or 
fixing it relative to a single possible world, either our actual world or the world in which 
the mechanism is used. Goldman believes that the option of using the “all possible 
worlds” approach is ruled out, since our ordinary understanding of reliability does not 
require a mechanism to be reliable in all possible situations. Yet the option of relativizing 
reliability to a single possible world is also problematic, since this can result in counter-
intuitive evaluations in cases where the mechanism is infrequently used. Reliability is 
most plausibly understood as a disposition, which means that it should be evaluated 
relative to some set of possible worlds with more than a single member.107  
 
2. Contextualism 
 As we have seen, Goldman’s theory of justification has become quite complex in 
response to various problem cases. One possible factor that could be responsible for 
driving this complexity is that Goldman’s theory assumes that the norms of justification 
                                                     
107 “Strong and Weak Justification,” p 63. See note 22.  
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attribution do not vary according to context. If contextualism (the claim that the 
propositions expressed by knowledge attributions do vary from context to context) is 
true, then this might help explain some of the problem cases that help complicate 
Goldman’s theory.  
 One example of a contextualist theory is the one proposed by David Lewis in 
“Elusive Knowledge.”108 I do not claim that this theory is correct, but it may serve as a 
model of what a correct contextualist theory might look like. Since Lewis’ theory is a 
theory of knowledge, it will need to be modified to provide even an incorrect theory of 
justification. 
 Lewis’s theory claims that S knows that p iff p holds in every possibility that is 
not properly ignored left uneliminated by S's evidence.109 According to Lewis, subject S's 
evidence E eliminates possibility W iff W is a possibility where S does not have E.110 
Lewis provides a set of rules that are intended to formulate what possibilities can be 
properly ignored. I will refer to possibilities that cannot be properly ignored for the 
purposes of knowledge attribution “K-relevant worlds." Lewis’ rules are as follows: 
1) Rule of Actuality - The possibility that actually obtains is never properly 
ignored.111   
2) Rule of Belief - A possibility that the subject believes to obtain is not properly 
ignored, whether or not he is right to so believe. Neither is one that they ought to 
believe to obtain - on that evidence and arguments justify him in believing - 
                                                     
108 Lewis, David., “Elusive Knowledge,” Australasian Journal of Philosophy, Vol. 74, Issue 4 (1996): pp 
549-567. 
109 Lewis, “Elusive Knowledge,” slightly paraphrased, p 551. 
110 Lewis, slightly paraphrased, p 553. 
111 Lewis, p 554. 
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whether or not he does so believe. A possibility may not be properly ignored if the 
subject gives it, or ought to give it, a degree of belief that is sufficiently high. 
How high is 'sufficiently' high may depend on how much is at stake.112  
3) Rule of Resemblance - If one possibility saliently resembles another which is 
not properly ignored in virtue of rules other than this one, then that possibility 
may not be properly ignored.  
4) Rule of Reliability - If a belief-forming process is reliable, we may defeasibly 
ignore a possibility where the process fails. 
5) Rules of Method - We are defeasibly entitled properly to ignore possible 
failures in at least two standard methods of non-deductive inference (random 
sampling and inference to the best explanation).113  
6) Rule of Conservatism - We are defeasibly permitted to ignore possibilities if 
members of our society normally do ignore those possibilities, and it is common 
knowledge that they do.114  
7) Rule of Attention - If a possibility is not ignored, then it is not properly 
ignored. "No matter how far-fetched a certain possibility may be, no matter how 
properly we might have ignored it in some other context, if in this context we are 
not in fact ignoring it but attending to it, then for us now it is a relevant 
alternative."115  
 Lewis notes that it is unclear if we need all four of the permissive rules (Rules 4, 
                                                     
112 Lewis, paraphrased, p 555-6. 
113 Lewis, p 558. 
114 Lewis, p 559. 
115 Lewis, p 559. 
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5, and 6, with 5 being counted twice), since some might be subsumed under others.116 For 
example, both Rules of Method appear to be special cases of the Rule of Reliability, and 
could probably be subsumed by it.  
 If we want to create a reliabilist epistemic theory, Lewis’s theory of knowledge 
needs to be slightly modified. Specifically, his account of elimination needs to be slightly 
modified in order to eliminate references to evidence. I would suggest this as a reliabilist 
account of elimination: Possibility W is eliminated for S’s belief B iff W is a possibility 
where the belief-forming mechanism M that was responsible for forming B in the actual 
world would not form a false belief.   
This reliabilistic account of elimination provides a way of resolving an oddity in 
Lewis’ theory of knowledge. Lewis individuates propositions coarsely, by necessary 
equivalence. As a result, there is only one necessary proposition, which holds in every 
possibility, and hence in every possibility left uneliminated by any epistemic subject’s 
evidence. From this, his theory implies that all epistemic subjects know all necessary 
truths.117  
A similar problem exists for Ernest Sosa’s basis-relative safety condition for 
knowledge.118 This condition is satisfied for epistemic subject S’s belief that p if and only 
                                                     
116 Ibid. 
117 Lewis, “Elusive Knowledge,” p 551-2. 
118 While I initially believed that this modified version of Sosa’s safety condition provided a plausible anti-
Gettier condition, Ram Neta and Guy Rohrbaugh provide counterexamples to the notion that the set of AG-
relevant worlds is the set of worlds that are “near” to the actual world that I find plausible. (“Luminosity 
and the Safety of Knowledge,” Pacific Philosophical Quarterly, vol 85, issue 4 (December 2004), pp 396-
406.) Unfortunately, their own proposed alternative to Sosa’s safety condition (which, to paraphrase, claims 
that the set of AG-relevant worlds consists of the set of worlds where the circumstances surrounding the 
formation of the belief are the same as in the actual world) faces a generality problem: that of specifying 
which of the circumstances that held in the actual world define the set of AG-relevant worlds.  
 It would be interesting to see if the set of AG-relevant worlds vary according to context in ways 
similar to the way that the set of K-relevant and J-relevant worlds seem to. If so, then a theory that explains 
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if, in all nearby worlds, the subject would not falsely believe p on the same basis as S 
believes p in the actual world.119 One objection to this condition is that is trivially 
satisfied in the case of necessary truths - since a necessary truth is true in all possible 
worlds, and therefore in all nearby worlds, it is never the case that an epistemic subject 
would falsely believe a proposition that is a necessary truth in a nearby world.120  
 In both cases, the problem arises from identifying a belief too closely with its 
propositional content. Just as a token belief-forming process belongs to as many types as 
the process has properties, a token belief also belongs to a multitude of types. The belief-
type that is constituted by the set of beliefs with the same propositional content is only 
one belief-type that a token belief belongs to. Another belief-type that a token belief 
belongs to is defined by the property of being formed by the same belief-forming 
mechanism.  
To say that the strength of a belief’s epistemic position is directly related to the 
overall reliability rating of the mechanism that formed it is equivalent to saying that the 
epistemic position of a (token) belief is strong just to the extent that beliefs of the same 
formation-type as the token belief are seldom false. For a token belief whose 
propositional content is a necessary truth (such as ‘2+2=4‘), it will never be the case, in 
any possible world, that beliefs of the same propositional content type will be false. But if 
the mechanism that formed that token belief is not absolutely reliable, then there are 
some beliefs of the same formation type that are false, and have a different propositional 
                                                                                                                                                              
this variation might provide a way of specifying the set of worlds which are AG-relevant. Gendeler and 
Hawthorne’s ”The Real Guide to Fake Barns” may provide some food for thought on this subject. 
119 A version of this condition appears in Ernest Sosa’s “How to Defeat Opposition to Moore,” Noûs, Vol. 
33, Issue Supplement s13 (October 1999), p 142. 
120 This objection appears in Robert Nozick’s Philosophical Explanations, Harvard University Press, 1981, 
p 186, and was there directed against Nozick’s own sensitivity condition for knowledge.  
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content. In other words, there are worlds where the mechanism responsible for forming a 
belief with the proposition ‘2+2=4‘ in the actual world formed a false belief, such as 
‘2+2=5,‘ instead. If there are possible false beliefs of the same formation type as the 
actual token belief, then this will count against the strength of that belief’s epistemic 
position, even if the propositional content of the belief in the actual world is a necessary 
truth. 
 Given this, we can modify both Lewis’ theory of knowledge and Sosa’s safety 
condition to avoid this problem involving necessary truths. We can say that a subject’s 
belief counts as knowledge just if there is no K-relevant world (that is, no possibility that 
is not properly ignored for the purposes of knowledge attribution) in which the 
mechanism responsible for forming the subject’s belief would form a false belief. 
Likewise, we can construct a modified version of Sosa’s safety condition as follows: S 
knows that p only if there is no “nearby” world where the mechanism responsible for 
forming S’s belief that p would produce a false belief.  
 Another modification that needs to be made to Lewis’s theory is that justification 
and anti-Gettier conditions need to be developed. It is generally thought that a subject 
knows a proposition if and only if 1) the subject believes the proposition, 2) the 
proposition is true, 3) the subject’s belief is justified, and 3) the subject’s belief satisfies 
some anti-Gettier condition.121 It is highly plausible that a belief does not need to satisfy 
                                                     
121 Prior to the mid-20th Century, it was generally thought among epistemologists that knowledge was 
justified true belief. Edmund Gettier’s 1963 paper, “Is Justified True Belief Knowledge?,” despite only 
being two or three pages long, was, perhaps, the most significant paper in epistemology in the 20 th Century, 
since it provided two counterexamples to this widespread assumption. Gettier’s original two cases assumed 
falliblism (it is possible to have a false justified belief) and closure (if you infer a belief from a justified 
belief via a valid argument, that belief is also justified). These cases were later generalized in such a way 
that only fallibilism is needed to generate a Gettier-style case. 
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all Lewis’s conditions for knowledge in order to be merely justified. For example, in 
order for a belief to be justified, it is not necessary to follow the Rule of Actuality - it 
could be the case that the belief is false in the actual world, but still be justified. (By 
contrast, it is plausible that beliefs that satisfy the anti-Gettier condition do follow the 
Rule of Actuality.) 
 A schema for justification and anti-Gettier conditions based on Lewis’s theory of 
knowledge is as follows: a subject S’s belief in proposition p is justified if and only if all 
“J-relevant” worlds where p is false are eliminated. Similarly, subject S’s belief in p 
satisfies the anti-Gettier condition if and only if S’s evidence eliminates all “AG-
relevant” worlds where p is false. The union of the set of J-relevant worlds, the set of 
AG-relevant worlds, and the actual world (if you are unwilling to grant that a belief’s 
satisfying the anti-Gettier condition already entails the truth of the belief) is the set of K-
relevant worlds - the set of worlds that cannot be properly ignored when making 
knowledge attributions.  
 A complete version of Lewis’ theory would need to provide an account of what 
worlds are J-relevant and what worlds are AG-relevant. Obviously, not all of Lewis’ rules 
about which worlds are K-relevant would apply to the question of what worlds are J-
relevant. As I have already stated, an obvious example is the Rule of Actuality. Given 
that justified false belief is possible, it must be the case that the actual world is not always 
                                                                                                                                                              
 The basic recipe for a Gettier case, as formulated by Linda Zagzebski, is as follows: Take a 
justified true belief. Through an act of bad luck, make this justified belief false. Through a second act of 
good luck, make this justified false belief true. This severs the connection between the truth of the belief 
and its justification, resulting in a justified belief that is true only by accident. One classic example of a 
Gettier-style case is the Fake Barn Case, which was previously discussed in the introduction to this chapter. 
 The strategy that has generally been deployed against Gettier-style cases is to supplement the 
traditional Justified True Belief account of knowledge with a fourth condition – the anti-Gettier condition. 
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relevant for justification.  Lewis himself admits that the Rule of Actuality is “externalist," 
and the subject himself may not be able to tell what is properly ignored.122  
 A less obvious case is the Rule of Resemblance. Lewis applies this rule to provide 
solutions to two sets of problem cases - Gettier cases and the Lottery Paradox. In both 
sets of problem cases, Lewis’ explanation applies the Rule of Resemblance in 
conjunction with the Rule of Actuality. Given that Gettiered beliefs are justified true 
beliefs that do not amount to knowledge, a justified belief should not be required to 
satisfy an anti-Gettier condition. However, it is not so clear what judgment an account of 
justification should yield in the Lottery Paradox. And, indeed, it is not entirely clear how 
the conjunction of the Rule of Actuality and the Rule of Resemblance offer a solution to 
the Lottery Paradox – the world in which you won or will win the lottery does resemble 
the actual world, but this world would also be a world in which could afford that African 
safari you’re dreaming of. Resolving this issue would no doubt require an investigation of 
what Lewis means by ‘salience,’ which is outside the scope of this chapter and this 
dissertation. Fortunately, another contextualist epistemologist, Keith DeRose, has 
proposed another Rule which does seem to provide a solution to the Lottery Paradox. I 
will discuss this rule, the Rule of Sensitivity, in Section 4 of this chapter. 
  For the purposes of using the notion of contextualism to resolve complications in 
Goldman’s theory of justification, Lewis’ Rule of Belief is perhaps the most important, 
since it is strikingly similar to Goldman’s non-undermining condition. The letters of both 
Lewis’ Rule of Belief and Goldman’s non-undermining condition are somewhat vague 
but they are almost identical in spirit, to the point that, if the Rule and the condition were 
                                                     
122 Lewis, “Elusive Knowledge,” p 554. 
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found to diverge in some cases, I believe that supporters of these two authors’ theories 
would be able (and perhaps willing) to modify the rule or condition they endorse in order 
to eliminate this divergence. Lewis’ Rule of Attention may provide an example for this. 
Many epistemologists, including myself, are quite skeptical of this rule (it would be odd 
if Richard Nixon could have claimed that he knew nothing about the Watergate break-in, 
given that, for all he knew, he could have been in the Matrix), but if enough evidence 
accumulated that the truth of this rule were established, I believe that Goldman and his 
followers could accommodate this by modifying his non-undermining condition. 
 With the above modifications to Lewis’ theory in mind, we can sketch a highly 
incomplete account of justification that is both reliabilist and contextualist: S is justified 
in believing p iff the mechanism M responsible for producing S’s belief B is “J-reliable.” 
Mechanism M is J-reliable iff it would not produce a false belief in any J-relevant 
possibility W. In order for this sketch account of justification to be completed, a correct 
account of what possibilities are J-relevant needs to be provided. I do not claim that 
Lewis’ theory, even as we have modified it, provides such a correct account, but it may 
provide a model for what such an account might look like. 
 This notion of a “J-reliable” mechanism gives rise to the Problem of Contextual 
Divergence. If mechanisms that are “J-reliable” are also what ordinary language would 
term reliable, then the Problem does not exist. But if there are many cases where a 
mechanism is “J-reliable” but fails to be reliable, or vice-versa, then the Problem of 
Contextual Divergence does arise. And Goldman’s reliance on the “non-undermining” 
condition, to the extent that he makes satisfying it a sufficient condition for “weak” 
justification, suggests that there are many cases of this sort. This Problem would suggest 
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that reliabilism, or at least strict reliabilism, about justification would need to be 
abandoned.  
 One common objection to the set of rules Lewis provides is that they seem quite 
ad hoc - at best, he has identified some regularities in the ways we attribute knowledge, 
and his rules describe these regularities without explaining them. Lewis himself seems to 
admit this: "What is it all for? Why have a notion of knowledge that works in the way I 
described? (Not a compulsory question. Enough to observe that we do have it.) But I 
venture the guess that it is one of the messy short-cuts - like satisficing, like having 
indeterminate degrees of belief - that we resort to because we are not smart enough to live 
up to really high, perfectly Bayesian, standards of rationality."123 A complete account of 
knowledge or justified belief should explain what role these notions play and Lewis’s 
theory, by his own admission, does not explain this. 
 While I have no theory to offer on this point, I would like to suggest an approach 
that, if followed, may bear some fruit on this subject. The first half of this approach is 
that, in constructing such a theory, I would suggest that a deliberative model of belief 
application should be deployed. This approach is suggested by three considerations. First, 
one claim made by contextualists and one claim made by supporters of a competing 
theory, subject-sensitive invariantism, both deal with belief application rather than belief 
formation: Keith DeRose has claimed that knowledge is the norm of assertion, and John 
Hawthorne has claimed that knowledge is a norm of practical reasoning – that one should 
not use a proposition as a premise in practical reasoning unless one knows that 
                                                     
123 Lewis, “Elusive Knowledge,” p 563. 
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proposition is true.124 Neither of these claims have anything directly to do with how 
beliefs are formed. Instead, they are claims about how beliefs can be permissibly applied.  
Secondly, the emphasis contextualists place on the stakes involved in a given 
context should be addressed, and a deliberative approach would address this issue in a 
natural way.  
Thirdly, modern psychology tells us that most human actions are self-directed but 
non-deliberate, and these kinds of actions are the paradigm kind of action that the skill-
based model addresses. Some exceptions to this rule involve cases where there is a 
conflict between action-directing mechanisms that must be resolved through conscious 
deliberation, or cases where actions that were non-deliberately performed are later 
challenged in a social context. In these exceptional cases, a deliberative model of action 
and the post hoc justification of non-deliberate action becomes more appropriate. It 
seems to me that cases where the justification of a belief becomes relevant involve just 
these kinds of cases. As a result, while it may be appropriate to deploy a skill-based 
model of belief formation, it may also be appropriate to deploy a deliberative model of 
belief application and post-hoc justification. 
 For the second half of this approach, I would suggest that, before attempting to 
construct theories about how the standards of knowledge and justification may vary from 
context to context, it may be wise to first focus on the elements of knowledge that remain 
context-invariant. An example of such an element may well involve the norms of when it 
is permissible to hold a belief. If knowledge is the norm of assertion (as many 
                                                     
124 DeRose makes this claim in "Assertion, Knowledge and Context," The Philosophical Review, Vol. 111, 
No.2 (April 2002), pp 167-203. Hawthorne makes this claim in Knowledge and Lotteries, Oxford 
University Press, 2004 – see, for example, pp 29-31. 
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contextualists claim), then our everyday conversations strongly suggest that knowledge is 
not the norm of belief! This can be illustrated by DeRose’s Bank Cases, which is often 
used to motivate both contextualism and the claim that knowledge is the norm of 
assertion: 
“Bank Case A. My wife and I are driving home on a Friday 
afternoon. We plan to stop at the bank on the way home to 
deposit our paychecks. But as we drive past the bank, we 
notice that the lines inside are very long, as they often are 
on Friday afternoons. Although we generally like to deposit 
our paychecks as soon as possible, it is not especially 
important in this case that they be deposited right away, so 
I suggest that we drive straight home and deposit our 
paychecks on Saturday morning. My wife says, ‘Maybe the 
bank won't be open tomorrow. Lots of banks are closed on 
Saturdays.’ I reply, ‘No, I know it'll be open. I was just 
there two weeks ago on Saturday. It's open until noon.’ 
 
“Bank Case B. My wife and I drive past the bank on a 
Friday afternoon, as in Case A, and notice the long lines. I 
again suggest that we deposit our paychecks on Saturday 
morning, explaining that I was at the bank on Saturday 
morning only two weeks ago and discovered that it was 
open until noon. But in this case, we have just written a 
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very large and very important check. If our paychecks are 
not deposited into our checking account before Monday 
morning, the important check we wrote will bounce, 
leaving us in a very bad situation. And, of course, the bank 
is not open on Sunday. My wife reminds me of these facts. 
She then says, ‘Banks do change their hours. Do you know 
the bank will be open tomorrow?’ Remaining as confident 
as I was before that the bank will be open then, still, I reply, 
‘Well, no. I'd better go in and make sure.’”125 
 In Bank Case B, it seems the narrator self-admittedly does not know (and, 
therefore, cannot permissibly assert) that the bank will be open tomorrow. However, we 
can easily picture the narrator asserting that he believes that the bank will be open 
tomorrow. Even though the narrator himself admits that his belief that the bank will be 
open tomorrow does not amount to knowledge in the new context, he might still persist in 
holding this belief. And, intuitively, it seems that he would be doing nothing wrong in 
doing so! 
 I would suggest that the norms of belief-holding are context-invariant and 
relatively stable. If this is true, it may be wise to first have a firm account of these norms 
before investigating the norms of applying beliefs, which (if DeRose and contextualists in 
general are to be believed), may vary from context to context. And it may well be that a 
deliberative model may be more appropriate than a skill-based model for investigating 
                                                     
125 Keith DeRose, "Contextualism and Knowledge Attributions," Philosophy and Phenomenological 
Research, Vol. 52, No. 4 (Dec., 1992), p 913. 
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this matter. 
 While it remains to be seen if a plausible account of justification that is both 
reliablist and contextualist can be developed, I believe it is possible to provide a reliablist 
account of a belief’s epistemic strength based on the skill-based model of belief-
formation I developed in the previous chapter. I will turn to this task in the remainder of 
this chapter. 
   
Section 2: A Rough Account of Epistemic Strength 
 I will begin my development of a reliabilistic account of the strength of a belief’s 
epistemic position by first constructing a rough draft version of it. According to this 
rough draft account, a belief is epistemically ‘strong’ just to the extent that the belief-
forming mechanism responsible for producing the belief belongs to an activation type (as 
defined in the previous chapter) with a high overall reliability rating. 
In sub-section 1, I will describe the details of my proposal in more detail. 
In sub-section 2, I will demonstrate that the rough draft account is able to explain 
a certain kind of New Evil Demon Problem case – cases where the “demonic” force 
involved interferes with the proximate process of belief-formation, but not the underlying 
process of skill-learning.  
In sub-section 3, I will demonstrate that, with some modification, the rough draft 
account is also able to explain the Lying Authorities and the Two Heuristics cases.  
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1. From Normal Worlds Reliability to Absolute Reliability,  
and from Strength of Epistemic Position to Epistemic Strength 
 As Alvin Goldman explains in his various works, there are multiple available 
accounts of what reliability means. Reliability could be a ‘rigid’ designator, and the 
mechanism’s successes and failures across all possible worlds all count for or against the 
reliability of the mechanism. Or, reliability could be relativized towards a possible world, 
such as the actual world. Goldman’s “normal worlds” account of reliability was an 
attempt to find a third way between these two extremes - relativizing the term 
“reliability,” but relativizing it to a large set of “normal” worlds rather than a single world 
(the actual world). I propose that the account of reliability that is relevant for determining 
a belief’s epistemic strength falls closer to the first extreme: that a belief is 
‘epistemically’ strong just to the extent that the mechanism responsible for forming it is 
reliable across a very large set of possible worlds, such as the set of all logically possible 
worlds. This kind of reliability is what Mark Heller calls the overall reliability rating of a 
belief-forming mechanism. 
 In “Strong and Weak Justification,” Goldman explains that one of his motivations 
for avoiding this extreme (in addition to providing a plausible account of justification that 
would not lead to extreme skepticism) is that the reliability of an artifact is generally 
assessed in normal situations rather than all possible situations.126 For example, in order 
to be reliable, a car does not need to start and run smoothly in all conditions (including -
50 degrees Fahrenheit, or at 3 Kelvins), but only needs to do so in its normal operating 
conditions. This is true, but it remains the case that a car that is able to start and run 
                                                     
126  “Strong and Weak Justification,” p 61. 
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smoothly even under extreme conditions (such as at -50 degrees Fahrenheit, or at 3 
Kelvins) is more reliable than a car that is only able to start and run smoothly under 
normal conditions, even though both are reliable in the given context.  
Likewise, Lewis, DeRose, and contextualists in general claim that a subject’s 
epistemic position towards a belief can be even stronger than that which is required for 
‘mere’ knowledge. According to Lewis’ theory of knowledge, a belief in a proposition 
can obtain this position if the subject’s evidence for this proposition eliminates even 
possibilities that are properly ignored.127 As such, it seems natural to think that this 
extreme “absolute” kind of reliability may have something to do with strength of 
epistemic position, even if a belief-forming mechanism does not need to be absolutely 
reliable in order to yield knowledge or justified belief. 
While it is tempting to think that a subject’s epistemic position towards a belief is 
strong just to the extent that the belief-forming mechanism the subject used to form the 
belief is absolutely reliable, the situation is more complicated than that. This is because 
Keith DeRose has persuasively argued that what he calls ‘subject-factors’ (and what I 
will call a subject’s ‘epistemic situation’) can play a role in determining a subject’s 
epistemic position.128 For example, a subject’s barn-beliefs while the subject is in Fake 
Barn Country do not count as knowledge, while a version of the subject that is not in 
Fake Barn Country does know that there are barns around him. But this difference in 
knowledge is not like the difference in knowledge in the two versions of the Bank Cases 
(which are quoted above). At least according to DeRose, in the two Bank Cases, the 
                                                     
127 David Lewis, “Elusive Knowledge,” p 562. 
128 Keith DeRose, The Case for Contextualism, p 31-4. 
161 
 
epistemic position of the subject involved (DeRose himself) remains constant, but how 
strong an epistemic position has to be in order for the belief it supports to count as 
knowledge changes due to contextual factors. But in the two versions of the Fake Barn 
Country Case, the epistemic positions of the two versions of the subject differ (again, 
according to DeRose).  
If a subject’s epistemic situation does affect his epistemic position, then the 
absolute reliability of the belief-forming mechanism the subject to form a belief cannot 
be directly related to the strength of the subject’s epistemic situation with regards to that 
belief. That is because the subject’s epistemic situation seems to directly affect whether 
or not the subject satisfies the anti-Gettier condition, and, according to reliabilistic 
theories of knowledge, whether or not a subject satisfies the anti-Gettier condition is not a 
matter of a belief-forming mechanism’s absolute reliability or even its ‘global’ reliability 
(the kind of reliability required for justification, or at least ‘strong’ justification). Instead, 
a subject’s belief satisfies the anti-Gettier condition if and only if the mechanism used to 
form it is locally reliable. 
As a result of this complication, I do not propose that the absolute reliability of a 
belief-forming mechanism is directly related to the strength of the subject’s epistemic 
position towards the beliefs formed by that mechanism. Instead, I will propose that the 
absolute reliability of a belief-forming mechanism is directly related to a component of 
the subject’s epistemic position. I will call this component the belief’s ‘epistemic 
strength,’ and I will stipulate that this epistemic strength consists of whatever positive 
epistemic qualities that are context- and situation-independent. I will further propose that 
a belief’s epistemic strength and the subject’s epistemic situation will together determine 
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the subject’s epistemic position towards the belief.  
To use an analogy, a male body-builder in his prime may be stronger than an 
elderly lady. However, in certain situations (such as the elderly lady being a world-class 
akido master, while the body-builder completely lacks martial arts training), the elderly 
lady may be able to best the body-builder in a physical contest (such as a martial arts 
context). This is because the elderly lady, thanks to her skills, is able to place herself in a 
better and stronger ‘position’ than the body-builder, using her weaker strength but greater 
leverage to pin him. Likewise, the two world-slices of the same subject in the two 
versions of the Fake Barn Case are equally ‘strong,’ but differ in their epistemic situation. 
Due to this difference in situation, the Fake Barn Country version of the subject has less 
epistemic ‘leverage’ than his Normal Country counterpart, and so has a weaker epistemic 
position with regards to barn-beliefs.  
  
2. Simple New Evil Demon Problem Cases 
 This version of my account of a belief’s epistemic strength may still be rough, but 
it is already capable of resolving certain problem cases that Goldman’s theory (or 
theories) of justification found difficult to handle. These problem cases include simple 
versions of the New Evil Demon problem cases, where the “demonic” force involved 
affects the process of belief-formation, but not the process of cognitive skill learning.  
 For example, this version of my account can explain why the strengths of the 
epistemic positions of your perceptual beliefs are the same as the strengths of the 
epistemic positions of the perceptual beliefs of your counterpart that is the victim of the 
Evil Demon. For both you and your counterpart, there is a set of logically possible worlds 
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where the mechanisms you both use to form perceptual beliefs would not produce false 
beliefs (e.g., the world both you and your counterpart believe to be the actual world). 
There is also a set of possible worlds where the mechanisms you both use to form 
perceptual beliefs would fail and produce false beliefs (e.g., the worlds where you or your 
counterpart are the victim of a Tricky Demon).  
 Our working solution to the Generality Problem is that the type a token belief-
forming process belongs to which is relevant to the epistemic project is the set of 
activations of belief-forming mechanisms of the same activation type (as defined in the 
previous chapter). Since both you and your counterpart are using belief-forming 
mechanisms of the same activation type, the set of worlds where belief-forming 
mechanisms of the relevant activation type would fail and produce false beliefs, and the 
set of worlds where belief-forming mechanisms of the relevant activation type would 
succeed and produce true beliefs are the same for both you and your counterpart. As a 
result, the belief-forming mechanisms by you and by your counterpart have the same 
degree of absolute reliability.  
 Intuitively, your Demon World counterpart lacks knowledge, while you have 
much knowledge. But your beliefs are equally justified. On DeRose’s contextualist 
theory, this difference in knowledge is explained by a difference in epistemic position, 
which, in turn, is explained by a difference in epistemic situations (or, to use DeRose’s 
term, ‘subject-factors’) – namely, that your counterpart is trapped in a Demon World, 
while you are not. 
 Because the difference in knowledge between you and your counterpart can be 
explained by a difference in epistemic situation, without citing a difference in attributor-
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context, it seems highly plausible that the set of worlds that are J-relevant is the same for 
both you and your counterpart. Because there is also no difference in the absolute 
reliability of the belief-forming mechanisms used by you and your counterpart (these 
mechanisms are of the same activation type, and the set of worlds that are ‘absolutely’ 
possible are the same for both you and your counterpart), my proposed account of 
epistemic strength predicts that you and your counterpart’s beliefs will be equally 
‘strong.’ This, together with the highly plausible claim that the set of J-relevant worlds is 
the same for both you and your counterpart, yield the prediction that your beliefs will be 
equally justified. And this prediction certainly matches our intuitions. 
 This rough draft account of a belief’s epistemic strength also provides an 
explanation of the Benevolent Demon case. There does exist a set of logically possible 
worlds where wishful thinking is a reliable belief-forming process. However, this set is 
quite limited, and only includes worlds where some “demonic” (or possibly “angelic”) 
force is causing wishes to come true. (Such a force might include sheer good luck.) There 
are many more logically possible worlds where wishful thinking is quite unreliable - 
including the world that we take to be actual. As a result, my account does suggest that 
beliefs formed by wishful thinking may have some limited strength. However, these 
beliefs would be so epistemically weak that it seems quite implausible that the process of 
forming beliefs based on wishful thinking would be J-reliable. As a result, there would be 
very few (if any) contexts in which beliefs formed in such a manner would be justified. 
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3. Sensitivity to Defeat and the Rule of Belief 
 The notion that an epistemic agent’s cognitive state can cause a shift in the set of 
worlds that are J-relevant, along with a minor refinement of our working account of the 
strength of a belief’s epistemic position, provides a solution to two further problem cases: 
The Lying Authorities cases and the Two Heuristics case.  
 Two factors can explain why the beliefs of the epistemic subjects in the Lying 
Authorities cases lack justification and have relatively weak epistemic positions. First, it 
is plausible that the epistemic subjects’ beliefs about the unreliability of their belief-
forming mechanisms have caused a shift in the set of worlds which are J-relevant. 
Secondly, the beliefs formed by the belief-forming mechanisms in question appear to be 
inappropriately insensitive to defeat. This insensitivity to defeat reduces the overall 
reliability rating of these belief-forming mechanisms. 
 In the previous chapter, I mentioned that the actual activation conditions for a 
belief-forming mechanism may be more restrictive than the mechanism’s ‘official’ 
activation conditions due to the presence of preemption mechanisms. Anderson’s ACT* 
theory of cognition provides an example of a preemption mechanism. According to 
ACT*, only a single production can be activated at a time, and a system of conflict 
resolution is utilized when the 'official’ activation conditions for multiple productions 
have been satisfied. If this system of conflict resolution activates a production A at the 
expense of production B, production A can be said to ‘preempt’ production B. This 
system of conflict resolution and preemption causes productions to be more reliable than 
their ‘official’ activation conditions might indicate. 
 Defeater mechanisms are similar to preemption mechanisms, with one important 
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difference. Preemption mechanisms prevent a belief-forming mechanism from forming a 
belief; defeater mechanisms cause a belief to be abandoned after the belief has formed. In 
order to accommodate defeater mechanisms into our account of the strength of a belief’s 
epistemic position, we must recognize that the reliability of a belief-forming mechanism 
is not merely a function of the conditions under which the mechanism would form a false 
belief. It is also a function of how long it takes the agent using the mechanism to 
recognize and correct false beliefs (through the use of a defeater mechanism) when a 
false belief has been formed. This ability to correct false beliefs can be compared to the 
ability of engineered artifacts to “fail safely.” I believe we do tend to attribute reliability 
to artifacts that have the ability to fail safely, so I believe that it is natural that our account 
of reliability takes this into consideration. 
 Belief-forming mechanisms that attain reliability purely through sensitivity to 
defeat do exist. Sanford Goldberg, in his 2010 book, Relying on Others, devotes a chapter 
to cases of beliefs that are formed through the epistemic agent’s reliance on what 
Goldberg calls the “coverage-reliability” of the agent’s community.129 One of the cases 
Goldberg provides is as follows:  
WMD: Over lunch, you and a friend are having a 
discussion about overseas ventures by the US military 
during the administration of George W. Bush. She raises 
the question whether weapons of mass destruction (WMDs) 
                                                     
129 I would prefer a term along the lines of “coverage-power” rather than “coverage-reliability,” following 
Goldman’s distinction between power (the property of producing true beliefs, as opposed to producing no 
beliefs or false beliefs) and reliability (the property of rarely producing false beliefs), since what the agent 
is relying on is that her community is very good at promptly providing defeaters for beliefs when those 
beliefs are false, and not necessarily at providing defeaters for beliefs only when those beliefs are false. 
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were ever found in Iraq. You think for a moment and 
respond that, no, they were not. (You reason that if such 
weapons had been found, you would have heard about it by 
now.)130 
 Unlike the Lying Authorities cases, inappropriate insensitivity to defeat does not 
play a large role in the Two Heuristics case, except that if the subject in this case does 
suspect that the more reliable heuristic would yield a different result, this may be a sign 
of a defeater system that almost activated, but failed to actually do so. If our intuitions 
report that the subject in this case is unjustified in forming a belief based on the results of 
the less reliable heuristic even in cases where the subject does not suspect that the more 
reliable heuristic would provide a different result, then this could be explained if the easy 
availability of a more reliable belief-forming mechanisms causes a shift in the set of 
worlds that are J-relevant. Lewis’s Rule of Belief, as currently formulated, does not yield 
this implication, but it could be modified to do so. 
  
Section 3: 
 A More Refined Account 
 The rough draft account of a belief’s epistemic strength proposed in Part 2 has 
provided explanations of simple versions of the New Evil Demon Problem cases, where 
the “demonic” force involved interferes with the belief-forming process, and the 
epistemic subject trapped in the demon world uses the same belief-forming mechanism as 
his or her actual world counterpart. However, there does exist a more complex version of 
                                                     
130 Sanford C. Goldberg, Relying on Others, Oxford University Press, 2010, p 155. 
168 
 
the New Evil Demon Problem, where the “demonic” force does not just interfere with the 
belief-forming process, but also with the learning process in which the belief-forming 
mechanism used in the belief-forming process was formed. In order to account for this 
kind of case, I will need to provide a more refined and complete version of the solution to 
the Generality Problem I proposed in the previous chapter. 
 The rough draft version of the solution to the Generality Problem I proposed in 
the previous chapter was incomplete in two ways. First, I did not provide a way of 
specifying the epistemically relevant type for a token activation mechanism. Secondly, 
while I claimed that my proposed solution to the Generality Problem did yield defensible 
predictions of what epistemic statuses a given belief has, I did not provide a reason for 
why these classifications are plausibly linked to traditional notions of these epistemic 
statuses. I will now address these two issues. 
 The answers I will provide to these two questions are as follows: First, I propose 
that the epistemically relevant type for a given token activation mechanism is determined 
by the learning, selection, or maintenance mechanism responsible for producing or 
maintaining it. Naturally, the epistemically relevant type of this underlying adaptive 
mechanism will need to be specified. This may initially appear to lead to a regress 
problem but, as I will argue below, this regress can be terminated non-traumatically.  
 Secondly, I will argue that there is a reason why it is plausible that the reliability 
of the type of belief-forming mechanism specified by this chain of adaptive mechanisms 
– which I will call the extended activation type of a belief-forming mechanism – is 
plausibly linked to certain positive epistemic statuses (namely, strength of epistemic 
position). This is because the various learning or ‘learning’ mechanisms in this chain of 
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adaptive mechanisms provide a way of tracing the flow of information that played a role 
in shaping the belief-forming mechanism in question. 
 In sub-section 1, I will argue that this extended model of skill-learning provides a 
way of tracing the flow of information that shapes a given belief-forming mechanism, 
and that the regress of adaptive mechanisms involved in this extended model can be 
terminated non-traumatically. 
 In sub-section 2, I will discuss the extended activation type in more detail. 
 In sub-section 3, I will demonstrate that the reliabilistic account of belief’s 
epistemic strength that this more refined solution to the Generality Problem provides can 
explain a second kind of New Evil Demon Problem case. This kind of case involves the 
“demonic” force interfering with the underlying process of skill-learning, and includes 
the case of the scientist trapped in a Demon World, the Properly Acquired Clairvoyance 
case, and the Astrologer case. 
 
1. A Regress of Adaptive Mechanisms 
 In the paradigm case of skill-learning, the activation mechanism for a skill is itself 
the product of a learning mechanism. In the case of Adams’ open-loop theory of motor-
learning, it was hypothesized that this learning mechanism takes the form of Stimulus-
Response conditioning. In Anderson’s ACT* theory of cognition, this learning 
mechanism took the form of strengthening and condition discrimination.  
 All three of these learning mechanisms rely on feedback or “Knowledge of the 
Result.” As I described in the previous chapter, a learning mechanism can be further 
broken down into two sub-mechanisms: a “detector” sub-mechanism that gathers 
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Knowledge of the Result, and a “modifier” sub-mechanism that modifies the target item 
in response to the Knowledge of the Result gathered by the detector sub-mechanism. 
While in theory, Knowledge of the Result contains information about both 
success and failures of the target item, in practice, the role the detector sub-mechanism 
plays in detecting error is more central.  
As Anderson points out, in principle, a production application could be 
characterized as being in one of three states – known to be incorrect, known to be correct, 
or correctness unknown. However, the ACT computer model that implements ACT* is 
unable to distinguish between an application being in the state of known to be correct and 
being in the state of correctness unknown. Yet the selection mechanisms included in ACT 
are still able to perform their functions, relying only on reports about the failures of 
applications without needing reports about the successes of applications.131 
It is also worth noting that, in ACT, the activation mechanism for a production is 
only strengthened linearly in response to applications that were successful (or at least not 
known to have failed), but is weakened exponentially in response to applications that 
were known to have failed.132 
 Another feature of this detector mechanism is that while the reliability of this 
error detection system is, of course, important, it is perhaps more important that the error 
detection system is powerful. The difference between these two properties is as follows: 
A reliable system is one that seldom fails. A powerful system is one that often succeeds. 
A system can be reliable without being powerful by often aborting, since an abort does 
                                                     
131 John R. Anderson, The Architecture of Cognition, Harvard University Press, 1983, p 248. 
132 John Anderson, Architecture of Cognition, p 250-1. 
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not count as either a success or a failure. In epistemology, a “skeptical" belief-forming 
system would provide an example of just such a reliable, but “powerless,” system. 
 Adams cites experimental evidence which shows that the error rate of a subject 
performing a motor task essentially remains constant, or increases slightly, if the subject 
is not provided with Knowledge of the Result. Interestingly, the error rate of a subject 
that is provided with irrelevant “Knowledge of the Result” actually tends to be somewhat 
higher than if the subject were not provided with Knowledge of the Result at all.133 One 
possible interpretation of this experimental evidence is that, in the absence of Knowledge 
of the Result, the subject does not modify their motor response, and when provided with 
irrelevant “Knowledge of the Result,” the subject essentially modifies their motor 
response at random. A possible moral of this story is that false error reports will tend to 
degrade the reliability of a learning mechanism’s target item, but without at least some 
true error reports, improvement of the reliability of a learning mechanism’s target item is 
a practical impossibility. In this way, the ‘detector’ sub-mechanisms that produce 
Knowledge of the Result resemble defeater systems - in both cases, false reports of errors 
are an annoyance, but it is critically important that, if an error is made, then that error is 
detected. 
It should also be noted that Knowledge of the Result is information possessed by 
the learning or selection mechanism, and not necessarily by the subject herself. This is 
clearest when we extend our model of 'skill learning' to natural selection. Natural 
selection 'knows' about the successes and failures of competing traits based on the extent 
that these traits promote reproductive success. Most organisms, of course, have no 
                                                     
133 Adams, “A Closed-Loop Theory,” p 130. 
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knowledge of history of successes and failures of the various traits that existed in the 
evolving population that produced them.  
Even in the paradigm case of skill learning, as described Adams' theory, where 
the subject does possess Knowledge of the Result of her various trials, this knowledge is 
often transitory, since it only needs to persist long enough to help the subject modify her 
performance in the next trial. Thus, even in the case of learning acquired skills, 
Knowledge of the Result of previous trials might not be reflectively accessible to the 
subject at a sufficiently later time. 
 Since activation mechanisms are, at least typically, the product of some selection, 
learning, or design mechanism or mechanisms, these selection mechanisms define a type 
that these activation mechanisms belong to - the activation mechanism’s selection type, 
learning type, or design type. The manner in which the exact properties of the target of a 
learning mechanism (for example) can vary from world to world are constrained by 
nature of the learning mechanism itself: by the learning mechanism’s ability to produce 
Knowledge of the Result, and by the learning mechanism’s ability to appropriately 
modify the target mechanism in response to this Knowledge of the Result. 
 The relevant type of this selection, learning, or design mechanism that defines the 
relevant type for a given activation mechanism will itself need to be specified. In the case 
of humans, the learning mechanisms we use to produce the activation mechanisms for our 
skills are likely the result of a genetic developmental mechanism (which, given our 
current model, can be modeled as a simple control program), which is itself the product 
of evolution by natural selection (a selection mechanism). It may appear that we have a 
potentially problematic regress of adaptive mechanisms, with each adaptive mechanism 
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requiring another adaptive mechanism to define its adaptive type. 
 I would suggest that this regress is not just similar to the standard regress problem 
in epistemology - instead, I would suggest that it is actually a continuation of it! The 
standard regress problem in epistemology arises from the deliberative model of belief-
formation used by traditional epistemology. In this model, we form beliefs by reasoning 
from other beliefs, which form the premises of an argument. If our belief in these 
premises are justified, and the argument is valid, then it is generally thought that this 
justification ‘transfers’ to the conclusion via the argument. The standard regress problem 
arises from the notion that this method is the only way that a belief can gain justification. 
If this notion is true, then this can lead to skepticism, since it seems implausible that the 
human mind can hold an infinite number of premises, or that circular arguments can 
provide justification for their conclusions. 
 Applying our skill-based model to the case of deliberative deduction yields a 
slightly different picture. Through this lens, it is not simply the case that reaching a 
conclusion through a valid argument transfers the justification we have for the premises 
of that argument to conclusion. Instead, our ability to judge the validity of the argument 
can be seen as a kind of design mechanism. We could be said to be using our foresight to 
look for possible failures of the belief-forming mechanism formed by the argument. If we 
spot a possible case where an argument is invalid, and would yield a false conclusion 
even when all of its premises are true, then this could be seen as an instance of gaining 
Knowledge of the Result of applying that argument in a possible trial where all the 
premises are true, but the argument still yields a false conclusion. Based on this 
Knowledge of the Result, we can then modify the belief-forming mechanism provided by 
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the argument, by rejecting it entirely, by modifying the argument so it is valid, or (in the 
case of non-deductive arguments) by at least recognizing the kinds of cases where the 
argument could produce a false belief. Something similar could be said about our ability 
to recognize cases where the set of logically possible worlds where the premises of our 
argument are true does not exhaust the set of worlds that are K-relevant in the current 
context. 
 If this model of how beliefs are formed through the act of deliberative deduction 
is appropriate, and the explanation it provides is correct, then this suggests several 
comfortingly non-skeptical conclusions about the standard regress problem of 
epistemology. First, it suggests that deliberative deduction is only one method through 
which justified beliefs can be formed. (This is, of course, a central claim of reliabilism 
and foundationalism in general.) Second, it suggests that what is needed for a justified 
belief is not an argument with premises, but a reliable belief-forming process formed by a 
reliable learning or selection mechanism. Our ability to judge the strength of an argument 
is only one kind of learning or selection mechanism. (This is similar, but slightly 
different, from the standard central claim of reliabilism, since we are focusing on the 
reliability of our ability to judge the strength of an argument, and not the reliability of an 
argument as a belief-forming mechanism.)  
 Thirdly, it suggests that what is needed for justification is not a set of premises, 
but Knowledge of the Result. This is comfortingly non-skeptical for several reasons. 
While an epistemic subject needs access to a piece of information in order to use it in an 
argument, the subject does not need access to Knowledge of the Result in order for a 
selection mechanism to make use of it in modifying its target mechanism - in other 
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words, Knowledge of the Result is information that is possessed by the learning or 
selection mechanism, and is not necessarily possessed by the epistemic subject. In the 
paradigm case our skill-based model applies to, that of skill-learning, the subject does 
have access to Knowledge of the Result, but this access can be fleeting. It only needs to 
last long enough for the subject to apply it in the next trial.  
If we extend this model to evolution by natural selection, then it is likely that the 
organism would have little to no idea of the successes and failures that affected the 
evolution of its population. In the case of deliberative deduction, it may well be that the 
epistemic subject has some idea of the possible failure modes of an argument (or at least 
the institution responsible for training her will), but for adaptive mechanisms in general, 
this persistent awareness on the part of the epistemic subject is the exception, not the rule. 
 Since the epistemic subject does not necessarily have access to Knowledge of the 
Result, there is no need for the subject to store infinite pieces of information. Also, the 
selection or learning mechanism itself has no need of an infinite amount Knowledge of 
the Result to produce a quite reliable target mechanism. It only needs sufficient amount 
of Knowledge of the Result that it can produce a target mechanism that can compensate 
for the most common failure modes. (More Knowledge of the Result will, of course, be 
needed to produce even more reliable target mechanisms that can compensate for 
uncommon failure modes. But our theory claims that absolute reliability is not needed for 
mere knowledge.)  
 Fourthly, and perhaps most importantly, a regress of adaptive mechanisms, unlike 
a regress of premises, can be terminated in a non-traumatic fashion. Evolution by natural 
selection provides an example of a “non-traumatic” terminal selection mechanism, which 
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does not require a further selection mechanism to specify its type.  
 In our paradigm case of motor skill learning, the selection mechanism that 
produces a motor routine first produces Knowledge of the Result of a trial where that 
motor routine is tested, and then applies that Knowledge of the Result in order to modify 
the motor routine executed in the next trial. The motor routine, as well as the simple 
control program used to execute it (the target item for the learning mechanism involved 
in motor learning), will vary according to the learning mechanism’s ability to gain 
Knowledge of the Result from trials and its ability to appropriately modify the target 
mechanism for the next trial in response to this Knowledge of the Result. 
 This model partially breaks down when applied to evolution by natural selection, 
in a way that explains why natural selection is a selection mechanism that does not need a 
further adaptive mechanism to define its adaptive type. Natural selection does not 
literally produce Knowledge of the Result about the failure of a trait to promote 
reproductive success of the organism that possesses it or the success of a trait in 
performing that function, and then use this information to modify the frequency of that 
trait in the next generation of the population the organism belongs to.  
 Instead, a trait succeeding or failing to promote reproductive success just is the 
modification of the frequency of that trait in the next generation. Because this fact is true 
in any system that instantiates evolution by natural selection, the manner in which natural 
selection modifies the frequency of traits is invariant. (This manner of modification may 
be probabilistic due to factors including genetic drift, etc., but it is probabilistic in an 
invariant way.) Because the manner in which natural selection modifies the frequency of 
traits is invariant, it does not require a further adaptive mechanism to explain how this 
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method varies. 
 Another non-traumatic terminal selection mechanism might include (pace Alvin 
Plantinga) a specific kind of Intelligent Design, involving a necessarily existent 
Intelligent Designer which, by necessity, has certain abilities and psychological 
properties. If the existence of this Designer, as well as Its abilities, and the psychological 
properties which motivate the use of those abilities, all remain invariant across all 
possible worlds, then this Designer would provide an adaptive mechanism (a design 
mechanism) that remains invariant across all possible worlds, much like natural selection. 
 A third terminal selection mechanism that is at least potentially traumatic is 
random chance, of the sort involved in the Swampman case (which I will discuss in more 
detail in Part 4). While random chance is not a 'true’ selection mechanism, it can be 
accommodated by our model as a selection mechanism that is completely insensitive to 
Knowledge of the Result, and, as a consequence, is highly unreliable.   
 If the justificatory regress in epistemology does involve a regress of adaptive 
mechanisms and not a regress of arguments and premises, then I believe this would be a 
reason to think that the extended selection type of a belief-forming mechanism defined by 
this chain of adaptive mechanisms, is the type that the belief-forming mechanism belongs 
to which is relevant to the epistemic project. The adaptive type of the belief-forming 
mechanism which is defined not by a single non-terminal adaptive mechanism, but by the 
entire chain of adaptive mechanisms, down to the final and terminal adaptive mechanism, 
is what I will call the extended activation type of the belief-forming mechanism. 
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2. The Extended Activation Type 
 As stated in the previous chapter, the activation type of a belief-forming 
mechanism is defined by an activation mechanism and whatever belief-forming program 
(which, according to our current model, is some kind of simple control program) is 
activated when the activation mechanism’s activation conditions are satisfied. The 
manner in which the belief-forming program can vary from world to world is constrained 
by further adaptive mechanisms. In our central model of skill-learning, these adaptive 
mechanisms might include: 1) a maintenance mechanism, which (to some degree) 
protects the simple control program from damage and prevents the simple control 
program from varying unless a learning or selection mechanism is activated, and/or 2) a 
learning mechanism, which will modify the simple control program in response to 
detected errors and, to a lesser extent, detected successes. In more extended versions of 
this model, this list of adaptive mechanisms might be supplemented by a developmental 
control program (which is a control program that helps determine how an organism 
develops over time) or a selection mechanism (which selects one target item out of a set 
of competing target items in response to something like Knowledge of the Result). 
 The extended activation type is similar to the activation type with one crucial 
difference. Its definition recognizes that the various adaptive mechanisms acting on the 
belief-forming program are not static entities that remain invariant across all possible 
worlds. Instead, these adaptive mechanisms that act on the belief-forming program are 
themselves acted on by further adaptive mechanisms.  
In humans, the activation mechanisms of our cognitive and motor skills are acted 
on by various learning mechanisms (stimulus-response conditioning, condition 
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discrimination, strengthening, etc.) and at least one maintenance mechanism (the ability 
of our procedural memory to protect itself from damage). The learning mechanisms and 
maintenance mechanisms that act on the activation mechanism and the belief-forming 
program are themselves the result of the developmental program (which, given our 
current model, can be thought of as a simple control program) provided by our genome. 
And this developmental program is itself the product of evolution by natural selection, 
which is a terminal selection mechanism. 
 Each learning or selection mechanism in a given chain of adaptive mechanisms, 
beginning with the terminal selection mechanism (which might be evolution by natural 
selection, or an intelligent designer, or random chance, etc.), constrains how the adaptive 
mechanisms above it can vary from world to world. The selection and learning 
mechanisms located further up the chain constrain how the adaptive mechanisms above 
them can vary from world to world - including other selection and learning mechanisms. 
Finally, the belief-forming mechanism at the end of this chain will constrain how the 
propositional contents of the beliefs it produces will vary from world to world, and how 
well these propositional contents are ‘fitted’ to the truth in the external world the 
organism finds itself in. 
 As a result of this chain of adaptive mechanisms, the belief-forming mechanisms 
that would be outputted by this chain in different worlds, where the various learning and 
selection mechanisms gathered a different set of Knowledge of the Result, may differ 
from the belief-forming mechanisms that exist in the actual world. Even so, these other-
worldly versions of the belief-forming mechanism still belong to the same extended 
activation type as the belief-forming mechanism in the actual world. And this fact 
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provides a solution to a second kind of New Evil Demon Problem cases. 
 
3. ‘Demonic’ Interference with Skill-Learning 
 Given this account of the extended activation type of a belief-forming mechanism, 
we can now turn to variants of the New Evil Demon problem cases that involve 
“demonic” interference with skill-learning, and not merely “demonic” interference with 
the proximate act of belief formation. Examples of this kind of case include a scientist 
who forms and applies a false theory in a demon world using appropriate scientific 
methods, the Properly Acquired Clairvoyance case, and the Astrologer case. 
 The clearest example of this kind of case is the one involving the scientist trapped 
in a Demon World. In this case, the scientist uses appropriate scientific methods to create 
a theory, but the Evil Demon interferes by providing the scientist with false observational 
data. The theory the scientist creates is analogous to a cognitive skill, and the predictions 
this theory allows is analogous to the beliefs produced by a cognitive skill. The scientific 
methods used to create the theory are analogous to the learning mechanisms that produce 
a cognitive skill. With this in mind, we can characterize the extended activation type of 
this theory and the formation-type of the beliefs it produces as follows: In worlds where 
the Evil Demon exits, the scientist will tend to accept the theory, and will use it to make 
predictions which will tend to be false. In worlds where the Evil Demon does not exist, 
the scientist will tend to reject the theory, and will not use it to make predictions. What 
does this pattern suggest about the overall reliability rating of the theory’s extended 
activation type? 
 Goldman defines reliability as follows: “An object (a process, method, system, or 
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what have you) is reliable if and only if 1) it is the sort of thing that tends to produce 
beliefs, and 2) the proportion of true beliefs among the beliefs it produces meets some 
threshold or criterion value.”134 This definition, of course, applies only to ‘threshold’ 
reliability, and not the overall reliability rating of a mechanism. It also only applies to 
belief-forming mechanisms, which is somewhat at odds with the everyday use of the 
term, which applies to all kinds of mechanisms in general. 
 This definition also has the flaw of producing counter-intuitive results in the 
Scientist in Demon World case: If a belief-forming mechanism is reliable just to the 
extent that there is a high ratio between the true beliefs it produces and the total number 
of beliefs it produces, then the scientist’s theory is, indeed, unreliable.  
 But what if a belief-forming mechanism is reliable just to the extent that it has a 
low rate of failure? There are two ways a mechanism can avoid failure. The first, and 
more obvious way, is for the mechanism to succeed. But there is a second way: the 
mechanism could abort, which is neither a success nor a failure. And in the case of 
belief-forming mechanism, an abortion would mean forming no beliefs at all. 
 In the case of the scientist, in most worlds, her theory would produce no beliefs at 
all – since she only tends to accept this theory when tricked by the Demon. So, across the 
set of logically possible worlds in which she exists, her theory has a very low rate of 
failure – in most worlds, the theory ‘aborts’ rather than producing a false belief. If we 
define the reliability of a belief-forming mechanism in this way, that would mean that the 
set of belief-forming mechanisms tokens that belong to the same extended activation type 
as the theory she accepts and applies in the Demon Worlds actually have a high overall 
                                                     
134 Alvin Goldman, Epistemology and Cognition, p 26. 
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reliability rating – despite the fact that this theory usually produces false beliefs when it is 
applied.  
 Thus, if we do define reliability in terms of having a low rate of failure rather than 
in terms of a high truth-ratio, we can use our account of the strength of a belief’s 
epistemic position to explain why the beliefs the scientist produces using this theory are 
fairly strong, epistemically speaking. It is also plausible that the scientist is justified in 
these beliefs, since it is quite plausible that these beliefs are epistemically strong enough 
to eliminate all J-relevant worlds. 
 I believe that Goldman, by defining reliability of a belief-forming mechanism in 
terms of high truth ratio rather than in terms of low rate of failure, makes a mistake that is 
similar to the one made by Lewis and Sosa - that of identifying a belief too closely with 
its propositional content. If it helps, we could think of the “belief” produced by a belief-
forming mechanism when it aborts as having null propositional content, and therefore no 
truth value. But such “null-beliefs” would still be of the same formation type as the 
beliefs formed by the belief-forming mechanism in trials where it activates. 
 We can use this same basic strategy to explain the Properly Acquired 
Clairvoyance case. Since this clairvoyance is properly acquired, the epistemic agents 
involved would tend to only rely on clairvoyance in worlds where clairvoyance works. 
The formation type of the resulting beliefs would tend to have null content in non-
clairvoyant worlds, true content in clairvoyant worlds, and would only have false content 
in those few worlds where the epistemic agents inadvertently acquire clairvoyance in a 
non-clairvoyant world, or where clairvoyance does exist, but fails (assuming that 
clairvoyance is not perfectly reliable). 
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 The Astrologer case is a bit more complicated, since social considerations are 
involved in two different ways. First, the Astrologer acquired his cognitive “skill” 
through institutional instruction, rather than self-directed learning. I will partially address 
the matter of this kind of instruction in the next chapter. For now, we can avoid this 
complication by modifying the case - instead of an Astrologer who acquired his “skill” 
through institutional instruction, let’s imagine an Augurer who has acquired his “skill” of 
augury through his own non-scientific “discoveries.”  
 The second social consideration is that both the Astrologer and the Augurer 
belong to pre-scientific societies, and this may affect the standards of justification, or the 
propositions that justification attributions would express. I will address this issue after 
providing an explanation of the epistemic strength of the predictions made by the 
Augurer. 
 When normal, average humans learn skills, they acquire and apply Knowledge of 
the Result gathered by applying a new skill in various trials. In humans, this Knowledge 
of the Result generally takes the form of hypotheses about the cause of failures. Since 
these are normal humans we are talking about, they do not apply proper scientific 
methods when constructing these hypotheses. (Scientists probably also fail to apply 
proper scientific method in these cases, being relatively normal humans themselves, 
when they are not on the clock.) As a result, they often fall victim to the post hoc, propter 
hoc fallacy. This is particularly the case in domains where the success of the agent is not 
solely determined by skill, and luck plays a major role. For examples of this, we need 
only consider the kinds of superstitions that develop around baseball (where even an 
excellent batter only succeeds in achieving a “hit” in less than one third of trials) and 
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jackpot machines in casinos (where success is purely a matter of luck, or worse, 
unscrupulous casino owners). Proper use of scientific methods would eliminate these 
superstitions, since practically the first order of business in constructing a scientific 
theory is to test observed correlations for statistical significance, in order to disconfirm 
the null hypothesis. Unfortunately, the need to acquire a statistically valid sample of 
trials, as well as applying the methods of statistical analysis, probably makes it too 
difficult to apply the scientific method to skill-learning in everyday life. 
 With this in mind, we can expect that extended activation type of the system of 
augury used by the Augurer does have some degree of reliability - the Augurer would 
learn to not use augury if it consistently gave false predictions. But the extended 
activation type of this system would not be as absolutely reliable as our demon-world 
scientist’s scientific theory, since the Augerer would not know how to properly 
disconfirm the null hypothesis. From this, we can predict that the Augurer’s predictions 
have some degree of strength, but not as the demon-world scientist’s predictions. And 
this agrees with our intuitions. 
 Now for the question of whether the Augurer is justified in accepting his 
predictions. As Goldman notes, we have competing intuitive pulls in this case - we have 
some pull for the notion that the Augurer is justified, and some pull for the notion that the 
Augurer is not justified. Both of these intuitive pulls can be explained by Lewis’ Rule of 
Conservatism, which states that we are defeasibly permitted to ignore possibilities if 
members of our society normally do ignore those possibilities, and it is common 
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knowledge that they do.135 The members of the Augurer’s society do normally ignore the 
possibility that an observed correlation could be simply a matter of chance, or at least 
have no idea of how to eliminate this possibility. So, by the rules of his own society, the 
Augurer is likely justified in his augury-based beliefs. But by the more stringent rules of 
our own society, the Augurer is unjustified. This relativistic ambiguity of the term 
“justified” explains why we feel competing intuitive pulls in this case. It is worth noting 
that Goldman himself provided a Culturally Relative Criterion of Rightness for Methods 
(and augury is almost certainly a “method,” in his terminology), even though he did not 
himself endorse this Criterion.136  
 
Section 4:  
The Nature of Epistemic Strength and the ‘Demonic’ Creation of Epistemic Agents 
0. Introduction 
 In this part, I will suggest one adequacy condition and one desideratum for any 
account of a belief’s epistemic strength. The adequacy condition is as follows: No 
adequate account of a belief’s epistemic strength should predict that an unjustified belief 
can have maximal epistemic strength. The desideratum is as follows: It would be 
desirable if an account of a belief’s epistemic strength would not predict that a justified 
belief can have zero epistemic strength.  
 My proposed account of a belief’s epistemic strength claims that a belief is 
epistemically strong just to the extent that the belief-forming mechanism responsible for 
                                                     
135  Lewis, “Elusive Knowledge,” p 559. 
136 Alvin Goldman, Epistemology and Cognition, p 95. 
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producing it is absolutely reliable. It may appear that there is a danger that my proposed 
account fails to satisfy both the adequacy condition and the desideratum I have suggested. 
This is because I have claimed that the set of worlds which is relevant for measuring a 
belief-forming mechanism’s absolute reliability is some very large set of objectively 
possible worlds (such as the set of logically possible worlds) in which the ‘same’ belief-
forming mechanism is used by the ‘same’ agent. By contrast, it is highly plausible that 
the set of worlds that are J-relevant consists of some subset of worlds that are 
‘doxastically’ possible (in the same loose sense of ‘doxastic’ in which Lewis’ Rule of 
Belief refers to ‘beliefs’) for the agent or the attributor.  
 Because a world that is objectively or logically impossible can be doxastically 
possible (it may be possible, for all an agent knows, that 2+2=5), there is a danger that a 
belief-forming mechanism could eliminate all absolutely possible worlds while leaving at 
least one J-relevant world uneliminated (this world would be ‘doxastically’ possible, but 
absolutely impossible). This would result in a belief that is unjustified but one that, 
according to the account I have proposed, would have maximal epistemic strength.  
Likewise, there is at least an apparent danger that a belief-forming mechanism 
could eliminate all J-relevant worlds, but fail to eliminate a single absolutely possible 
world. This would be embarrassing for my account, but perhaps less so than predicting 
that an unjustified belief could have maximal epistemic strength. The notion of such a 
justified, but strength-less, belief could be compared to Alvin Goldman’s notion of a 
belief that is merely ‘weakly’ justified. (A justified belief that had zero epistemic strength 
would be weakly justified indeed.) But there is one crucial difference between these two 
notions: My account of a belief’s epistemic strength would still allow for univocal 
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account of justification. A belief would be justified if and only if its belief-forming 
mechanism is ‘strong’ enough to eliminate all J-relevant worlds, and it may be possible 
that this could be done even if the mechanism has zero strength. There is no need to 
distinguish between ‘strong’ and ‘weak’ forms of justification. It would still be desirable 
for an account of epistemic strength not to predict that it is possible for a justified belief 
to have zero epistemic strength, but such a prediction might not be fatal for such an 
account. 
Both of these two dangers could perhaps be avoided if we were willing to retreat 
from the claim that some subset of objectively possible worlds is the set of worlds that 
are relevant for epistemic strength, and adopt some sort of merely subjectively possible 
worlds (such as some subset of worlds that are ‘doxastically’ possible) instead. But I 
believe that this retreat would depart from the spirit of the reliabilist project, and should 
be resisted if possible. In sub-section 1, I will argue that my proposed account of a 
belief’s epistemic strength does not predict that it is possible to have an unjustified belief 
with maximal epistemic strength. I will leave the question of whether or not this account 
predicts that it is possible to have a justified belief with zero epistemic strength an open 
question. 
A third kind of danger to this account involves a third kind of New Evil Demon 
Problem case, one where the ‘demonic’ force involved actually plays a role in the 
creation of the epistemic agent. Two cases of this sort are as follows: 
 
Artificial Brain-in-a-Vat: This case is similar to the 
standard Brain-in-a-Vat case, where a the brain of a normal 
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human subject is removed, placed in a vat of nutritive fluid, 
and hooked up to a supercomputer, which simulates the 
neural inputs the brain would receive from the human’s 
body. But this case has one difference - instead of being a 
normal human brain, the Artificial Brain was created by 
super-scientists in order to provide a functionally-
equivalent replica of the normal human brain. Intuitively, 
the Artificial Brain-in-a-Vat lacks perceptual knowledge, 
but its perceptual beliefs are just as justified as those of the 
standard Brain-in-a-Vat or a normal human.137 
 
Swampman: Swampman is an atom-for-atom replica of the 
philosopher Donald Davidson, created as the cosmically 
improbably result of a lightning strike in a swamp. 
Intuitively, Swampman lacks much knowledge. For 
example, Swampman falsely believes he was born in 1917. 
However, these beliefs are typically justified. Intuitively, 
Swampman does have perceptual knowledge.138 
 
                                                     
137 Michael Bergmann cites this thought experiment in Justification Without Awareness: A Defense of 
Epistemic Externalism, Clarendon Press, 2006, p 150. Bergmann explains, in footnote 75, that this was part 
of Earl Conee and Richard Feldman’s reply to his comments on their symposium paper, “Some Virtues of 
Evidentialism,” presented at the Central Division Meeting of the American Philosophical Association in 
April 2005. 
138 This case originally appeared in Donald Davidson’s "Knowing One's Own Mind," Proceedings and 
Addresses of the American Philosophical Association, Vol. 60, No. 3 (Jan. 1987), pp 441-458. 
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 These two cases do not present obvious problems for Goldman’s theory of 
justification. If the mechanisms responsible for the Artificial Brain-in-a-Vat’s perceptual 
beliefs are of the same epistemically relevant type as those of normal humans (as a 
‘commonsense’ method of specifying the epistemically relevant types of belief-forming 
mechanisms might suggest), then these mechanisms are highly reliable. Arguably, the 
Artificial Brain-in-a-Vat’s perceptual belief-forming methods were also acquired in a 
meta-reliable way. As for Swampman, his perceptual belief-forming mechanisms might 
also be thought to be the same epistemically relevant type as Davidson’s. It could also be 
said that belief-forming mechanisms that were acquired belief-forming methods for 
Davidson are actually innate belief-forming processes for Swampman. If so, then 
according to Goldman’s theory of justification, these belief-forming processes would not 
need to be acquired in a meta-reliable fashion in order for them to produce justified 
beliefs or knowledge. 
 These cases do present problems for the Proper Function family of epistemic 
theories, which are based on the Selected Effect family of theories of function. These 
cases are problematic for these theories since, while the subjects in these cases are 
functionally equivalent to their normal counterparts, they have a wildly divergent 
etiology. For the Selected Effect family of theories of function, and the Proper Function 
family of epistemic theories based on the Selected Effect theories, it is the etiology of an 
item that determines its function or functions, and not the item’s actual capabilities. 
 For example, in the Artificial Brain-in-a-Vat case, the super-scientists that created 
the Artificial Brain’s cognitive faculties did not intend that those faculties produce true 
beliefs. Instead, they merely intended to create a functionally equivalent model of the 
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human brain. Since this brain was intended to be hooked up to a supercomputer, the 
scientists expected that the brain would have very few true perceptual beliefs, if any. It is 
true that if the Artificial Brain were placed in a human body or in a replica human body, 
it would be reliable in forming true perceptual beliefs. But this was not intended by the 
super-scientists, and is merely a side-effect of the super-scientists’ intentions.  
Since Proper Function epistemic theories typically require the cognitive faculties 
of an epistemic agent to be aimed at producing true beliefs as a necessary condition for 
any positive epistemic status, a Proper Function theory of justification (such as the one 
proposed by Michael Bergmann in his book Justification Without Awareness), would 
generally predict that the perceptual beliefs of the Artificial Brain lack justification.  
 This kind of ‘accidental’ function, where the ability of an item to perform a 
function is a side-effect of a selection (or design) rather than a direct product of selection, 
can be compared to exapted function in biology. An example of exapted function 
sometimes used in biology is the ability of sea turtles to use their legs for land locomotion 
and egg-burying. It could be the case that sea turtles’ legs were never actually selected for 
the ability to perform these functions, but were only selected for the ability to swim. Sea 
turtles without the ability to swim would be eliminated from the population before they 
arrived at the egg-laying stage of their life-cycle. According to this story, the ability sea 
turtles have to drag themselves up on sandy beaches and bury their eggs is merely a by-
product of their ability to swim. 
 This problem is even more acute in the Swampman case. Since Swampman was 
not the result of any selection or design mechanism, it is highly plausible that he lacks 
any kind of ‘design’ plan. As such, Proper Function epistemic theories would predict that 
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his beliefs lack any kind of positive epistemic status. (Functionalist theories about beliefs 
and meaning based on the Selected Effect theories of function may go even further, and 
predict that Swampman even lacks beliefs.) 
 Since the epistemic theory I have developed in this dissertation is based on the 
Boorsean theory of function, and not the Selected Effect family of theories of function, 
these cases may present a problem for my theory, but not as drastic a one as it presents 
for the Proper Function epistemic theories. On the Selected Effect view of function, an 
item has a function because it was selected for. On the Boorsean view of function, an 
item is selected for because it performs a function. Typically, but not always (as the sea-
turtle story illustrates), this selection process explains why that item stably performs that 
function. The ‘demonic’ forces involved in these two cases do present a problem for my 
theory, but it is because this ‘demonic’ interference may interfere with the stability of the 
subject’s cognitive abilities, and not with the fact that these abilities do sometimes 
perform the function of forming true beliefs. 
 I can offer two possible strategies for explaining these two problem cases, which I 
will describe in sub-sections 2 and 3. Both strategies rely on the notion that we are not 
interested in just any possible organism a selection, learning, or design mechanism might 
produce. Instead, we are interested only in the possible products of such a mechanism 
that are, in some sense, the ‘same’ as the epistemic agent in the actual world. 
 The first of these two strategies, which I will discuss in sub-section 2, is a 
“heaping” strategy. While the artificial envatted brain is not the same agent as its 
unenvatted normal human counterpart, and Swampman is not the same agent as 
Davidson, it still seems that the envatted brain and Swampman are the same kind of agent 
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as their normal human counterparts. This strategy will be of more use in providing a 
solution to the Artificial Brain-in-a-Vat case than in providing a solution to the 
Swampman case. 
 The second strategy, which I will discuss in Section 3, is a “splitting” strategy. 
This strategy relies on the claim that a shared origin is an insufficient condition for agent-
identity. This strategy will be of more use of providing a solution to the Swampman case 
than in providing a solution to the Artificial Brain-in-a-Vat case. 
 
1. Reasons for the Impossibility of Maximally Strong but Unjustified Beliefs 
 As mentioned in the introduction to this part, there is an apparent danger that my 
proposed account of a belief’s epistemic strength may yield the prediction that it is 
possible to have a belief whose epistemic strength is maximal but which, nonetheless, 
fails to be justified. In this section, I will argue that my proposed account does not yield 
this prediction. In order to reach this conclusion, I must either demonstrate that, for any 
unjustified belief, 1) there is at least one logically possible alternative that the relevant 
belief-forming mechanism fails to eliminate, or 2) there is some other reason why the 
unjustified belief fails to have an epistemic position that is maximally strong. 
 While there is at least one extreme case I am aware of in which I will have to 
resort to strategy 2), strategy 1) is more powerful and covers more ground than it may 
initially appear. That is because, for a given doxastically possible but logically impossible 
alternative that a given belief-forming mechanism fails to eliminate, there is typically at 
least one corresponding, but not identical, ‘absolutely’ possible world that it also fails to 
eliminate. 
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 To illustrate this, I will turn to Keith DeRose’s Rule of Sensitivity, which he first 
proposed in his 1995 paper, “Solving the Skeptical Problem.”139 This Rule states that 
“when it is asserted that some subject S knows (or does not know) some proposition P, 
the standards tend to be raised, if need be, to such a level as to require S’s belief in that 
particular P to be sensitive for it to count as knowledge.”140 This Rule is intended to 
provide an explanation for why certain kinds of skeptical arguments are so persuasive, to 
serve as a replacement for Robert Nozick’s sensitivity condition for knowledge, and to 
serve as at least a partial replacement for a Lewis-style “rule of accommodation” about 
knowledge. 
 Nozick’s sensitivity condition for knowledge claims that S knows that p only if, if 
p were not true, S would not believe p (or at least not believe p on the same basis as S 
believes p in the actual world). Or, to formulate this condition in terms of possible world 
semantics, S knows that p only if, in the nearest world (or worlds) where p is false, S 
would not believe p (or at least not believe p on the same basis as S believes p in the 
actual world.  
As DeRose recognizes, Nozick’s sensitivity condition does provide an 
explanation of why we do not know certain ‘skeptical’ propositions, such as “I will not 
win the lottery,” are true, even though we do know ‘ordinary’ propositions that entail 
these propositions, such as, “I will not be able to afford to go on that African safari this 
year.” This is because our belief in ‘skeptical’ proposition is not sensitive –in the nearest 
world where you did win or will win the lottery, there would be no difference in the 
                                                     
139 Keith DeRose, “Solving the Skeptical Problem,” The Philosophical Review, Vol. 104, No. 1 (Jan., 
1995), pp 1-52. 
140 DeRose, “Solving the Skeptical Problem,” p 36. 
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evidence available to you. So, if you believed that you would not win the lottery on the 
basis of this available evidence, you would still have this belief in the nearest world 
where this proposition is false. By contrast, in the nearest world where you could afford 
that African safari, there would presumably be some difference in the evidence available 
to you – such as the balance of your bank account – that would cause you to give up the 
belief that you could not afford the safari. 
As DeRose also recognizes, this explanation does come at a high cost: if 
sensitivity is a necessary condition for knowledge, then knowledge is not closed over 
known entailment. By proposing a Rule of Sensitivity about conversational context 
instead of a sensitivity condition for knowledge, DeRose avoids this problem: Given this 
Rule, knowledge is closed over known entailment, but introducing ‘skeptical’ 
propositions into a conversation tends to expand the set of worlds that are J-relevant to 
include the nearest worlds where these propositions are false. This tends to destroy 
knowledge of ‘ordinary’ propositions that entail these ‘skeptical’ propositions.  
DeRose does not explicitly recognize this, but converting Nozick’s sensitivity 
condition for knowledge into a rule about which worlds are relevant for justification and 
knowledge attributions also provides a possible solution to a second problem the 
sensitivity condition faces. Like the conditions that Lewis’ theory postulate for 
knowledge and Sosa’s safety condition for knowledge, Nozick’s sensitivity condition for 
knowledge is trivially satisfied in cases where the believed proposition is necessarily true. 
In these cases, there is no objectively possible world where the believed proposition is 
false, so the antecedent of Nozick’s conditional is never satisfied. But it is highly 
plausible that the set of J-relevant worlds consists of some sub-set of doxastically 
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possible worlds, and it may be doxastically possible for an objectively necessary truth to 
be false.141 I will return to this point momentarily.  
DeRose’s Rule of Sensitivity is also intended to provide a replacement for the 
kind of “rule of accommodation” proposed by David Lewis in Lewis’ 1979 paper, 
“Scorekeeping in a Language Game.”142 According to Lewis, rules of accommodation 
operate in many spheres of discourse that contain context-sensitive terms. These rules 
specify that when a statement is made that contains such a term, then the conversational 
score tends to change, if needed, in order to make that statement true. (Lewis’ Rule of 
Attention, as given in “Elusive Knowledge,” could be interpreted as a knowledge-specific 
rule of accommodation.) As DeRose notes, this general tendency does not apply to 
knowledge attributions. Merely disagreeing with a knowledge claim (responding to a 
claim “I know I have hands” with “No, you don’t!) does not generally expand the set of 
knowledge-relevant alternatives in such a way as to make the knowledge claim false. 
Instead, providing a reason why the proposition which a speaker claims to know (“You 
don’t know you have hands because you don’t know you’re not a handless Brain-in-a-
Vat”) does tend to expand the set of knowledge-relevant alternatives in this way.143 
 Because DeRose’s Rule of Sensitivity gives a clear guideline as to what 
possibilities are knowledge and justification relevant, we can use it to explore what 
                                                     
141 A third objection that is often aimed at Nozick’s sensitivity condition, as well as Sosa’s safety condition, 
is that they both require applying a distance metric to possible worlds. It is unclear which distance metric is 
relevant to the epistemic project, or if such a distance metric is even possible. Applying Nozick’s 
sensitivity condition to ‘doxastically’ possible worlds may well aggravate this problem. 
142 David Lewis, “Scorekeeping in a Language Game,” Journal of Philosophical Logic 8 (1979): p 339-59. 
143 DeRose, “Solving the Skeptical Problem,” p 9. I would note that the “tends” term is very important here. 
Unless we are willing to allow that Richard Nixon could plausibly claim that he did not know the 
Watergate break-in was going to happen on the grounds that, for all he knew, he was a Brain-in-a-Vat, 
there must be an additional Rule that can sometimes re-contract the set of knowledge-relevant worlds, 
despite this general tendency. 
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happens when the ‘doxastic’ possibility that an objectively necessary truth becomes J-
relevant. Let’s say that a math student has constructed a proof that relies on Fermat’s Last 
Theorem as a premise. Her teacher tells her, “Very good. But what if Fermat’s Last 
Theorem is false?” Given DeRose’s Rule of Sensitivity, the falsity of Fermat’s Last 
Theorem becomes J-relevant at this point. And, of course, since Fermat’s Last Theorem 
has been proven to be true, this Theorem is necessarily true. But it is still objectively 
possible for the math student to form some belief on the same basis as she believes 
Fermat’s Last Theorem in the actual world. For example, she may have heard about the 
proof for Fermat’s Last Theorem second-hand. It is objectively possible (though, 
presumably, not probable) that this reporting channel got its story wrong. Or perhaps the 
student did go over the proof herself, but there could have been a mistake in this proof, 
and the proof would have falsely concluded that Fermat’s Last Theorem is false or 
unprovable. (The proof, after all, is hundreds of pages long and was originally, if I recall 
correctly, computer generated.) If the math student generalized her proof so that it did not 
rely on the Theorem, that would eliminate these objective possibilities, and she would be 
in a stronger epistemic position with regards towards her conclusion. 
While a central claim of reliabilism is that the subject need not have any reflective 
access into how a belief-forming mechanism works in order for beliefs produced by that 
mechanism to have some positive epistemic status for the subject, it is still the case that 
the more reflective access the subject has into the workings of the mechanism, the better 
able the subject will be to compensate for possible failures of the mechanism. Typically, 
it would be impossible for the extended activation type of a belief-forming mechanism to 
be perfectly reliable – to eliminate all logically possible alternatives to the beliefs it 
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produces to be true – unless it is also doxastically impossible, relative to the subject, for 
that mechanism to fail. Belief-forming mechanisms that are perfectly reliable in this 
manner include the cogito, and may arguably include the mechanisms responsible for 
forming our beliefs about our perceptual states. 
Nevertheless, it is possible to construct at least one scenario in which a belief-
forming mechanism with a perfectly reliable extended activation type exists, but it is 
‘doxasitically’ possible, relative to the subject, that it would fail.   
 Let’s say that there exists, by objective necessity, an Intelligent Designer that is 
omnipotent and omniscient. Let’s further say that, by objective necessity, It has certain 
psychological traits. These psychological traits (again, by objective necessity) lead this 
Designer to will that certain epistemic agents have a perfect belief-forming mechanism of 
some sort. (Perhaps this mechanism always and only outputs the belief that the Designer 
exists.) This perfect belief-forming mechanism does not merely form only true beliefs 
only when it is working as Designed. The psychology of this Designer leads It (by 
objective necessity) to ensure that the maintenance type of this belief-forming mechanism 
is also perfect. Given all of this, then, by objective necessity, this perfect belief-forming 
mechanism will never deviate from its divinely mandated perfection. With all of this said, 
though, this Intelligent Designer does not find it necessary to give the epistemic agents 
that receive this blessed belief-forming mechanism any insight into their gift. (This 
oversight may be merely a contingent truth.) As a result, it is objectively impossible for 
this perfect belief-forming mechanism to produce a false belief, despite any corruption 
the mortal world may throw its way. But, for the epistemic agents that receive it, its 
failure remains a doxastic possibility. 
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 In this extreme case, I admit that the agent’s belief that the agent’s belief that the 
Designer exists is unjustified, even though the belief-forming mechanism responsible for 
this belief does indeed eliminate all objectively possible alternatives to this belief being 
true. So, I must turn to other methods in order to explain why the epistemic position of 
the agent’s belief is not maximally strong. 
 This case does remind me of another case that presents a problem for reliabilism:  
Truetemp: “Suppose a person, whom we shall name Mr. 
Truetemp, undergoes brain surgery by an experimental 
surgeon who invents a small device which is both a very 
accurate thermometer and a computational device capable 
of generating thoughts. The device, call it a tempucomp, is 
implanted in Truetemp’s head, so that the very tip of the 
device, no larger than the head of a pin, sits unnoticed on 
his scalp and acts as a sensor to transmit information about 
the temperature to the computational system in his brain. 
This device, in turn, sends a message to his brain causing 
him to think of the temperature recorded by the external 
sensor. Assume that the tempucomp is very reliable, and so 
his thoughts are correct temperature thoughts. All told, this 
is a reliable belief-forming process. Now imagine, finally, 
that he has no idea that the tempucomp has been inserted 
into his brain, is only slightly puzzled about why he thinks 
so obsessively about the temperature, but never checks a 
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thermometer to determine whether these thoughts about the 
temperature are correct. He accepts them unreflectively, 
another effect of the tempucomp. Thus, he thinks and 
accepts that the temperature is 104 degrees. It is. Does he 
know that it is? Surely not.”144 
The Truetemp case provides an example of the Strange and Fleeting Process 
Problem that faces reliablism. The standard move that many reliabilist theories take in 
response to this problem is to claim that reliability is a necessary but insufficient 
condition for the positive epistemic status relevant to that theory. For example, John 
Greco’s trait-virtue (or, more accurately, ability-based) theory of knowledge claims that 
knowledge can only result from a reliable cognitive ability. Greco responds to Strange 
and Fleeting Process Problem cases by claiming that, in order for a belief-forming 
mechanism to be a cognitive ability, it must be a stable and constitutive part of the 
agent’s cognitive character. The kinds of belief-forming processes involved in Strange 
and Fleeting Process Problem cases fail at least one of these conditions, and so fail to be a 
cognitive ability.145 
 Sadly, at least in his book Achieving Knowledge, Greco’s account of what it is for 
a mechanism to be a stable part of an agent’s cognitive character is embryonic, and his 
account of what it is for a mechanism to be a constitutive part of an agent’s character is 
non-existent. However, the skill-based model I have developed in this dissertation (which 
is inspired, in great part, by Greco’s work) may be able to help on at least one of those 
                                                     
144 Keith Lehrer, Theory of Knowledge, Westview Press, 1990, p 163-4. 
145 John Greco, Achieving Knowledge, p 150ff. 
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points: As I will discuss in the next chapter, belief-forming mechanisms with reliable 
extended activation types tend to be stable parts of their agent’s cognitive character in 
Greco’s sense.  
However, the belief-forming mechanisms involved in the Intelligent Designer and 
Truetemp cases do have reliable extended activation types. What seems to me to be the 
crucial feature in these two cases is that the agent has no ability to modify the relevant 
belief-forming mechanism. Might these belief-forming mechanisms also fail to be 
constitutive parts of the agents’ cognitive characters in Greco’s sense? 
 What I would like to suggest is that, in order for a mechanism to be a constitutive 
part of an agent’s cognitive character, the agent must have some ability to modify that 
mechanism. This ability may be limited. For example, the character Kumar, at least early 
in the Harold and Kumar series of movies, has a great natural talent as a doctor, but 
actively desires to not be an excellent doctor, since he believes that it is too stereotypical 
for an Indian to be a doctor. This desire has no effect on his natural talent. However, if 
Kumar applied himself, he could further perfect this natural talent. 
 It does seem that some of our knowledge is the product of natural abilities that 
have not been affected by any process of self-modification. But I believe that, in these 
cases, we could modify those natural abilities if we were properly motivated. Our 
capacity to modify our own natural abilities affects the reliability of the extended 
activation type of those abilities. Typically, this capacity promotes the reliability of our 
natural abilities. In some rare cases, it degrades it. If our natural cognitive abilities are 
reliable because we have not yet modified them (perhaps because we have not yet been 
properly motivated), then this might be sufficient for these abilities to produce 
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knowledge. But it is another issue if these abilities are reliable because we are unable to 
modify them (even when properly motivated). 
 If this suggestion is true, then the epistemic positions of the unjustified beliefs in 
the Truetemp and Intelligent Designer cases are not maximally strong. But this is not 
because the relevant belief-forming mechanism failed to eliminate some absolutely 
possible world. Instead, because the belief in question was not created by a cognitive 
ability of the agent, but by an external force acting on the agent’s cognition, the belief 
lacks any true epistemic position in the first place. I would suggest that the belief would 
have an epistemic position of some strength if its creation was overdetermined - if there 
exists a world where the agent would form the belief via a cognitive ability, even if the 
external force were not active. (Evaluating this counterfactual may be problematic in the 
Intelligent Designer case if being blessed by the Designer in the manner we have 
discussed is a necessary condition for being that agent.) 
 Another factor that might affect whether or not a mechanism is a constituent part 
of an agent’s cognitive character is how well integrated that mechanism is with the rest of 
the agent’s cognitive character. In other words, even if the agent is unable to modify the 
mechanism itself, it may be possible for the mechanism to become a part of the agent’s 
cognitive character if the agent is able to modify the rest of her character to fit it. For 
example, if the agent was able to resist forming beliefs based on the Tru-Temp module or 
Intelligently Designed module until such time as the agent adjusted his defeater and 
preemption mechanisms to account for these modules’ observed reliability, it would be 
much more plausible that these modules could become integrated into the agent’s 
cognitive character. 
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 Given this account of a belief’s epistemic strength, the unjustified belief in the 
Intelligent Designer case failed to have a maximally strong epistemic position because it 
failed to have any epistemic position, due to its creation by an external force acting on the 
agent’s cognition, rather than by any cognitive ability of the agent. In all cases less 
extreme than the Intelligent Designer case, I believe that any unjustified belief would fail 
to have a maximally strong epistemic position, since the belief-forming mechanism 
responsible for producing the belief would fail to eliminate at least one logically possible 
world. If this is true, then this account a belief’s epistemic strength satisfies at least one 
adequacy condition for any such account - this account does not predict that an 
unjustified belief could be maximally strong. 
 
2. The Artificial Brain-in-a-Vat and the “Heaping” Strategy 
 In the introduction to this part, I described two cases that may present a problem 
for my proposed account of epistemic strength, both of which involve a ‘demonic’ force 
interfering with the creation of the agent itself. The root of the potential problem in both 
of these cases is that I have claimed that the set of worlds that is relevant for determining 
the absolute reliability of a belief-forming mechanism is limited to the set of objectively 
possible worlds in which the agent using the mechanism is somehow the ‘same’ as the 
agent in the actual world.  
In this section, I will address the first of these two cases, the Artificial Brain-in-a-
Vat case. This case is problematic because, intuitively, while the Artificial Brain-in-a-Vat 
lacks perceptual knowledge, it is equally justified in these beliefs as its normal human 
counterpart. The Artificial Brain-in-a-Vat’s lack of knowledge can be explained by its 
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epistemic situation. Its perceptual belief-forming mechanisms may be ‘reliable’ in some 
sense, but they fail to be locally reliable in the environment of the vat, unlike those of its 
normal human counterpart. The intuition that the Artificial Brain-in-a-Vat is justified in 
its perceptual beliefs is compatible with my proposed account of epistemic strength – it 
seems highly plausible that the set of worlds that are J-relevant are the same for both the 
Artificial Brain-in-a-Vat and its normal human counterpart, and that the perceptual 
beliefs of both epistemic agents are epistemically strong enough to eliminate all of them.  
What makes this case problematic is that it appears that the perceptual belief-
forming mechanisms of the Artificial Brain-in-a-Vat and its normal human counterpart 
do not have the same degree of absolute reliability. Worlds do exist in which the 
Artificial Brain-in-a-Vat would be highly reliable in forming perceptual beliefs (for 
example, those worlds in which the Brain was implanted in a human, or at least 
humanoid, body at some point after its creation). There also exist worlds in which the 
normal human would be highly unreliable in forming perceptual beliefs (for example, 
those worlds in which the normal human’s brain was removed from its body and 
envatted). But given the difference in how these two agents came into being, it seems 
highly plausible that the set of absolutely possible worlds in which the Artificial Brain-in-
a-Vat would be reliable in forming perceptual beliefs is not as large as the set of 
absolutely possible worlds in which the normal human counterpart would be reliable in 
forming perceptual beliefs. Given my claim that a belief is epistemically strong just to the 
extent that the mechanism responsible for forming it is absolutely reliable, and my 
account of what absolute reliability means, this yields the counter-intuitive prediction 
that, while both the Artificial Brain-in-a-Vat and its normal human counterpart are 
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justified in their perceptual beliefs, the Artificial Brain-in-a-Vat is not as justified in its 
perceptual beliefs as its normal human counterpart. 
 One possible approach towards providing an explanation of this case suggested 
itself to me when I noticed that, while the Artificial Brain-in-a-Vat and its normal human 
counterpart are not the same agent, they are the same kind of agent – they both share the 
‘same’ kind of cognitive character. 
What I would like to suggest is that being a certain kind of agent, or possessing a 
certain kind of cognitive character, is something like being a member of a biological 
species. According to the modern definition of species, at least as it is promulgated by 
evolutionary biologists such as Ernst Mayr, a species is a population of individual 
organisms which are capable of fertilely interbreeding. Complete functional equivalence 
with other members of a species is a sufficient but not necessary condition for 
membership in that species. (If complete functional equivalence were a necessary 
condition, then evolution by natural selection, which relies on differential reproductive 
success between variant traits, would be unable to operate.)  
In practice, all members of a species share common descent – they are all 
descendants of the same interbreeding population. It would be difficult, to the point of 
practical impossibility, for natural evolution to be so convergent that descendants of two 
populations that were completely reproductively isolated for their entire histories could 
become able to fertilely interbreed. But, in principle, it would be possible. It could also be 
possible that a completely de novo organism that is the product of intelligent design or a 
cosmically improbably accident could find itself able to fertilely interbreed with an 
existing species. 
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 The heaping strategy is based on the notion that something like this happened in 
the Swampman and artificial envatted brain cases. Even though these epistemic agents 
were not produced by the same selection, learning, or design mechanisms that produced 
their normal counterparts, they are functionally equivalent to those counterparts. And this 
functional equivalence may be enough to be the same ‘kind’ of epistemic agent as their 
normal counterparts. If this type of epistemic agent is epistemically relevant, then this 
might suggest that the beliefs of the artificial envatted brain have the same degree of 
strength as those of its normal human counterpart – the belief-forming mechanisms of the 
‘demon’-created agent belong to the same extended activation type as those of their 
normal counterparts, despite being produced by radically different selection, learning, 
and/or design mechanisms. 
Functional equivalence is almost certainly not a necessary condition for belonging 
to the relevant type of epistemic agent. Just to give one example, if Millicent did have the 
surgery that she believe she had in the Lying Neurologist case, she would no longer be 
functionally equivalent to the actual Millicent. But the two versions of Millicent would 
still be the same type of epistemic agent. It is unclear how much far this could extend. In 
biology, two populations belong to the same species so long as they are functionally 
equivalent enough that they are still capable of fertilely interbreeding. I have no ideas to 
offer at present about what kind of equivalence would be a necessary condition for 
belonging to the same agent or character type. 
 One feature of functional equivalence is that a certain kind of reflective 
equivalence is a necessary but insufficient condition for it. If two epistemic agents have 
exactly the ‘same’ cognitive character, they should have exactly the same sensory 
206 
 
experience when exposed to the same sensory environment. Or, there may be some minor 
differences in their sensory experiences, but these differences must be causally inert – 
they should produce no differences in the Knowledge of the Result yielded by the 
‘detector’ components of the various learning mechanisms, and should produce no 
differences in what belief-forming mechanisms are activated. 
 The fact that reflective equivalence is insufficient condition for functional 
equivalence can be demonstrated by the following case: Let’s say that an inmate of an 
insane asylum believes that he is Napoleon Bonaparte. Furthermore, this inmate has 
studied the life of Bonaparte so closely that, if Bonaparte was resurrected, their explicit, 
reflectively accessible memories would match exactly. But, unless this inmate has also 
replicated Bonaparte’s procedural memories, they would not have the same kind of 
epistemic characters. The inmate’s military judgments would not have the same degree of 
epistemic strength as the resurrected Bonaparte’s would. 
 There are, of course, some drawbacks to this approach. The most obvious one is 
that we seem to have solved one generality problem (that of specifying the epistemically 
relevant type of belief-forming mechanism), only to have replaced it with a further one 
(that of specifying the epistemically relevant type of cognitive character). If so, then this 
may still represent a kind of progress.  
One worrying possibility is that there may be no objective way of specifying the 
relevant type of cognitive character. It may turn out to be the case that a possible 
epistemic agent may have the same epistemically relevant type of cognitive character as 
the actual epistemic agent just if the actual epistemic agent actually is that possible 
epistemic agent becomes a J-relevant possibility. The Bonaparte case may suggest that 
207 
 
this worry is an unnecessary one. 
 In the case of species-identity, perfect functional equivalence is a sufficient but 
unnecessary condition for two populations of organisms to belong to the same species. 
But it is at least clear what kind of imperfect functional equivalence is a necessary 
condition for being of the same biologically relevant type – the two populations must be 
functionally equivalent enough to be able to fertilely interbreed. This condition is, of 
course, a vague one. Horse and donkeys are generally considered to be separate species, 
but, from time to time, the rare fertile jenny is born. Likewise, species-identity is not a 
transitive property, as the phenomenon of ring-species demonstrates: In North America, 
western wolves can fertilely interbreed with eastern wolves, and eastern wolves can 
fertilely interbreed with coyotes, but coyotes and western wolves cannot fertilely 
interbreed. But this defining characteristic of species-identity (ability to fertilely 
interbreed), as vague as it is, has no obvious counterpart in the question of character-type-
identity. 
 It may be tempting to simply drop the claim that a belief-forming mechanism 
must be operated by the ‘same’ epistemic agent in order for that possible use of the 
mechanism to count for or against its absolute reliability. On that approach, we could 
accept that being of the same extended activation type is a sufficient condition for a 
mechanism to belong to the same epistemically relevant type, and a necessary one if two 
mechanism-tokens are being used by the same agent. In that case, we would ‘merely’ 
need to look for a principled way of determining whether or not mechanism-tokens being 
used by completely different agents belong to the same epistemically relevant type. But I 
would warn against that approach. The absolute reliability of a given belief-forming 
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mechanism is crucially dependent on other mechanisms (pre-emption mechanisms, 
defeater mechanisms, learning mechanisms, etc.) to the extent that measuring the 
absolute reliability of a given mechanism would be virtually meaningless unless the over-
arching cognitive system that contains it remains more-or-less invariant. 
 
3. Swampman and the “Splitting” Strategy 
 The second problem case involving the ‘demonic’ creation of an epistemic agent 
that I will address is that of Swampman. In the Swampman case, my intuitions report that 
Swampman does have perceptual knowledge, but that his epistemic position regarding his 
perceptual beliefs is perhaps not as strong as Davidson’s. (My intuitions are not clear on 
this second point, and may have become corrupted by my theory. I will leave my readers 
to judge this for themselves.) The main reason this case is problematic is that the cosmic 
accident that brought Swampman into existence could have easily come out otherwise – 
instead of coming into being as an atom-for-atom replica of Davidson, Swampman could 
have come out as an atom-for-atom replica of Mr. Magoo, or, worse and far more 
probable, an inanimate and slightly scorched lump of swamp-muck. 146 
 The strategy I will use to explain this case is a “splitting” strategy. The key to this 
strategy is that not all of the possible organisms that could be produced by a given 
selection, learning, or design mechanism are the same agent as the organism that 
mechanism produced in the actual world. For example, it makes little sense to ask what 
                                                     
146 For those readers who are not fully informed about 20th Century American popular culture, Mr. Magoo 
was the protagonist of a number of animated shorts. He was an elderly man who was in denial about his 
nearly complete blindness, but despite this handicap, managed to succeed in every situation (and frustrate 
those who attempted to cheat him or mistreat him) through sheer blind luck. An excellent case study for 
those interested in the question of why knowledge is more valuable than mere true belief! 
209 
 
you would have become if the fertilized egg that became you had instead been fertilized 
by the second sperm to the left – the result of this variation would not have been an other-
worldly version of you, but your other-worldly sibling. But it does make sense, I think, to 
ask what you would be like if you had been born as a member of the opposite sex, or with 
Down’s Syndrome, or with a single-point mutation. (Note that all of these possible 
organisms belong to the same selection type – they are all organisms that could have been 
produced by your parents mating, under the aegis of the selection mechanism provided by 
evolution by natural selection.) 
 Similarly, I once wondered which side of the American Civil War I would have 
supported if I had been raised in ante bellum Missouri. I quickly realized that the question 
was meaningless – if I had been raised in ante bellum Missouri, I would not have the 
same moral character as I do now, and I would not be the same person. The difference 
between me and that possible self would be so extreme that we would no longer be the 
same person – that version of me would simply be my identical twin, displaced in time 
and space. 
As mentioned above, it is possible that the cosmic accident that was responsible 
for producing an atom-for-atom copy of Donald Davidson in the actual world could have, 
instead, produced an atom-for-atom copy of Mr. Magoo. My intuitions suggest that 
Magoo-Swampman is not the same agent as Davidson-Swampman, and (less clearly) that 
the possible epistemic failures of Magoo-Swampman should not count against Davidson-
Swampman. 
 There are, of course, less drastic variations between possible Swampmen, and 
some of these variations would, I think, be the same agent as our Davidson-Swampman. 
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For example, Swampman could have come out of the accident with color-blindness, but 
otherwise identical to Davidson. It might take this Swampman a long time to realize that 
he had this sensory handicap. But how long it would take Swampman to realize this 
would be a function of how powerful the various error-detectors contained by his 
learning mechanisms are, and just how unreliable his belief-forming mechanisms are as a 
result of this disability. If this possible Swampman were anything like our Davidson-
Swampman, there would generally be a limit to how long he could remain massively 
deceived.147  
 Since it is presumably more likely that Davidson-Swampman could have come 
into being with color-blindness than Davidson himself could have come into being with 
color-blindness, this does suggest that Swampman’s perceptual beliefs are not as 
epistemically strong as those of Davidson’s. This result, while it may not fully cohere 
with my intuitions, at least does not conflict with them. After all, Swampman shares 
many beliefs with Davidson which do not amount to knowledge since they are false – 
Swampman, despite what he believes, is not married to Davidson’s wife. Swampman’s 
perceptual beliefs may be on more solid ground, solid enough to amount to knowledge. 
But it may well be that Swampman’s perceptual knowledge is mere knowledge (or close 
to it), and the epistemic positions of Swampman with regard to his perceptual beliefs are 
                                                     
147 The color blind are actually highly reliable at judging color based on properties other than hue, even 
though they are less reliable than the normally sighted. This ability can be compared to the ability of the 
normally sighted to reliably judge color in low-light conditions. This is why it is so difficult to know that 
you are color blind. I had the privilege of being present when a friend of mine first realized, at the age of 
twenty-one, that he might be color-blind. He complained to me that the colors Microsoft Office uses to 
highlight errors detected by its spell-checker (red) and grammar-checker (green) were highly similar. I 
pointed out to him that, for most people, those two colors are highly distinct (since they are of very 
different hues). Since these highlights differed from each other only by hue, it was very difficult for my 
friend to distinguish them, despite his ability to distinguish colors in other contexts, based on properties 
other than hue. 
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not as strong as those of Davidson’s. While this weakness may be partially explained by 
the difference in Swampman and Davidson’s epistemic situations, it may also be partially 
explained by the difference in the epistemic strength of their perceptual beliefs. 
 
 Section 5: 
Conclusion 
 In this chapter, I have developed a reliabilistic account of a belief’s epistemic 
strength. According to this account, a belief is epistemically strong just to the extent that 
the belief-producing ability or skill that produced it has a high overall reliability rating 
across a large set of objectively possible worlds, such as the set of all logically possible 
worlds in which the belief-forming ability or skill and the epistemic agent that possesses 
it can be said to exist. I have demonstrated that this account of the strength of a belief’s 
epistemic position explains two variants of the New Evil Demon Problem, and I have 
suggested two strategies that may be able to explain a third variant. I have also proposed 
one adequacy condition for any account of the strength of a belief’s epistemic position, 
and have argued that my proposed account satisfies it. 
 In the next chapter, I will demonstrate that the theory of knowledge I have 
developed in this dissertation can provide solutions to several Strange and Fleeting 
Process and other problem cases which, for one reason or another, are especially difficult. 
  
212 
 
 
Chapter 4 
Strange and Fleeting Process Problems 
 
0. Introduction 
 The Strange and Fleeting Process Problem facing reliabilism consists of a set of 
problem cases involving belief-forming processes that appear to be reliable, but 
intuitively fail to produce justified beliefs, since the processes involved are also ‘strange’ 
or ‘fleeting.’ A standard tactic which reliabilists have used to explain these cases is to 
claim that reliability is a necessary but insufficient condition for knowledge or 
justification, and that the beliefs formed by the kinds of processes involved in Strange 
and Fleeting Process Problem Cases fail to satisfy this further requirement for knowledge 
or justification.  
 In Achieving Knowledge, John Greco proposes that knowledge can only be 
produced by a cognitive ability. In order to be a cognitive ability, a belief-forming 
mechanism must be a stable and constitutive part of an agent’s cognitive character.148 The 
kinds of belief-forming processes involved in Strange and Fleeting Process Problem 
cases tend to not be ones that satisfy these conditions for being a cognitive ability. 
 In the previous chapter, I used Greco’s claim that a cognitive ability must be a 
constitutive part of its agent’s cognitive character in order to explain the Intelligent 
Designer case. In Chapter 2, I demonstrated how my proposed solution to the Generality 
Problem also explains some Strange and Fleeting Process Problem cases, such as the 
                                                     
148 John Greco, Achieving Knowledge, Cambridge University Press, 2010, pp 149-155. 
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Serendipitous Brain Lesion Case. The basic strategy used to explain these cases is that, 
while the belief-forming mechanism in question may belong to a ‘commonsense’ type 
that is reliable, the extended activation type it belongs to is unreliable. This explanation is 
compatible with Greco’s since belief-forming mechanisms with reliable extended 
activation types also tend to be ‘stable’ parts of their agent’s cognitive characters, roughly 
in the sense that Greco intends. 
 In this chapter, I will apply the ‘stable’ strategy to explain several Strange and 
Fleeting Process Problem cases that, for one reason or another, are especially difficult to 
explain. Some of these cases will also provide an opportunity to further refine my 
proposed solution to the Generality Problem. 
 
1. The Case of the Autistic Twins and Environmentally Sensitive Control Programs 
 One Strange and Fleeting Process Problem case actually presents a challenge for 
reliabilistic theories because these theories must explain why the belief-forming process 
involved in it is not a ‘strange’ or ‘fleeting’ process: 
Autistic Twins: “The neurologist Oliver Sacks writes of 
several cases where abnormality and dysfunction increase 
the victim’s cognitive abilities along certain dimensions, 
and, as a result, increase the person’s capacity for relevant 
sorts of knowledge. An obvious example is the story of 
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autistic twins, who enjoyed incredible mathematical 
abilities associated with their autism.”149 
The kinds of abilities that these twins reportedly had as a result of their autism included 
the ability to instantly perceive that there were 111 matchsticks in a pile in much the 
same way that a neuro-typical individual can perceive that there are three matchsticks in a 
pile without actually counting them. The twins were also able to instantly perceive that 
37+37+37=111, a fact that amused the twins since 37 is a prime number. 
 This case is intended to be a counterexample for the Proper Function family of 
epistemic theories. These epistemic theories explain Strange and Fleeting Process 
Problem cases by claiming that, in order to produce knowledge, a cognitive faculty must 
be properly functioning. But, in the case of the autistic twins, it appears that the twins 
have greater mathematic knowledge than their neuro-typical counterparts, and this is 
because their cognition is dysfunctional (or at least atypical), not despite this cognitive 
dysfunction. 
 Since this case involves a developmental abnormality, our model of ‘skill-
learning’ requires a more nuanced view of development in order to explain it. In previous 
chapters, I have claimed that the developmental program provided by our genomes can be 
modeled as a simple control program. The function of a simple control program is to 
ensure that all the items produced by different activations of the program closely 
resemble each other. It is the function of the selection, learning, or design mechanism that 
produced the simple control program to ensure that the products of the simple control 
program are well-fitted to the environment they find themselves in. 
                                                     
149 John Greco, Achieving Knowledge, p 151. 
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 While this model of development is sufficient for many applications, Richard 
Lewontin has criticized a model of biological development that is identical to it, or at 
least very similar to it, as being overly simple. Lewontin depicts this model in two ways. 
First, this model sees the development of an organism as an ‘unfolding,’ much like the 
development of a photographic film. It is necessary to apply various chemicals in order to 
get the image to appear, but the development of the image is just an unfolding of 
information already contained in the film. This model can also compare the development 
of an organism to the execution of a program on a computer. A third metaphor that this 
model could use is to compare the development of an organism to the manufacture of an 
artifact according to a blueprint (or a design plan). 
 More specifically, this ‘unfolding’ model of development sees the life history 
pattern of an organism’s development as “a regular sequence of stages through which the 
developing system passes, the successful completion of one stage being the signal and 
condition for passing to the next stage.”150  
This model of development allows the environment to play two roles in the 
process of development. First, some environmental trigger may be necessary to start the 
process of development. For example, the seeds of a desert plant may need to be 
moistened by rain before they sprout. We can compare this environmental trigger to the 
conditions that activate a given belief-forming program in our skill-based model of 
belief-formation.  
                                                     
150 Richard Lewontin, The Triple Helix: Gene, Organism, and Environment, Harvard University Press, 
2000, p 12. 
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Secondly, once a process has started, some environmental conditions must exist in 
order for the internally programmed stages of development to ‘unfold.’ Lewontin 
compares this to how a photographic film requires the correct chemical bath in order to 
develop, but the chemical bath does not alter the shape of the final image. In our skill-
based model of belief-formation, this role the environment can play in development can 
be captured by the notion that the execution of a simple control program can vary due to 
environmental interference that the simple control program is unable to overcome. 
Lewontin offers three objections to this model of development. First, internally 
fixed successive stages are a common feature of biological development, but they are not 
universal. For example, the stages in which some tropical rain forests vines develop are 
determined spatially, not temporally – the phenotype a vine displays is determined by 
whether it is growing along the ground, or climbing up a tree, or growing over a log, etc., 
etc.151 This objection does not deeply affect our model of skill-learning, since the 
conditions which trigger the execution of a skill could just as easily be part of the external 
environment as the completion of some internal process. 
Lewontin’s second objection to the ‘unfolding’ model of development is that the 
organism is not specified by its genes, but is a unique outcome of a process that is 
contingent on the sequence of environments in which it occurs. This can be illustrated by 
the ‘norms of reactions’ of organisms, which are graphs that plot the phenotypic features 
of organisms of a particular genotype develop as a function of the developmental 
environment. The ‘unfolding’ model of development would predict that the norms of 
reactions for most organisms would tend to be flat. Organisms of a certain genotype 
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would tend to produce a given phenotypic trait more or less often than organisms of other 
genotypes, almost regardless of differences between developmental environments. Any 
correlation between environment and phenotype would be the result of environmental 
interference with the genetically specified process of development. 
But norms of reaction of this kind are very rare.152 Most organisms have norms of 
reaction with complex patterns, which frequently cross the norms of reactions of con-
specifics with other genotypes. (This means that an organism of genotype A is more 
likely than organisms of genotype B to display a certain phenotypic trait in a certain 
developmental environment, but in other developmental environments, this is reversed.) 
For example, a mountain flower with a certain genotype might grow fairly tall in high 
and low altitudes, but much shorter in middle altitudes. The complex patterns of 
interaction between environment and development suggest that the genotype does not 
specify a single ‘natural’ or ‘proper’ phenotype, but an entire norm of reaction.  
Some organisms do display the kind of flat norm of reaction that the ‘unfolding’ 
model of development would predict, but these organisms are the exception, not the rule. 
Often, organisms with flat norms of reaction are the result of human intervention – 
domesticated crops are selected not just for high average yield, but also for consistently 
high yield. More troubling, the model organisms that are widely used in biology (fruit 
flies, laboratory rats and rabbits, etc.) tend to be ones that are easily breed in captivity, 
and are therefore relatively insensitive to changes in developmental environment. This 
suggests that the model organisms used in biological research are not typical organisms. 
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The complex norms of reaction observed in nature also strongly disconfirm two 
other models of development that are closely related to naïve versions of the ‘unfolding’ 
model. The first variant model is that genes determine an organism’s capacity, a limit that 
may or may not be reached depending on how adequate the environment is. According to 
this model, in inadequate environments, all genotypes will suffer, but in an adequate 
environment, genotypes with large capacities will outperform genotypes with small 
capacities. This model would tend to predict that the development of a phenotypic trait is 
sensitive to the environment, but one genotype will almost always be superior to another, 
no matter the environment.153 But the norms of reaction observed in nature, which 
frequently cross each other, only rarely display this pattern. 
The second variant model is that one genotype has a tendency to produce a certain 
trait more than another genotype – that, while under some conditions, the second 
genotype may produce that trait more than the first genotype, under normal conditions 
the first genotype will outperform the other. But Lewontin claims that we are generally 
unable to specify the ‘normal’ environment.154 On the Selected Effect theories of 
function, we might expect that the ‘normal’ environment for a genotype is just ‘the’ 
environment that organisms of that genotype have been selected for. But, even if we 
restrict the range of ‘normal’ environments in this way, that still includes a very large set 
of environments. Even over this range of ‘normal’ environments, the norms of reactions 
of organisms rarely display the pattern the ‘tendency’ model would predict. 
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Lewontin’s third objection to the ‘unfolding’ model of development is that even 
the conjunction of genotype and environment are unable to explain some differences in 
development. For example, fruit flies often develop different numbers of bristles on the 
left side of their bodies than on their right. The two sides of the fruit fly of course share 
the same genotype, and it would be difficult to claim that the two sides of the same fruit 
fly have different developmental environments. This difference in development can be 
explained by a slight random imbalance in how certain intracellular chemical units are 
distributed between the cells that will form the left side and the cells that will form the 
right side during cellular division. This provides an example of what Lewontin calls 
developmental noise – differences in development that cannot be explained by genetic or 
environmental differences.155 
The differences in development caused by differences in the environment and by 
developmental noise are complex, but are not entirely random. The kind of 
developmental plasticity allowed by our genome’s very loose specification of our 
phenotype allows for a phenomenon known as phenotypic accommodation. In phenotypic 
accommodation, an organism develops some fit (but perhaps atypical) phenotype in 
response to novel developmental inputs, including novel genetic inputs (or mutations) 
and novel environmental inputs. This allows organisms to develop phenotypes that are 
relatively well fitted to the environments they develop in, even if organisms of that 
genotype had never previously been exposed to that selective environment. 
A simple example of phenotypic accommodation is how our muscles strengthen 
in response to exercise and atrophy in response to disuse (thereby using less metabolic 
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energy). A more extreme example is provided by a young goat which, due to a congenital 
defect, was born without front legs. This goat taught itself to move by jumping on its hind 
legs. In response to this novel method of locomotion, it developed certain anatomical 
features that are rarely seen in goats, but are often seen in bipedal mammals, such as 
humans and kangaroos.156 
A related process, genetic accommodation, provides an explanation for how an 
acquired skill can become, over evolutionary time, an innate instinct. Due to the 
developmental plasticity allowed by the effects of environment on development, by 
developmental noise, and by phenotypic accommodation, organisms with many different 
genotypes can develop the same phenotypic feature in the same developmental 
environment. For example, many children can learn the same skill at school. However, 
some genotypes produce organisms that are able to develop this phenotypic feature more 
quickly, or more efficiently, or over a greater range of developmental environments. 
These genotypes are selected for, and, over time, in the general population, development 
of that phenotypic trait will occur more quickly and over a greater range of environments. 
Due to this effect, what was originally an acquired skill may become an innate instinct 
that organisms belonging to that population will develop over a wide range of 
developmental environments. There is some speculation that our human capacity for 
speech may have evolved in this way. 
While Lewontin is correct that the ‘unfolding’ model of development needs to be 
abandoned in favor of a more nuanced one, his objections and the complexities revealed 
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221 
 
by the recent evolutionary development revolution in biology can still be captured by the 
metaphor that compares our genome to a computer program that produces an organism as 
its ‘output.’157 The modification that needs to be made is that we must recognize that the 
environment plays more of a role in the execution of this program than just triggering its 
activation or interfering with its ‘proper’ execution. Instead, the developmental program 
provided by our genome is environmentally sensitive – it takes information about the 
developmental environment in which it is executed as input, and this produces 
differences in the final organism ‘outputted’ by the ‘program.’  
This program also, in some cases, allows developmental noise to play a role. This 
increases the diversity of phenotypes produced by a given genotype (or closely related set 
of genotypes), which, in turn, increases the chances that some of the organisms produced 
by this genotype or set of genotypes will find themselves with a fit phenotype when 
exposed to a novel environment. In general, only when selective forces require it does the 
development of certain phenotypic traits become tightly ‘canalized.’ 
This move from modeling developmental programs of organisms as 
environmentally insensitive simple control programs towards modeling them as 
environmentally-sensitive control programs is not only paralleled in the study of skill-
learning, an analogous move in skill-learning actually predates it. In motor-learning, 
Adams’ original closed-loop theory has largely been replaced by Richard Schmidt’s 1975 
schema theory of motor learning. This theory heavily borrows from Adams’, but differs 
in two major ways. First, this theory recognizes that many human movements are 
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it now seems that the genome seems less like a stored computer program, and more like the memory state 
of a computer executing a program. 
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‘ballistic,’ and are completed before any sensory feedback could be received by the 
subject. Hence, the schema theory is an open-loop theory, as opposed to Adams’ closed-
loop theory, which claimed that a motor response is controlled by comparing sensory 
feedback with the memory of how it felt to perform the response provided by the 
perceptual trace. 
Secondly, and more importantly for our purposes here, Schmidt’s schema theory 
replaced the simple control program provided by Adams’ perceptual trace with a 
Generalized Motor Program (a kind of schema). This Generalized Motor Program is 
structured with certain invariant features, but also with parameters that specify the way 
that the program is to be executed for any one particular instance.158 Since the 
information that is inputted into these parameters is gathered from the environment in 
which the program will be executed, Schmidt’s Generalized Motor Program provides an 
example of an environmentally-sensitive control program. 
Anderson’s ACT* theory of cognition also provides an example of an 
environmentally-sensitive control program, since the learning mechanism of action 
discrimination modifies productions so that they take certain features of the environment 
(or at least the contents of working memory) into account in performing slightly different 
actions. 
Unlike the items produce by a simple control program, the different products of 
an environmentally-sensitive control program may not closely resemble each other. 
Instead, the products of an environmentally-sensitive control program will vary in 
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response to environmental differences and ‘developmental’ noise. But these products still 
share the property of being created by the same control program, and are united into a 
single production type based on this property. This sensitivity to the environment 
generally tends to make the control program more reliable in performing its function of 
producing items that are well fitted to their environment. And, thanks to the process of 
phenotypic accommodation, and processes analogous to it, the items produced by an 
environmentally-sensitive control program may find themselves tolerably well-fitted even 
to environments that the control program was never selected for. 
With this addition of environmentally-sensitive control programs added to our 
model of ‘skill-learning,’ we can now provide an explanation of the Autistic Twins case. 
These twins were the product of an environmentally-sensitive developmental control 
program. In response to some novel developmental input, such as a mutation or an 
atypical environmental input, these twins developed the phenotypic trait of autism.159  
If the twins had not been exposed to this novel developmental input, they would 
have developed in a neuro-typical fashion. The phenotype of the autistic twins and these 
neuro-typical counterparts belong to the same production type, since they would all be 
products of the same environmentally-sensitive developmental control program. Even if 
we apply the ‘splitting’ strategy I suggested in the previous chapter, it is at least plausible 
                                                     
159 Since we are speaking of ‘a’ single genetically-encoded developmental ‘program’ reacting to novel 
genetic inputs, it seems that this program is not individuated by the exact pattern of the genes that constitute 
it. The regress of adaptive mechanisms I mentioned in the previous chapter suggests that this program is 
instead individuated by the selection type specified by evolution by natural selection. Since evolution by 
natural selection is unable to act within a single generation, the program provided by the twins’ genotypes 
and that provided by their genetically and neurologically typical counterparts are of the same selection 
type. For that matter, all of the offspring that the twins’ parents could have given birth to could be 
considered as belonging to the same selection type. In the next generation, as genetic differences give rise 
to differences in reproductive success, this single selection type will diverge into different selection types. 
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that a given autistic twin and his neuro-typical counterpart are the ‘same’ epistemic agent, 
and are not merely other-worldly siblings.  
The neuro-typical versions of the autistic twins may well use the same instinctive 
belief-forming mechanisms that the twins use to perform their amazing mathematical 
feats. However, it seems likely that they would only use this instinctive mathematical 
ability when confronted with three or four matchsticks, and would not use this instinctive 
mathematical ability when confronted with a pile of 111 matchsticks. Even if the neuro-
typical twins would form false beliefs if they did apply this ability to large numbers of 
matchsticks, this possible failure does not count against the overall reliability rating of the 
ability, since the twins would not use the ability in that case. 
This difference between the activation conditions of the instinctive mathematical 
ability as used by the autistic twins and the activation conditions of the ‘same’ instinctive 
mathematical ability as used by their neuro-typical counterparts is almost certainly the 
result of some phenotypic-level learning mechanism. (In which case, they belong to the 
same learning type.) But, at least in principle, this difference could be explained purely as 
a result of the same developmental program reacting to two different sets of 
developmental inputs.  
Given either interpretation of the case, we can predict that the belief-forming 
mechanism belonging to the same extended activation type as the instinctive 
mathematical ability used by the twins in the actual world has a high overall reliability 
rating. This is true, even if we include the neuro-typical versions of the twins in this tally. 
Thus, we can predict that the beliefs the twins form using this ability are epistemically 
quite strong. It is highly plausible that the epistemic positions of the autistic twins with 
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regards towards their mathematical beliefs are strong enough to eliminate all J-relevant 
and K-relevant alternatives. As such, we can predict that the twins’ mathematical beliefs 
are justified and amount to knowledge. And this coheres with our intuitions in this case. 
 
2. The Careless Math Student and the Possibility of Multiple Output Activation 
Mechanisms 
 A second, and more standard, Strange and Fleeting Process case is one proposed 
by John Greco. My first reaction to this case was to think that, in order to explain it, we 
would need to posit the possibility of an activation mechanism that could activate a 
selection of belief-forming programs, instead of merely activating a single belief-forming 
mechanism whenever its activation conditions are met. While the skill-based model can, I 
believe, accommodate this kind of activation mechanism, this move does introduce some 
complications. Fortunately, I believe that ACT* provides a way of resolving this 
particular case without making this move (even though this move will, of course, 
probably eventually need to be made). This case is as follows: 
Careless Math Student: “Suppose that S is taking a math 
test and adopts a correct algorithm for solving a problem. 
But suppose that S has no understanding that the algorithm 
is the correct one to use for this problem. Rather, S chooses 
it on a whim, but could just as well have chosen one that is 
incorrect. By hypothesis, the algorithm is the right one, and 
so using it to solve the problem constitutes a reliable 
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process. It seems wrong to say that S thereby knows the 
answer to the problem, however.”160 
 My first instinct in providing an explanation to this case was to think that the key 
to it was that S (let’s call this careless math student Stanley, for the sake of convenience) 
could have easily chosen a different, incorrect algorithm, and that this possibility counts 
as an uneliminated alternative to the truth of Stanley’s answer to the math problem. This 
explanation requires positing that the activation mechanism responsible for applying this 
algorithm could have instead applied some other, incorrect algorithm or belief-forming 
program instead. In turn, this requires positing a class of activation mechanisms that are 
capable of activating multiple belief-forming programs, not just a single one. 
 This kind of activation mechanism has been studied by motor learning scientists. 
They are used, for example, when a subject must select which of several buttons to push 
in response to one of a set of lights comes on.161 So it is not unreasonable to think that the 
skill-based model could accommodate the notion of an activation mechanism that is 
capable of activating multiple belief-forming programs. 
One way our model could accommodate the notion of a multiple-output activation 
mechanism is if we say that all of the belief-forming programs the activation mechanism 
could possibly activate belong to the same activation type, and that the reliability of the 
activation type is determined in part by the ability of the activation mechanism to select 
the appropriate belief-forming program in a given situation.  
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This modification of our model can explain the case of the Careless Math Student. 
Stanley’s “whim” can be modeled as an activation mechanism that did, in the actual 
world, apply an algorithm that was correct for the problem. But this “whim” could have 
just as easily have applied another, incorrect algorithm, and which algorithm was applied 
was a matter of random chance. Thus, while belief-forming mechanisms of the same 
algorithmic type as the algorithm that Stanley applied in the actual world are highly 
reliable when applied to that kind of math problem, the extended activation type of this 
belief-forming mechanism is highly unreliable. This means (according to our theory) that 
Stanley’s answer to the math problem has a weak epistemic position, and it is likely that 
the belief-forming mechanism responsible for it failed to eliminate some J-relevant and 
K-relevant alternatives to the answer being true. 
While this modification to our model does provide an explanation for the case of 
the Careless Math Student, this modification could potentially be problematic if we 
extend our model to cases of deliberate belief-formation. Consider this case, which is 
inspired by a case provided by Robert Nozick162: A dutiful grandson decides to visit his 
grandmother, sees that she is alive and well, and forms a belief on this basis. Intuitively, 
the grandson does know that his grandmother is alive and well. But if he had decided not 
to visit her, and she had died or become ill, others would tell him that she was well in 
order to spare him upset. 
If we apply the modified model to this case, we might come to the conclusion that 
the grandson’s decision to visit his grandmother was an activation mechanism that, in the 
actual world, ultimately triggered a belief-forming program that caused the grandson to 
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form the belief that his grandmother is alive and well on the basis of him seeing her. But 
this activation mechanism could instead have ultimately have caused the grandson to 
form the false belief that she was alive and well on the basis of the testimony of others. 
Since both belief-forming programs would be of the same extended activation type, this 
interpretation would suggest that the grandson does not know that his grandmother is 
alive and well, or at least that his belief that she is relatively weak, epistemically 
speaking. 
In this case, I believe we can explain why this interpretation is incorrect, but this 
possible misinterpretation does illustrate the difficulties of extending the skill-based 
model to deliberate methods of belief-formation. I believe that these difficulties can 
eventually be overcome. After all, deliberation itself is a skill, and it would be surprising 
indeed if the skill-based model could not eventually be extended to cover cases involving 
deliberate belief formation. But it may be that more work is required before the skill-
based model can be extended to all cases of deliberate belief formation. 
In this case, though, I think we can explain why the above interpretation of this 
case is incorrect by distinguishing between deliberate mechanisms of belief-formation 
(which may be dependent on the output of other belief-forming mechanisms) and 
deliberate actions which merely create the environment in which a belief-forming 
mechanism then operates. The grandson’s decision to visit his grandmother can indeed be 
modeled as an activation mechanism, but the program it activated in the actual world was 
not a belief-forming mechanism, but an action-producing mechanism which caused him 
to visit his grandmother. This action created an environment which caused a belief-
forming mechanism to activate, but this activation was caused by a separate activation 
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mechanism. If the grandson had decided to not visit his grandmother, this action would 
have created a different environment, and a different belief-forming mechanism would 
have been activated. These two different belief-forming mechanisms belong to different 
extended activation types, and so the failure of one belief-forming mechanism (believing 
that his grandmother is alive and well on the basis of the testimony of others) is irrelevant 
to the overall reliability rating of the other (believing that his grandmother is alive and 
well on the basis of the evidence of his own eyes). 
In any event, there is another possible explanation of the case of the Careless 
Math Student that does not require positing the existence of a multiple-output activation 
mechanism. Anderson’s ACT* theory of cognition provides another explanation of this 
case: It seems plausible that the phenomenon of applying an algorithm on a “whim” 
might be what it subjectively feels like when there is no ‘strong’ production available 
which could be applied to the problem at hand. The production containing the algorithm 
that Stanley did apply to the math problem was available, but was so ‘weak’ that applying 
it took an act of volition on Stanley’s part. This act of volition might subjectively appear 
to be a case of “acting on a whim.”  
If this is the case, then this would suggest that, while the belief-forming program 
which instantiates the algorithm may be well-formed, the activation conditions for the 
production are not very well formed. On this interpretation of the case, there are also no 
available preemption mechanisms that might prevent the production from activating, 
which would normally make the production more reliable. Given this, it is highly 
probable that the production containing this algorithm would be activated if Stanley were 
presented with a similar math problem for which the algorithm would not be correct. 
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And, according to this explanation, it is this alternative that is left uneliminated, not the 
possibility that Stanley could have used some other algorithm in order to solve the math 
problem that appeared in the actual world. It seems highly plausible that this 
uneliminated alternative is not just relevant for the overall reliability rating of the relevant 
belief-forming mechanism, but it is also J-relevant for Stanley. This would explain why 
Stanley does not know his answer to the math problem is correct, and would not be 
justified in believing that it is. 
 
3. The Possibility of Socially Extended Learning Mechanisms 
 A third kind of ‘strange’ and ‘fleeting’ process problem involves cognitive ‘skills’ 
that are learned as the result of external instruction, instead of self-directed learning. Two 
examples of this kind of case are as follows: 
Humperdink-Fraud: “Suppose our friend Humperdink has 
attended a series of talks on mathematics by a certain Elmer 
Fraud. These talks are not under the auspices of any 
certified educational institution, and Humperdink has been 
warned that Fraud has no credentials in mathematics. 
Humperdink hears Fraud enunciate numerous principles 
and algorithms, almost all of them defective. Nonetheless, 
being a complete novice - and a gullible one at that - 
Humperdink blindly accepts and applies them all. In one 
case, however, Fraud happens to teach a perfectly correct 
algorithm. Humperdink internalizes this one along with the 
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others, and applies it to a relevant class of problems. In 
using this algorithm to solve a problem, Humperdink gets 
the answer right and forms a true belief in the answer. This 
belief is the result of a reliable process, namely, the 
algorithm.  [...] Clearly, though, Humperdink should not be 
credited with knowledge.163  
 
Astrologer: “Consider a scientifically benighted culture, of 
ancient or medieval vintage. This culture employs certain 
highly unreliable methods for forming beliefs about the 
future and the unobserved. Their methods appeal to the 
doctrine of signatures, to astrology, and to oracles. 
Members of the culture have never thought of probability 
theory or statistics, never dreamt of anything that could be 
classed as ‘experimental method.’ Now suppose that on a 
particular occasion a member of this culture forms a belief 
about the outcome of an impending battle by using one of 
the aforementioned methods, say, by consulting zodiacal 
signs in a culturally approved fashion. Call this method M. 
Is this person’s belief justified, or warranted?”164  
 Both of these cases involve epistemic subjects that have acquired a belief-forming 
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164 Alvin Goldman, “Strong and Weak Justification,” p 51-2. See note 2. 
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mechanism through instruction. The process of acquiring a belief-forming mechanism 
through instruction could be modeled in at least two ways. First, the learning mechanism 
involved can be pictured as being completely internal to the subject’s cognitive character, 
and the instructor is only part of the environment in which this mechanism is operating. 
Secondly, the learning mechanism involved can be pictured as extending to the instructor, 
with the cognitive character of the instructor providing some parts of this socially 
extended learning mechanism. 
 I believe that it is quite clear that extended learning or ‘learning’ mechanisms do 
exist. These mechanisms are not constitutive parts of the agent’s cognitive character, but 
are capable of creating belief-forming mechanisms that are constitutive parts of the 
agent’s cognitive character.. For example, the process of evolution by natural selection is 
not a part of any single human agent’s cognitive character, but is capable of producing 
instinctive belief-forming mechanisms that are constitutive parts of the cognitive 
characters of human agents. For another example, the kinds of external ‘learning’ 
mechanisms involved in the Truetemp and Intelligent Designer cases discussed in the 
previous chapter failed to create belief-forming mechanisms that were well-integrated 
into the cognitive characters of their subjects/victims. But if the subject of such an 
external ‘learning’ mechanism went into the process fully informed, it does seem that the 
resulting belief-forming mechanism would be a well-integrated part of the subject’s 
cognitive character. (What I have in mind here would be something like a cognitive 
equivalent of Neo’s “I know kung-fu” scene from The Matrix.) 
 The question of whether skill-learning by instruction is a socially extended 
learning mechanism is closely related to the question of whether or not forming beliefs 
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based on testimony is a socially extended belief-forming mechanism. The main difference 
between the two processes is that, in order to provide their listeners with knowledge 
based on their testimony, testifiers need to possess knowledge themselves. By contrast, 
possessing a skill is neither a necessary or sufficient condition for being able to instill that 
skill in others. Instead, in procedural instruction, merely being able to distinguish 
between the successes and failures of the student is what is needed in order to be an 
effective instructor. This ability allows the instructor to provide the student with the 
Knowledge of the Result that fuels the skill-learning process. 
 In Relying on Others, Sanford Goldberg argues against Process Individualism and 
in favor of Epistemic Reliance in cases of Testimonial Knowledge. Process Individualism 
claims that “for every subject S, all of the cognitive processes implicated in the formation 
or sustainment of S’s beliefs are cognitive processes that take place within S’s own 
mind/brain.”165 Epistemic Reliance in cases of Testimonial Knowledge (ERTK) claims 
that “whether a testimonial belief amounts to testimonial knowledge depends on the 
reliability of cognitive processes implicated in the production of the testimony.”166 
 Goldberg’s main argument against Process Individualism and in favor of ERTK is 
as follows: 
First (Negative) Subargument 
1) Doxastic justification is to be understood as that 
property that renders true unGETTIERED belief 
knowledge. 
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44. 
166 Goldberg, Relying on Others, p 14. 
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2) The property in question is the (global) reliability of 
the cognitive process(es) through which a belief is 
formed and sustained. 
3) (Global) reliability in the cognitive (perceptual, 
comprehensive, and monitoring) processes internal to 
the hearer does not suffice to render true 
unGETTIERED testimonial belief knowledge. 
Therefore: 
4) (Global) reliability in the cognitive processes 
internal to the hearer does not determine the doxastic 
justification of testimonial belief. 
Second (Positive) Subargument 
5) In cases of testimonial belief, the cognitive 
processes whose (global) reliability is needed to render 
a true unGETTIERED testimonial belief knowledge 
include (not only those perceptual, comprehension, and 
monitoring processes internal to the hearer but also) 
those processes implicated in the source’s production of 
testimony. 
Therefore: 
6) In cases of testimonial belief, doxastic justification 
is a matter of the (global) reliability of a cognitive 
process-type that includes (not only those perceptual, 
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comprehension, and monitoring processes internal to 
the hearer but also) those processes implicated in the 
source’s production of testimony. 
Therefore: 
7) The cognitive process-types through which 
testimonial beliefs are formed include (not only those 
perceptual, comprehension, and monitoring processes 
internal to the hearer but also) those processes 
implicated in the source’s production of testimony.167 
Goldberg’s negative argument has three premises, 1)-3). Goldberg understands 1) 
as the basis of Alvin Goldman’s argument against Terminal Phase Reliablism and in 
favor of Historical Reliabilism. Terminal Phase Reliabilism claims that a belief amounts 
to knowledge only if the final belief-forming mechanism proximately responsible for 
forming a belief is unconditionally reliable. This claim yields implausible results in the 
case of belief-dependent belief-forming processes, such as the process of recalling stored 
beliefs from memory. This process is not unconditionally reliable, since it is only reliable 
if the beliefs that were stored are true. Goldman rejected Terminal Phase Reliabilism in 
favor of Historical Reliabilism, which claims that a belief can amount to knowledge if the 
belief-dependent process that formed it is conditionally reliable, and the processes that 
produced the beliefs that were inputted into this process are either conditionally reliable 
(if they themselves are belief-dependent) or unconditionally reliable (if they are belief-
                                                     
167 Goldberg, Relying on Others, pp 95-6. By the term ‘GETTIERED,’ Goldberg refers both to Gettier’s 
original cases and the Gettier-style cases, such as the Fake Barn Case, which have since been developed. 
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independent). 
 Goldberg explains that 2) just is a generic statement of Process Reliabilism itself, 
and should be endorsed by any reliabilist. 
 Goldberg’s defends 3) by arguing that a process reliabilist who rejects it will be 
guilty of a version of Terminal Phase Reliabilism. He does so by constructing a case 
where a true, unGETTIERED testimonial belief where all of the processes ‘internal’ to 
the hearer’s cognition are reliable, but fails to amount to knowledge. This case involves a 
testimonial belief that expresses what is in the testifier a true belief which was formed 
through a process that “was not epistemically irresponsible, [but] was not quite reliable 
enough to count as knowledge (and not for having been GETTIERED).”168 Goldberg 
calls this last property the property of being ‘not quite good enough.’ 
 I believe that it is possible to reject Goldberg’s argument on the basis of an 
ambiguity concealed in 2), and the case that Goldberg himself provides allows us to 
illustrate this ambiguity. If justificatory contextualism is true, and justificatory reliabilism 
is able to avoid the Problem of Contextual Divergence, then whether or not a process is 
“reliable” will be sensitive to conversational context, in the same way that the term 
“justified” is. In the case of testimony, the testifier and the listener may be in 
disagreement about the conversational context, perhaps without realizing it. This could 
explain why the testifier’s belief was formed through a process that was not epistemically 
irresponsible, but is still not reliable enough for the belief to amount to knowledge, and 
not because it is GETTIERED. From the point of view of the testifier, the belief is 
justified, given the conversational context. But if the listener was fully appraised of the 
                                                     
168 Goldberg, Relying on Others, p 97. 
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process which formed this belief, then from the listener’s point of view, the belief would 
be seen as unjustified, given the conversational context. 
 To give a concrete example of the kind of case Goldberg is proposing, let’s say 
that Alan and his wife Barbara are vacationing in a cabin in the woods. If a stray cat is 
rummaging through their garbage, this is of no concern. But if a bobcat begins 
rummaging through their garbage, that could be dangerous, since it would mean that a 
wild predatory animal is learning to associate humans with food.  
 In the middle of a cold winter night, Barbara hears something rummaging through 
their garbage. She nudges Alan and tells him to go check it out. Alan walks downstairs, 
and blearily looks out the window. He sees what he thinks is just a stray cat (and it 
actually is a stray cat). He stumbles back to bed (perhaps tripping over a chair on the 
way). He mutters to Barbara that it was just a stray cat. Barbara, concerned about the 
possibility that it is a bobcat, asks, “Are you sure?” Alan, more concerned about getting 
back to bed, says, “Sure,” and gets under the covers. Barbara, satisfied with this, goes 
back to sleep herself. 
 If we accept Goldberg’s stipulation, and agree that 1) Alan’s belief that it was a 
stray cat rummaging through the garbage was not epistemically irresponsible, but 2) did 
not amount to knowledge, and 3) not because Alan was GETTIERED, then it does appear 
that Barbara’s testimonial belief also does not amount to knowledge. Yet, it is not 
obvious that Barbara is GETTIERED. 
 My diagnosis of this case is that it illustrates that forming a belief based on 
testimony is not (typically, at least) a passive process. An important part of responsibly 
receiving or transmitting testimony is that the listener and the testifier should converge on 
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the same view of the conversational context (or conversational ‘score,’ to use Lewis’ 
term). And if Barbara’s belief fails to amount to knowledge, we can say that the cause of 
this failure is that Alan and Barbara failed to converge on the same view of the 
conversational context (or score). What is not clear is whether this failure is Alan’s or 
Barbara’s. If Alan is solely at fault, then Barbara is GETTIERED, since this would be 
roughly equivalent to Barbara having the bad fortune of receiving the testimony of a 
plausible liar who, through accident, happened to be telling the truth. If Barbara is solely 
at fault, then her belief is unjustified, since she was not a ‘reliable’ receiver of testimony 
in this context. But it is not clear, to me at least, which of the spouses are more at fault in 
this case, let alone that one of the spouses is solely at fault.  
This is suggested by the fact that while it is not intuitively clear that Barbara is 
GETTIERED, it is also not intuitively clear that Barbara is unjustified. Since it is 
commonly thought that knowledge just is justified true belief that is unGETTIERED, and 
Barbara’s testimonial is a true belief that fails to amount to knowledge, then it would 
appear that all possible explanations for why Barbara does not know that it was a cat that 
was rummaging through the garbage are eliminated – unless Goldberg is suggesting that 
there is a fifth condition for knowledge. I would suggest that Barbara’s belief is squarely 
on the borderline between unjustified and GETTIERED, and this explains why we have 
no clear intuitions about which state her true testimonial belief (which does not amount to 
knowledge) is in. 
While I am sympathetic to the view that testimony provides an example of a 
socially extended belief-forming mechanism, Goldberg’s case is unable to establish 
ERTK, since both ERTK and process individualism are both able to explain it. Similarly, 
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both the notion that the learning mechanism involved in procedural instruction is 
completely internal to the student and the notion the learning mechanism extends to the 
instructor can explain the Humperdink-Fraud case and the Astrologer case. In 
Humperdink-Fraud, the epistemic weakness of the beliefs Humperdink forms on Fraud’s 
precepts could be equally well explained by the fact that Humperdink is an especially 
gullible student or by the fact that Fraud is an especially incompetent teacher. Either way, 
it is quite plausible that the epistemic position of Humperdink towards these beliefs is 
weak enough that if fails to eliminate at least one J-relevant and one K-relevant 
alternative. Likewise, the relatively weak epistemic positions of the Astrologer’s 
predictions might be explained by the fact that he was born into a benighted culture, or by 
the fact that he failed to be a scientific genius, born centuries before his time.169 The 
relatively narrow set of J-relevant worlds specified by applying Lewis’ Rule of 
Conservativism to the Astrologer’s pre-scientific culture explains why we have some 
intuitive pull towards the notion that the Astrologer is justified in his predictions (even if 
these predictions do not amount to knowledge). But this social consideration is 
independent of the question of whether or not the learning mechanism that formed his 
‘skill’ is socially extended. 
 
4. Norman the Clairvoyant 
 In "Externalist Theories of Empirical Knowledge," Laurence BonJour provided a 
classic set of Strange and Fleeting Process Problem case, consisting of four alleged 
                                                     
169 The fact that the first explanation is much more plausible, along with the fact that there are non-social 
extended learning mechanisms may suggest an approach to arguing that there are socially extended 
learning mechanisms. Perhaps this approach could be extended towards an argument that testimony is a 
socially extended belief-forming mechanism. 
240 
 
counterexamples to reliabilism, all of which involved clairvoyance. In most of these 
cases, the epistemic subject had some defeater for the belief that they were clairvoyant. 
But this was not true in the fourth and final case: 
Norman the Clairvoyant: "Norman, under certain 
conditions that usually obtain, is a completely reliable 
clairvoyant with respect to certain kinds of subject matter. 
He possesses no evidence or reasons of any kind for or 
against the general possibility of such a cognitive power, or 
for or against the thesis that he possesses it. One day 
Norman comes to believe that the President is in New York 
City, though he has no evidence for or against this belief. In 
fact the belief is true and results from his clairvoyant 
power, under circumstances in which it is completely 
reliable."170 
 A common reliabilist reply to this case is that it is underspecified – that in some 
variations of this case, it does intuitively seem that Norman knows, and in others, it 
intuitively seems that Norman does not know, and that a reliabilist theory may be able to 
explain this difference.  
I would note that Norman could be compared to a patient suffering from a form of 
amnesia which destroys episodic memories but leaves procedural memories intact. Both 
intuitively and according to the epistemic theory I have developed in this dissertation, 
                                                     
170 Laurence Bonjour, "Externalist Theories of Empirical Knowledge," Midwest Studies in Philosophy, Vol. 
5, Issue 1 (1980), p 62. 
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amnesia patients do tend to have weaker epistemic positions with regard towards their 
beliefs than their neuro-typical counterparts, since the missing episodic memories provide 
pre-emption and defeater mechanisms that would normally help the belief-forming 
mechanisms contained in procedural memory to be more reliable. As a result of the 
damage to their episodic memories, amnesia patients are prone to confabulation. 
Nevertheless, the epistemic positions of amnesia patients towards many of their beliefs 
are strong enough to allow for knowledge. 
  The epistemic theory I have developed in this dissertation provides a way of 
specifying the further conditions that, if satisfied, would be sufficient conditions for 
Norman knowing. This clairvoyance could have been acquired as a result of some 
learning, selection, or design mechanism that Norman does not now recall operating. 
Perhaps Norman properly learned how to form clairvoyant beliefs (given that he exists in 
a world where clairvoyance can be a reliable belief-forming mechanism), but does not 
remember this due to amnesia. Perhaps his clairvoyance is an innate ability that was 
selected for by natural evolution, and it has just now developed. Or, perhaps Norman’s 
clairvoyance is just the result of fortunate mutation. 
 Once we have discovered the selection, learning, or design type specified by 
whatever mechanism that was responsible for Norman having clairvoyance, we may wish 
to apply the ‘splitting’ strategy discussed in the previous chapter. For example, if 
Norman’s clairvoyance is a naturally evolved ability, then all of the possible offspring his 
parents could have had belong to the same selection type as him. If we apply the 
‘splitting’ strategy, then we must eliminate all of the epistemic agents from this set of 
possible siblings that are not Norman.  
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 While the form of clairvoyance that Norman has in the actual world is reliable, 
perhaps even perfectly reliable, we should recognize that it is highly probable that the 
adaptive type defined by whatever mechanism that brought Norman’s clairvoyance into 
being is not perfectly reliable. For example, if Norman’s clairvoyance is a natural 
evolved ability, he could have been exposed to novel developmental inputs that would 
interfere with the development of this ability, perhaps yielding an unreliable belief-
forming mechanism. If this is the case, then Norman’s clairvoyance could still achieve 
reliability if it is assisted by the appropriate pre-emption and defeater systems. In 
BonJour’s original case, it is not specified whether or not Norman has these systems, but 
it is specified that they have not actually activated. 
 If all of these conditions are met, then the theory I have developed in this 
dissertation predicts that Norman’s clairvoyant beliefs are quite epistemically strong. 
From here, we must determine whether or not Norman knows. This depends on the set of 
worlds which are J-relevant and K-relevant. Lewis’ Rule of Conservativism suggests that 
if Norman’s society does not accept clairvoyance as an acceptable belief-forming 
mechanism, then Norman’s clairvoyant beliefs are unjustified (perhaps even if Norman is 
not aware of this societal disapproval). This might well suggest justificatory reliabilism is 
false, since this would be an instance of the Problem of Contextual Divergence. But since 
my theory is not committed to justificatory reliabilism, we can specify that Norman’s 
society does accept clairvoyance as an acceptable belief-forming mechanism.  
Given that our society does not accept clairvoyance as an acceptable belief-forming 
mechanism, it seems likely that we would reject the notion that Norman knows if we 
were merely informed that his beliefs were allegedly formed through clairvoyance. Even 
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if he is justified in his beliefs (given the context of his society), we would probably think 
that his clairvoyance fails to eliminate some AG-relevant world (that is, some world that 
is relevant for satisfying the anti-Gettier condition), and that his clairvoyant beliefs are 
either false or at least Gettiered. But I believe we would grant that Norman knows if we 
were informed that he had satisfied the conditions provided above. 
So, let’s say that Norman had acquired his clairvoyance through some reliable 
adaptive mechanism (despite Norman not remembering this). Furthermore, his 
clairvoyance is sensitive enough to defeat and pre-emption to achieve reliability even if 
the adaptive type defined by this mechanism is not perfectly reliable. Norman also 
belongs to a society that regards clairvoyance as acceptable belief-forming mechanism. 
There is no other reason why the failure of Norman’s clairvoyance would be a J-relevant 
or AG-relevant alternative. If all of these conditions are met, then my theory, my 
intuitions, and I hope your intuitions, dear reader, all yield the same conclusion: Norman 
knows.  
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Chapter 5 
Concluding Remarks 
 The central problem I have attempted to solve in this dissertation is the Generality 
Problem facing reliabilism – the problem of specifying the one type, out of the multitude 
of types a given belief-forming mechanism-token belongs to, which is relevant to the 
epistemic project. According to the solution I have proposed in this dissertation, the type 
a mechanism belongs to that is relevant to the epistemic project is the mechanism’s 
extended activation type. This type consists of the set of possible belief-forming control 
program or programs, or versions of these program(s), which are activated by the ‘same’ 
activation mechanism.  
While the activation mechanism itself is only responsible for activating the belief-
forming program, this belief-forming program is (at least typically) acted on by various 
learning, selection, and/or maintenance mechanisms. All of these adaptive mechanisms 
act to constrain the manner in which their target (such as the belief-forming program) can 
vary from world to world and from time-slice to time-slice. In doing so, they define 
different types that the target belongs to.  
Similarly, the activation mechanism which defines the activation type is itself 
acted on by various adaptive mechanisms (learning mechanisms, selection mechanisms, 
maintenance mechanisms, developmental programs, etc.), and these adaptive mechanisms 
define types that the activation mechanism belongs to. In turn, these adaptive 
mechanisms are often themselves the products of more fundamental adaptive 
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mechanisms, leading to a regress in which learning and selection mechanisms play a 
particularly significant role.  
This regress of adaptive mechanisms is not an infinite one. That is because certain 
adaptive mechanisms do not require a further adaptive mechanism to define their type.  A 
standard learning mechanism’s ability to adaptively modify its target is determined by the 
learning mechanism’s ability to gather Knowledge of the Result of how the target 
mechanism behaves in various trials, and its ability to appropriately modify its target in 
response to this Knowledge of the Result. Depending on the ability of the adaptive 
mechanism to shape the learning mechanism, these abilities may vary from world to 
world and from time-slice to time-slice. 
By contrast, evolution by natural selection does not literally gather Knowledge of 
the Result and use this information to modify the frequencies of traits in the population. 
Instead, the success or failure of a trait to promote the reproductive success of the 
individual organisms that possess it constitutes the modification of the frequency of the 
trait in the population. Since this is true in any system that instantiates natural selection, 
the mechanism of natural selection remains invariant across all possible worlds. Because 
of the invariant nature of natural selection, natural selection provides an example of a 
terminal adaptive mechanism that does not require a further adaptive mechanism to 
define its epistemically relevant type, and thus provides an example of an adaptive 
mechanism that can terminate the regress of adaptive mechanisms in a non-traumatic 
fashion. 
 The entire chain of adaptive mechanisms that played a role in shaping a given 
belief-forming mechanism does define a type that this mechanism belongs to. I can 
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provide two reasons to think that this type (out of the multitude of types that the belief-
forming mechanism belongs to) is the one that is relevant to the epistemic project. The 
first reason is that this model of belief-forming mechanisms provides a way of 
incorporating the entire flow of information that went into shaping the belief-forming 
mechanism – including information that the epistemic subject that possesses this 
mechanism does not have reflective access to. This model also provides a way of 
understanding ‘noise’ or ‘interference’ that may cause the mechanism to behave in an 
atypical manner. The reliability of the mechanism is determined in large part by the 
ability of the adaptive mechanisms to overcome this kind of noise or interference. 
 The second reason I can give to think that the extended activation type of a belief-
forming mechanism is the type that is epistemically relevant is simply an appeal to 
Inference to the Best Explanation: this solution to the Generality Problem tends to yield 
predictions about the epistemic statuses of beliefs that agree with our intuitions. This kind 
of argument is, of course, not deductively valid, and while it may give a good reason to 
accept its conclusion, it does not guarantee the truth of its conclusion, even if its premises 
are true. 
 As this style of argument suggests, I have taken my task in this dissertation to 
‘merely’ consist of providing a correct solution to the Generality Problem (that is, a 
solution that satisfies the various adequacy conditions and desiderata for any solution to 
the Generality Problem), and not the task of providing the correct solution to the 
Generality Problem, which would require the further step of arguing, conclusively, that 
all competing solutions to the Generality Problem are incorrect. 
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 With that in mind, I would point out that at least two of the existing proposed 
solutions to the Generality Problem I have reviewed in this dissertation remain viable 
options. While I certainly do not endorse these possible solutions, I also cannot 
conclusively rule them out at the present moment.  
The first of these two possibly viable solutions is the ‘Quick’ Solution which was 
reviewed but ultimately rejected by Juan Comesaña. This solution rejects the claim that 
reliability is a property of type of process instead of a token of a process, on the grounds 
that, while the ‘same’ token process cannot be carried out at different times in the same 
world, the ‘same’ token process can occur in different possible worlds. 
 I would make the following modification to this proposed solution to the 
Generality Problem: Instead of couching this solution in terms of ‘processes,’ it might be 
better to couch it in terms of ‘mechanisms.’ One reason I can give for this move is that a 
mechanism is something that an epistemic agent can possess and use, but a process is 
not.171 Given this move, pursuing this possible solution to the Generality Problem would 
require providing an account of what it is for two world-slices of a mechanism to be 
identical – to be the ‘same’ mechanism. In deploying my own ‘splitting’ strategy, I have 
appealed to a similar cross-world agent identity relationship, and I have granted that if 
two different outputs of the same adaptive mechanism differ very significantly, they may 
need to be considered different mechanisms, even though they are of the same adaptive 
type. As a result, I am willing to grant that it may be possible to provide an account of a 
cross-world mechanism identity relationship. However, I suspect that this task may well 
be more difficult than the task of providing a solution to the Generality Problem. 
                                                     
171 My gratitude to my colleague Andrew Moon for making this point to me. 
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Comesaña does argue that, in order for token reliability to provide an adequate 
solution to the Generality Problem, we must also select a subset of those worlds in which 
the token process exists, and see what the truth-ratio of the beliefs produced by the token 
process is in those worlds. But, as Mark Heller notes, this version of the Generality 
Problem is equivalent to the Relevant Alternatives Problem, and the various contextualist 
theories provide some hope that the Relevant Alternatives Problem can eventually be 
solved. If the proponents of the ‘Quick’ Solution can provide an adequate account of the 
cross-world mechanism identity relationship, and provide a solution to the Relevant 
Alternatives Problem, then some version of the ‘Quick’ Solution may be a viable solution 
to the Generality Problem. 
My own non-conclusive objection to the ‘Quick’ Solution to the Generality 
Problem is based on the Strange and Fleeting Process Problem. My own explanation of 
the Serendipitous Brain Lesion Case is that the alleged belief-forming program that was 
activated by the brain lesion belongs to an unreliable selection type. In the actual world, 
this program resulted in the subject believing that she had a brain lesion, but it is possible 
that it could have, instead, resulted in her believing that chirping birds were orbiting her 
head. This belief-forming program could be acted on by evolution by natural selection, 
but given how rarely this program activates, even over generational time, it seems very 
plausible that both versions of the program belong to the same unreliable selection type – 
despite the fact that the two programs may appear to belong to two very different 
‘common sense’ types of programs. 
If the cross-world mechanism identity relationship provided by a proponent of the 
‘Quick’ Solution predicts that the brain-lesion-belief program and the chirping-bird-belief 
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program are, indeed, two different mechanisms (as common sense may suggest), then this 
proponent will be unable to apply my explanation of this case. While providing an 
explanation of the Strange and Fleeting Process Problem is not an adequacy condition for 
solutions to the Generality Problem, it is an adequacy condition for reliabilistic epistemic 
theories. So, if the proponent cannot use her version of the ‘Quick’ Solution to provide an 
explanation of the Serendipitous Brain Lesion Case, her larger reliabilistic theory would 
be required to. 
I can provide a similar objection to the second possible and still viable solution to 
the Generality Problem: James R. Beebe’s Tri-Level Condition. I believe that we can 
reject Beebe’s Statistical Relevance solution to the Generality Problem, since Julien 
Dutant and Erik J. Olsson persuasively argue that this proposed solution either does not 
yield a determinate result, or else it leads to trivialization – meaning that reliability 
collapses into truth and anti-reliability collapses into falsehood.172 Furthermore, even if 
Dutant and Olsson are mistaken, Beebe would still need to show that every statistically 
relevant property of a belief-forming process or mechanism is also an epistemically 
relevant property.173 But Beebe’s Tri-Level Condition is perhaps a more plausible 
solution to the Generality Problem than even Beebe gives it credit for.  
The first hurdle that proponents of the Tri-Level Solution need to clear is the 
problem of giving more detailed accounts of the three necessary conditions for type-
membership provided by this solution. It may well be that Beebe has split the Generality 
                                                     
172 Julien Dutant and Erik J. Olsson, “Is There a Statistical Solution to the Generality Problem?,” 
Erkenntnis, Vol 78, Issue 6 (Dec 2013): p 1347-65. 
173 Julien Dutant and Erik J. Olsson, “Is There a Statistical Solution to the Generality Problem?,” 
Erkenntnis, Vol 78, Issue 6 (Dec 2013): p 1347-65. 
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Problem into three smaller problems, but it also may be the case that Beebe has 
multiplied the Problem into three equally difficult sub-problems. 
The second and perhaps more serious hurdle that needs to be cleared is, again, the 
Strange and Fleeting Process Problem. Unlike the ‘Quick’ Solution, the Tri-Level 
Solution does appear to provide a clear solution to the Serendipitous Brain Lesion Case. 
It is highly plausible that the alleged belief-forming ‘program’ involved in this case does 
not solve any information-processing problem. This, in turn, strongly suggests that the 
mechanism responsible for forming the subject’s belief that she has a brain lesion is not 
the kind of mechanism that can produce knowledge. 
While the Tri-Level Solution does provide a plausible solution to the 
Serendipitous Brain Lesion case, it still faces other Strange and Fleeting Process Problem 
cases, specifically ones where the epistemic agent is in the cognitive equivalent of the 
Verbal-Motor Stage of learning. During this phase of learning, the cognitive skill is in 
constant state of flux, and different time-slices of the ‘same’ cognitive skill may 
instantiate wildly differing algorithms. John Greco’s Careless Math Student Case appears 
to be a special case of this more general problem where the activation mechanism, rather 
than the belief-forming program itself, is still in a ‘young’ and not well-formed state. 
The problem this kind of case presents for the Tri-Level Solution is as follows: If 
the Tri-Level Solution predicts that the belief-forming mechanisms used by the Careless 
Math Student and his ‘Careful’ counterpart belong to the same epistemically relevant 
type, then the larger reliabilistic theory advocated by proponents of the Tri-Level 
Solution must provide some explanation for why the Careless Math Student is unjustified 
in believing that the result of the algorithim is the answer to the math problem, while the 
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Careful Math Student is justified in this belief. And, if the Tri-Level Solution predicts 
that the belief-forming mechanisms used by the Careless Math Student and the Careful 
Math Student belong to different epistemically relevant types, then proponents of the Tri-
Level Solution need to demonstrate that their proposed solution is not simply a re-
formulation of the Skill-based Solution. 
In addition to the task of conclusively ruling out competing solutions to the 
Generality Problem, I have also not addressed the possibility of what I have called “the 
Problem of Contextual Divergence.” This possible Problem facing justificatory 
reliabilism is suggested by Mark Heller, and (if it is, indeed, a problem) it arises because 
the terms ‘reliable,’ ‘justified,’ and ‘knows’ are all contextually-sensitive, but may 
respond to contextual pressures in different ways. This may lead to cases where a belief 
was formed by a ‘reliable’ process or mechanism but is ‘unjustified’ or does not amount 
to ‘knowledge,’ or vice versa. 
In this dissertation, I have taken an agnostic position on whether or not this 
Problem really exists. Instead, I have merely taken the liberty of preparing a fall-back 
position that reliabilism may take should justificatory reliabilism indeed prove untenable 
in the face of the Problem. I have done so by attempting to link a form of reliability that 
is context-invariant (namely, the overall reliability rating or ‘absolute’ reliability of a 
belief-forming mechanism) with an epistemic property that is similarly context-invariant 
(the epistemic ‘strength’ of the beliefs produced by that mechanism).  
As one proof-reader of this dissertation has noted, I have failed to provide 
concrete examples of the Problem of Contextual Divergence at work. I must admit that 
this failure is due, at least in part, to a reluctance on my part to do the spadework that is, 
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by all rights, the responsibility of the opponents of reliabilism. Nevertheless, I do intend 
to correct this flaw in future revisions of this manuscript. With this quarry in mind, I 
would say profitable hunting grounds may well be found in the cases that convinced 
Alvin Goldman that reliability is a necessary but insufficient condition for justification. 
(Namely, the Lying Authority and Two-Heuristics Cases.)  
A second case that I initially believed might be an example of the Problem of 
Contextual Divergence at work is a case provided by Jonathan E. Adler in his 2005 
article, "Justification (or Knowledge) as a Good Truth-Ratio,” which involves subjects 
that face asymmetrical stakes (the subjects face greater costs for certain kinds of false 
beliefs than they do for other kinds of false beliefs). However, upon reflection, I now 
believe that this case can be explained by adopting a more contextualist account of 
reliability.  
A moderately contextualist account of reliability might claim that how reliable a 
mechanism needs to be (or how good of a truth-ratio it needs to provide) in order to be 
‘reliable’ may vary according to context. However, such a moderately contextualist 
account of reliability is insufficient to explain the case provided by Adler. Instead, I 
believe that Adler’s case can be explained if we take the more radical step of claiming 
that what function the belief-forming mechanism needs to be ‘reliable’ at in order for the 
subject to be justified in applying the beliefs the mechanism produces may also vary 
according to context. If so, then Adler’s case is not an objection to justificatory 
reliabilism, so much as it is an objection to the ‘good truth-ratio’ account of reliability. 
I had originally intended to address this case in much greater detail in Chapter 4, 
but I became aware of it late enough in the writing process that time constraints 
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prevented me from doing so in this version of the present manuscript. I intend to address 
this oversight in future manuscripts. 
In addition to these potential examples of the Problem of Contextual Divergence, 
I suspect that opponents of justificatory reliabilism will develop still more potential 
examples as the implications of contextualism become more apparent in the field of 
epistemology as a whole. If so, then I wish my colleagues happy hunting – and may the 
best theory win. 
On a final note, while I do believe that the skill-based model I have developed in 
this dissertation provides an adequate explanation of how beliefs are initially formed, I 
also believe that this model does not provide an adequate explanation of how beliefs are 
deliberately applied – for example, how beliefs are asserted, or used as premises in 
practical reasoning. More work needs to be done on this front.  
Additionally, one possible implication of contextualism has been, to the best of 
my knowledge, largely ignored in the literature: it appears to me that, if contextualism is 
true, then knowledge is not the norm of belief. It is often the case that we are aware that 
our epistemic position with regards to a proposition is not sufficiently strong for 
knowledge in the present context and that we are not in a good enough position to flat-out 
assert the proposition. In such cases, we will generally say, “I believe that p, but I don’t 
know that p” or “I think that p, but I don’t know that p.” It seems to me that (while there 
may be alternative explanations of these utterances) we should take these statements at 
face value – we are admitting that we hold a belief that we ourselves recognize as failing 
to amount to knowledge. And we do not seem to be doing anything wrong in doing so. 
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The notion of a ‘norm of belief’ that is distinct from the norm of assertion does 
have the odd effect of suggesting that our concept of epistemic justification is multivocal 
– we can be justified in believing a proposition even though we would be unjustified 
(whether objectively or subjectively) in asserting that belief. But it is plausible that all 
three kinds of justification are necessary, and perhaps jointly sufficient, conditions for 
knowledge. 
Since holding a belief even after it has been challenged in conversation may 
amount to a deliberate act, understanding the ‘norm of belief’ (whatever it is) may be a 
first step in the task of constructing a model of the deliberate application of beliefs. 
Unlike the norms of assertion and practical reasoning, which (according to contextualists) 
vary from context to context, the norm of belief appears to be context-invariant. This 
suggests that a study of the norm of belief may provide insight into the norms of assertion 
and practical reasoning, even while side-stepping the ongoing debate surrounding 
contextualism.  
 An account of the norm of belief may also provide an answer to a question that 
has become more salient with the advent of the contextualist debate: Why do we humans 
even have ‘beliefs’ at all? Why are we not idealized Bayesian reasoners instead? (Such 
reasoners would not flat-out accept any hypothesis, but would merely assign hypotheses 
subjective probabilities, and use these probabilities in practical reasoning.)  
Such an account might also provide some traction for settling the question of why 
knowledge is more valuable than mere true belief. 
In this dissertation, I have proposed a solution to the Generality Problem facing 
reliabilism. I expect that I will devote some time to the process of defending this 
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proposed solution. But if this proposed solution does prove adequate, the task of 
providing an account of the norm of belief does seem to be a worthwhile goal to pursue. 
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